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Résumé: 
Le but de cette thèse est de défendre la conception hypothético-déductive de la pratique 
scientifique. Cette thèse traite de problèmes fondrunentaux concernant la formulation et la 
confirmation des hypothèses explicatives. . . 
En règle générale, les hypothèses scientifiques sont déterminées à la fois par ·les données 
empiriques disponibles et par des considérations théoriques. La première partie de la thèse traite 
des composantes du donné empirique. L'analyse d'exemples tirés de la psychologie cognitive, la 
microbiologie et l'immunologie me permet de conclure. qu'il est possible d'établir un réseau de 
corrélations expérimentales sans l'aide d'une structure interprétative surajoutée. Ce savoir pure-
ment expérimental garantit la coréférence de diversés interprétations théoriques, et, par consé-
quent, une continuité extra-théorique ou infra-théorique du savoir scientifique. 
La deuxième partie traite des composantes théoriques dans la formulation des hypothèses. 
La théorie gravitationnelle de Newton est utilisée comme étude de cas afiri d'investiguer le ho-
lisme et les problèmes qu'il pose, plus précisément en ce qui concerne les hypothèses auxiliaires 
et l'idéalisation dans leur rapport avec la confirmation, la falsification et la méthode hypothético-
déductive en général. 
Dans la troisième partie de la thèse j'explore l'interaction entre les ingrédients empiriques 
et théoriques des hypothèses scientifiques. La transition de la génétique mendélienne à la généti-
que classique, caractérisée par l'interprétation physique d'une explication conceptuelle, me per-
met de discuter certains aspects du réalisme sémantique. La transition de la génétique classique à 
la biologie moléculaire est à l'origine d'un débat sur la continuité théorique du savoir scientifi-
que; par rapport à ce débat, je conclus que l'élucidation des mécanismes moléculaires contribue 
d'une façon significative à l'explication génétique, et que, malgré la complexité du problème, il 
est possible et nécessaire de redéfinir la notion classique. de gène en termes de structures molécu-
laires. Dans le dernier chapitre, je tente de montrer comment différents modèles explicatifs peu-
vent être combinés afin de générer de nouvell~s hypothèses. . 
Mots clé: 
confirmation, épistémologie, explication, idéalisation, mécanisme, méthode hypothético-
déductive, philosophie de la biologie, philosophie des sciences 
Abstract: 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to defend and update the hypothetico-deductive ac-
count of the scientific practice. It treats of fundamental issues concerning the formulation and 
confirmation of explanatory hypotheses. 
Typically. scientific hypotheses are constrained by both available empirical data and 
more general patterns of theoretical explanation. Accordingly, Part 1 deals with empirical con-
strains on hypothesis formation. Based on study cases drawn from cognitive psychology, micro:-
biology and immunology, 1 argue that it is possible to establish a web of empirical and experi-
mental correlations in the absence of higher-Ievel theoretical interpretations. Experimental 
knowledge ensures that different theoretical interpretations can continue to corefer to the same 
body of experimental data, thereby granting an extra-theoretical continuity of scientific knowl-
edge. Aiso an attempt is made to revivify the observable theoretical distinction by analysing 
actual examples of experimental knowledge and how this knowledge constrains higher-Ievel 
theoretical interpretations in the context ofhypothetico-deductive approaches to scientific meth-
odology. 
ln Part II, 1 concentrate on the theoretical constraints shaping the formulation of scientific 
hypotheses. Newton's gravitational model is used as a study case to investigate holism and the 
problems it entails, most notably issues concerning baèkground assumptions and idealisations, in 
respect to confirmation, falsification and the hypothetico-deductive method in general. 
In Part III 1 explore the interplay between the empirical and theoretical constraints shap-
ing the development of genetic explanations. The transition from Mendelian genetics to classical' 
genetics is characterised by the physical interpretation of conceptual explanation and therefore 
pro vides an excellent opportunity for discussing issues related to semantic realism. The subse-
quent transition from classical genetics to molecular biology is at the origin of a rather heated 
debate concerning the theoretical continuity of scientific knowledge. 1 argue that the elucidation 
of the mechanisms underlying the properties of genes hypothesised by classical genetics contrib-
utes directly to the genetic explanation and that, despite the complexity, it is possible and neces-
sary to redefine the classical 'gene' in molecular terms. In the final chapter, 1 show how different 
explanatory models combine together in order to yield new hypotheses and open hew avenues of 
research. 
Keywords: 
confirmation, epistemology, explanation, hypothetico-deductive method, idealisation, mecha-
nism, philosophy ofbiology, philosophy of science 
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Introduction 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to defend and illustrate the use of the hypothetico-
deductive method in the scientific practice. It provides an. introduction to sorne of the philosophi-
cal issues concerning the formulation and confirmation of explanatory hypotheses. 
The rise of and subsequent demi se logical positivism had a most peculiar effect on con-
, ' 
temporary philosophy of science. By the end of the 19th century, the basic requirement of empiri-
cal investigation and empirical confirmation led Mach to believe that scientific theories are 
summaries of experimental data constructed for the purpose of organising data into a readily 
comprehensible format. He held that scientists should restrain from appealing to unobservables, 
and that, in the rare cases when it proved useful to introduce them, they should be allowed a 
purely instrument role. In the 1920s, logical positivists pushed matters a step further and pro-
posed a rigorous formaI programme aiming to reduce aU assertions about unobservables to asser-
tions about observables. According to positivist accounts, there are no such things as explanatory 
hypotheses. To be more precise, the semantic content of hypotheses is deemed to be completely 
determined by available empirical data, while the excess theoretical content assumes the role of a 
form whose sole purpose is to organise the empirical content. 
The positivist project failed. Three decades later, the demise of the logical positivist pro-
gramme was followed by the rise of realism about unobservables. Explanatory hypotheses postu-
lating the existence of entities, mechanisms and processes were once again reinstated - not in the 
scientific practice, which never ceased making' use, of them, but rather in philosophical accounts 
of the scientific practice. However, scientific realism didn't reign for long. The social revolutions 
of the 60s and 70s intruded philosophy of science by favouring a socio-historical understanding 
of science according to which the excess theoretical content of explanatory hypotheses is, for the 
most part, a social construction. 
Today, philosophy of science is marked by a heated debate between realists and antireal-
ists about the semantic, epistemic and ontological status of the unobservables postulated by sci-
entific explanations. Realists and antirealists disagree on whether unobservables refer to some-
thing existing outside scientific explanations or whether they are mere human constructs. With 
very few exceptions, both camps agree that unobservables are indispensable, that they transcend 
the realm of direct empirical confrrmation and that; one way or another, every statement, even a 
purely perceptual one, is theory-Iaden. Explanatory hypotheses are nowadays thought to be pri-
marily theoretical in nature, to the extent that the autonomy of the experimental practice in sci-
ence has become a notion so outlandish that nobody cares to defend it anymore in philosophical 
circles. 
As a former scientist, l firmly believe that scientific hypotheses are always constrained by 
both available empirical data and more general patterns of theoretical explanation. Empirical in-
vestigation and experimentation are just as important today as they were a century ago, if not in 
2 
physics, then at least in newly emerging sciences, such as biology and psychology. The point 1 
want to make is that philosophy of science may have changed a lot, but core scientific practice 
didn't. This is not to say that Mach was right. Quite on the contrary, 1 think that the reaction to 
positivism is justified. 1 think however it is an extreme reaction to an extreme programme. Even 
if science, as a whole, does not reduce to the experimental practice and the knowledge it gener-
ates, it is nevertheless the case that experimentation, and empirical investigation in general, have 
a weIl established place in science. Accordingly, my first concern is to reaffirm the autonomy of 
experimental knowledge. Part 1 deals with empirical constràins on hypothesis formation. An at-
tempt is made to revivify the observable - theoretical distinction by analysing examples of ex-
perimental knowledge and by showing how this knowledge constrains higher-level theoretical 
interpretations in the context of hypothetico-deductive approaches to scientific methodology. 1 
begin by arguing that the introduction and subsequent use of theoretical terms should reinain 
contingent upon the satisfaction of certain observational conditions in order to avoid a needless 
proliferation of hypotheses. In chapter 2, 1 further argue that such a requirement can also pro vide 
a means to fix reference by correlating theoretical terms to a set of laboratory procedures and 
protocols. Experimental knowledge ensures that different theoretical interpretations can continue 
to corefer to the same body of experimental data, thereby granting an extra-theoretical continuity 
of scientific knowledge. In chapter 3, 1 defend the observable - theoretical distinction against 
theory-ladenness arguments. Against social constructi6nism, 1 argue that even though sorne as-
pects of perception are relative to the empirical experience and the social background of the re-
se archer, it does not follow that access to empirical reality is exclusive1y mediated via learning 
mechanisms and that learned perception, such as categorisation, is exclusively a matter of theo-
retical interpretation. 1 also challenge the Duhemian view according to which strictly observa-
3 
tional data pertains to a lesser form of knowledge proper to younger sciences by discussing the 
example of Gram staining in microbiology. l conclude that theory-free experimenial investiga-
tion of empirical phenomena is not only possible, but also a fruitful and quite common way of 
conducting science, especially when science is motivated by pressing practical concerns. Based 
on an example from molecular research in immunology, l further show in chapter 4 that it is pos-
sible to establish art extensive web of empirical and experimental correlations in the absence of 
any significant higher-Ievel theoretical interpretation of the experiniental techniques. This shows 
that it is conceivable that experimental data posits an initial (or 'input') set of constraints on the 
formulation higher level theoretical interpretations, as opposed to only theory positing a con-
straint on the interpretation of empirical data. Given the conclusions reached in chapters 3 and 4, 
l argue in the final chapter of the section that white individual pieces of data can be interpreted in 
a variety of ways, more extensive webs of empirical and experimental correlations posit more 
stringent constraints on the number of possible interpretations consistent with data and tech- . 
niques proper to several domains of investigation. By limiting the number of possible interpreta-
tions, extensive webs of experimental data can limit the number of possible explanatory hypothe-
ses and thus give sorne weight to daims to abduction or inference to the best explanation. 
In Part II, l concentrate on the theoretical constraints shaping the formulation of scientific 
hypotheses. The underlying assumption is that hypotheses are tied down to experimental data, 
and, at the same time, they are also connected to more general patterns of explanation (which 
are, in part, responsible for the interpretation of the empirical data). Chapter 6 provides a brief 
overview of the most common accounts of explanation available in the philosophical literature: 
the deductive-nomological, the causal and causal-mechanistic, the statistical relevance, the con-
ceptual unification and the manipulationist accounts. In chapter 7, I establish a connection be-
4 
tween deductive-nomological explanations and the theory-model distinction in science. Explana-
tory models are treated as attempts to extend the domain of application of pre-existing explana-
tions, which count as theories, to new phenomena and domains of investigation. Since it is not 
always possible to derive the empiricallaws describing the target phenomenon from the laws of 
the theory alone, largue that deductive explanations must consist of 'fundamental hypotheses', 
derived from the theory, and auxiliary assumptions counting as 'model-specific hypotheses'. 
However, since model-specific hypotheses are required in order to derive the target empirical 
law from the fundarnental hypothesis, confirmation (or corroboration) becomes holistic. In the 
remaining chapters of the section, Newton's gravitational model is used as a study qase to inves-
tigate holism and the problems it entails, most notably issues concerning background assump-
tions and idealisations. In chapter 8, l provide evidence that confirmation ho li sm does not neces-
sarily entail that theories cannot be falsified. For exarnple, if the inverse square law is verified on 
an individual basis, then it would take c1assical mechanics to be wrong about planetary motion in 
order to obtain a true conjunction of the principles of c1assical mechanics as established by local 
experiments, Newton's inverse law, the right distribution of massive objects and the presence of 
frictional forces, as demonstrated by the existence of a significantly dense inter-planetary me-
dium. If such a conjunction of observations were ever shown to be true empirically, it would 
mean that the law of addition of forces holds true on Earth, but not in Heavens. Then the funda-
mental hypothesis would be explicitly and unarnbiguously falsified, classical mechanics shown 
to be false about planetary motion and, as an immediate and unavoidable consequence, all me-
chanical models for planetary motion falsified. Using a similar strategy, l argue in chapter 9 that 
sorne idealisations can be treated as 'model-consistent hypotheses', that is, as consequences de-
;0 
ductively granted by the model if certain initial conditions hold true. The end result is that in-
5 
stead of having to justifY the assumptions themselves as additional, independent propositions re~ 
quired for the derivation - and therefore external to the theory -, it is only required to justify the 
conditions under which they follow as certain limit cases of the fundamental hypotheses used to 
formulate the model. 
In Part III 1 explore the interplay between the empirical and theoretical constraint~ shap-
ing the development of genetic explanations. The notions of semantic and epistemological real-
ism are introduced in chapter 10. Instrumentalists argue that scientific theories and models serve 
solely pragmatic purposes and should not be taken literally, but rather as means to summarise 
and organise empirical data, for instance, as reliable methods or computational algorithms for 
predicting phenomena. In contrast, semantic realists believe that the entities, mechanisms and 
structures hypothesised by scientific theories and models underlie and determine the manifesta-
tion of empirical reality at the observable level. The transition from Mendelian genetics to classi-
cal genetics is characterised by the physical interpretation of conceptual explanation and there-
fore provides an excellent opportunity for discussing issues related·to semantic realism. In chap-
ter Il 1 argue that even though sorne early geneticists seem to have adopted an instrumentalist 
stance, further research in the field of genetics was motivated by adopting a realist interpretation 
of the genetic expl anati ons. The downside of instrumentalism is that, once an empirically ade-
quate description is provided, research has no logical reason to continue. In contrast, to ask 
"How genes are inherited?" or "How genes determine phenotypes?" implies that there is more to 
be said, that a 'mechanism' of sorne sort must be specified, in short, that a an instrumental or 
'black-box' use of the genetic explanation is unsatisfactory or incomplete. A realist interpretation 
of Mendel's talk about 'genetic elements' and 'alleles' made possible the chromosomal explana-
tion of linkage and recombination. The subsequent transition from classical genetics to molecu-
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lar biology is at the origin of a debate concerning the theoretical continuity of scientific knowl-
edge. In chapter 12, 1 argue that a progression towards truth can be achieved when sorne parts of 
the theory acquire an empirical significance they didn't have before. In the case ofgenetics, the 
elucidation of the mechanisms underlying the properties of genes hypothesised by dassical ge-
netics contributes to the genetic explanation by taking into account additional empirical con-
straints, such as knowledge about the chemical makeup of the genes. For example, differences in 
the chromosomal makeup of an organism correlate with differences in phenotype; furthermore, 
experiments showed that any interference with the chromosomal makeup of an organism leads to 
radical changes in phenotype. This data served at the ~ime as evidencefor the existence of 'ge-
netic elements' and as a further empirical constraint on future genetic theories: future explana-
tions must take into account the fact that the fate of genes and their ability to determine the phe-
notype is tightly linked to the fate of chromosomes. Inchapter 13,1 attempt to show that, despite 
the complexity, it is possible to redefine the dassical 'gene' in molecular terms. 
Epistemological realists believe that the inferences and justification methods employed 
by scientists are reliable and tend to yield the truth. On the antirealist end of the debate, it is ar-
gued that even if theoretical terms refer, scientists cannot legitimate1y daim that they are in the, 
possession of truth. Van Fraassen argues that talk about thé experimental properties of an object 
considered outside the experimental context responsible for rendering these properties manifest 
is bound to refer to counterfactual states of affairs, meaning that experimental data does not con-
tribute to the empirical adequacy of explanations concerning the actual state of the object. 1 ad-
dress this objection in the final chapter of my thesis by arguing that there is a variable overlap 
between 'naturally-occurring situations' and 'experimental setups' that doesn't fit very well van 
Fraassen's rigid actual-counterfactual distinction between experimental and passive observation 
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data. Furthermore, since data obtained in a particular experimental setup is typically not thought 
to contribute directly to the empirical adequacy of explanations about how a phenomenon occurs 
in natural conditions, the data obtained in the labis not used counterfactually. For example, data· 
obtained in vitro and/or on cell lines is not thought to contribute directly to the empirical ade-
quacy ofmodels about in vivo primary cells. Rather, studies on celllines contribute to the under-
standing of the functioning of the human body indirectly, by opening the possibility to formulate 
further hypotheses and more complex models. Based on an example drawn from my own re-
se arch in molecular oncology, 1 argue that different explanatory models combine together in or-
der to yield new hypotheses and open new avenues of research. Confirmation of individual mod-
els is only partial and the fact that sorne elements of the model are confirmed provides insuffi-
cient grounds for inferring that the model is true, most likely true or true to a high degree of ap-
proximation. Things change for the better when, instead of having to make a judgement about 
the truth of a single model, it becomes possible to assess the truth of a collection of models 
cross-referencing each other. Once several partially confirmed models combine together in order 
to yield new confirmed predictions, the conjunction of the models receives a higher degree of 
confirmation than each individual model. 
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PARTI 
EXPERIMENTAL CONSTRAINTS ON HVPOTHESIS FORMATION 
CHAPTERI 
THE HVPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE METHOD: 
A GENERALFRAM.EWORKFOR UNDERSTANDING SCIENTIFIC REA-
SONING 
1.1 The Hypothetico-Dedllctive lt1et!wd mu! Its lmmediate ReltltÏl:e, Ftl!sificationism 
One of the few philosophical accounts of scientific reasoning that captured the attention 
of practicing scientists is the so-called 'hypothetico-deductive method' (HD). Aiready present in 
the writings of Newton and Descartes, the account gained widespread popularity in the second 
haif to the 20th century due to the efforts of Popper, whom is usually credited for it. 
It is important however to realise that the version of the HD account endorsed by scien-
tists, that is, the version found in the introduction of most science textbooks, diverges from Pop-
per's falsificationism initially responsible for popularising the HD account in scientific circles. 
The former is officially defined as the method of proposing hypotheses and testing their accept-
ability by determining whether their logical consequences are consistent with observed data l, and 
allows, at least in principle, for induction, inference and confirmation. In contrast, the latter ac-
cepts the validity of the Humean critique of induction and explicitly refutes the notion of confir-
mation (Popper, 1959 p. 315). 
1.2 J<à/s(ficatÎonism. in Principle tlml in Practice 
Lakatos points out that falsificationism can be understood both epistemologically and 
methodologically. For the time being, 1 will concentrate on the epistemological aspect. Accord-
ing to epistemological falsificationism (Popper, 1959; 1965), a hypothesis (H) is first conjectured 
'out of nowhere' so to speak, for theories cannot be inductively inferred from experience -
! 
then observational consequences (E), counting as predictions entailed by the hypothesis are de-
rived as dictated by the standard ruies of inference (H~ E). Popper takes H to be a universal law 
or statement, that is, a general proposition from which a more particular proposition E can be de-
rived. However, since Hume' s critique of induction, it is generally acknowledged that a universal 
statement cannot be empirically justified. The problem is twofold. Not only it is impossible to 
prove the truth of a universal proposition by confirming a few cases in which the proposition 
holds true, but, quite o:ften, the domain of reference of the universal proposition is not explicitly 
defined, meaning that we can never know wh ether we covered aIl the cases subsumed under the 
universal. The same comment applies to laws and theories, the underlying reasoning being that a 
law or theory can never be proved to hold universally and cannot be shown to be true about all 
phenomena, entities or situations of a given type. 
1 Encyclopaedia Britannica defines the hypothetico-deductive rnethod as the "procedure for the construction of a 
scientific theory that will accountfor resu/ts obtained through direct observation and experimentation and that will, 
through inference, predict further effects that can then be verifled or disproved by empirical evidence derived from 
other experiments" . 
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Given this difficulty, Popper adopts a strong anti-inductivism according to which the oc-
currence of E cannot possibly prove H. Then how is scientific knowledge justified? The follow-
ing quote surnrnarises Popper's solution to the probIem: 
"[W]e seek a decision as regards these (and other) [theOl)'-] derived statements by compar-
ing them wifh the results of practical applications and experiments. If this decision is posi-
tive, that is, if the singular conclusions turn out to be acceptable, or verified, then the theory 
has, for the time being, passed its test: we have found no reason to discard il. But if the deci-
sion is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their falsifica-
tion also falsifies the theory from which they were logically deduced. 
lt should be noted that a positive decision can only temporarily support the theo'ry, for subse-
quent negative decisions may always overthrow it. So long as a theory withstands detai!ed 
and severe tests and is not superseded by another theory in the course of scientific progress, 
we may say it has 'proved ifs mettle' or tha! il is corroborated by past experience. 
Nothing resembling inductive logic appears in the procedure here outlined. 1 never assume 
tha! we can argue from the truth of singular statements to the truth of theories. 1 never as-
sume that by force of 'verified' conclusions, theories can be established as '/rue', or ever as 
merely 'probable' ". 
(1959 p. 33) 
In SUffi, if E occurs as predicted, His merely 'corroborated', allocution which simply states that 
H survived the attempts to falsify it, hence Popper' s claim that experience cannot deterrnine sci-
entific knowledge by telling us which theories are true, but only delimit it by showing which 
theories are false. 
The epistemology of falsificationism rests entirely on modus tollens: 
« p ~ Q) 1\ -.Q) 1- -.P 
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The logical schema is simple, yet this does not mean that the falsification procedure is always a 
simple operation. Granted, in principle, the falsification of a single observational consequence 
suffices to overthrow the more general statement, law or theory from which it is derived (9\E ----+ 
9\H). In practice however, given the possibility of observational errar, it is virtually never the 
case that a single falsifying instance suffices to overthrow a generallaw or theory. 
Several authors further pointed out that Popper's 'universal law ----+ basic [i.e., singu-
lar/observational] statement' strategy for deriving predictions needs to be revised. Quine and 
Grünbaum chalIenged Popper' s account on the grounds that laws of nature are non-existential 
("AlI Sare P" is to be understood along the lines "Whatever is S is also P") and therefore cannot 
deductively entail basic statements, which refer to the occurrence of specific phenomena at spe-
cifie locations in space-time. Thus understood, a universal law can imply predictions about sin-
gular phenomena only in conjunction with a set of further statements specifying 'the initial con-
ditions' or 'parameters' of the system under investigation (Wedeking, 1976). In fact, most of the 
time, predictions are not derived from the statement under test, but from a conjunction of general 
statements plus a set of 'initial conditions' plus a set of additional propositions needed for the 
derivation (Putnam, 1991). As Popper himse1f eventualIy recognized, while testing a particular 
statement, scientists must often assume that a whole set of 'background assumptions' holds true. 
Thus, although simple in princip le, in practice, falsification often turns out to be exceedingly 
complicated as there is always a worry that the falsifying/corroborating observation is mistaken, 
or that the assumed background knowledge is faulty or defective (Popper, 1976). 
Set aside these complications pertaining to the falsification procedure, which 1 will ad-
dress in the second part of this book, there are other, more immediately obvious shortcomings of 
falsificationism as a general approach to science. First, unlike most versions of BD available in 
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science textbooks, falsificationism does not allow for corroboration to function as sorne form of 
empirical justification, weaker than logical pro of, but stronger than mere 'absence of falsifica-
tion'. And second, it does not tell us how hypotheses are formed and what their relationship to 
experimental data is prior to the epistemological justification of their observational conse-
quences. The main purpose of the present chapter is to show that, in the actual scientific practice, 
induction to low-Ievel generalisations is a common procedure and that the formulation of higher-
level hypotheses is often constrained by lower-Ievel empirical generalisations and experimental 
correlations. 
1.3 The Lessons of COl!lirmationisl1l 
In order to better understand falsificationism as an epistemological thesis, it is profitable 
to contrast it with its immediate competitor, the verificationism promoted by logical empiricism. 
According to logical positivism a scientific theory is 
1) formulated in a first order mathematicallanguage comprising the five standard truth func-
tions (D, D, --+, +-t, 9\), the two standard quantifiers (IJ, 0) and an identity sign (=) required 
to express co-reference; the language comprises 
2) a logical vocabulary comprising logical constants and mathematical terms; 
3) an observational vocabulary Va whose terms refer directly to observables entities, proper-
ties, events, etc.; 
4) a theoretical vocabulary Vr; and (5) explicit definitions of Vr in terms of Va, or corre-
spondence rules (C-rules) having the form Ox(Tx +-t Ox), where T is a theoretical term (t-
14 
term) and Ox contains solely observational terms (o-terms) and logical vocabulary 
(Suppe, 1977 pp. 16-17). 
In sum, the positivist picture of scientific knowledge looks as follows: 
Theoretical 
Vocabulary (V T) 
Sentence containing 
t-terms 
Sentence containing 
t-terms 
Sentence containing 
t-terms 
C-rules (explicit 
definitions) 
Observational 
Vocabulary (V cl 
Sentence containing 
o-terms 
Sentence containing 
o-terms 
Sentence containing 
o-terms 
FigUl'c t. Veriticationism 
Theworld 
Reference 
--0 
How does this compare with HD falsificationism? Presumably, the hypothesis H intro-
duces t-terms, while the prediction E contains only o-terms. At the very least, H involves a low-
level generalisation, such as the extrapolation of an empirically observed co-variation between 
two observables for values beyond the reach of actual measurements or observations, or for mo-
ments situated in a remote past or future, etc. Since a low-level generalisation extends a corre la-
tion beyond CUITent observations and potentially trespasses into the realm of the unobservable, 
the extrapolation may be viewed as a t-term. 
Carnap's verificationism requires that all t-terms are explicitly defined via o-terms (Car-
nap, 1928). The Herm T applies to or is a property of sorne entity or phenomenon x if and only 
if, under a test condition C, x displays observable property 0 (Tx ~ (Cx ~ Ox)). For example, 
object x is said to have a certain temperature if and only if, once put in contact with a thermome-
ter, a certain change in the height of the red marker is observed. It follows from here that T (in 
this case, temperature) is equivalent and can be replaced without any loss of meaning by C ~ 0 
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(the operation whereby the temperature of the object is read from a thermometer). Verification-
ism c1early states that the meaning of t-terms is co~pletely exhausted by various explicit defini-
tions involving only o-terms. T -terms have no 'ex~ess content' and as such they are always dis-
pensable. In the end, it is best to think of them as handy abbreviations for observational asser-
tions. 
From the standpoint of the HD method, it is immediately obvious that verificationism se-
verely restricts the kind of hypotheses we can form and, as it has been acknowledged by Carnap 
himse1f (1939), it is not possible to account for the current scientific theories relying solely on 
the very narrow basis of verificationism. Consider, for example, the difference between the ac-
tuaI observational correlates {(Tl, Il), (T2, 12) ... (Tn, ln)} and the empiricallaw 1 = kT, where 1 is 
the observed length of a metal rod and T is the temperature of the rad. Not only the law extrapo-
lates the correlation for arbitrarily high or low temperatures, but it also postulates a continuous 
spectrum of temperatures which transcends the resolution of actual and currently possible meas-
urements. 
Historically, the fatal objection to verificationism stemmed from an inability to account 
for the so-called 'dispositional properties'. In reference to the above mentioned example, it has 
been argued, quite evidently with good reason, that an object has a temperature even if it is not 
measured by a thermometer and that it is possible to talk meaningfully about the temperature of 
an object independently of the experimental operation giving themeasure of temperature. This 
strongly suggests that most t-terms cannot be introduced via explicit definitions compounding 0-
terms. 
A subsequent version ofverificationism, which we may call 'confirmationism', was later 
proposed in order to account for this difficulty (Carnap, 1936). According to this revised ac-
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count, the conditions (aJO) ~ T and (aJ9\O) ~9\T tell us that T applies to all things that sat-
'isfy the condition aJO and does not apply toany ofthethings which satisfy 9\(aJ9\O). Unlike 
the explicit definition T ~ (C ~ 0), the tandem of conditionals doesn't tell us what T is, nor it 
reduces T to a measurement of T, but merely corielates T with the experimental conditional C ~ 
o (the measurement of its magnitude, for example), where the latter can be considered some-
where along the lines of an 'observational trace' of the theoretical term. To use a better suited 
example, talk about a beam of electrons (T) is justified by the presence of drop lets (0) in a con-
densation chamber following a certain experimental procedure (C); conversely, absence of drop-
lets (9\0) given the same experimental procedure (C) renders talk about electrons illegitimate. 
Since the meaning of T is not exhausted, confirmationism is compatible with semantic realism, 
that is, with the thesis that t-terms refer to ontological items beyond those justified by observa-
tional sentences (Feigl, 1950). Nevertheless, Carnap and, following him, Nagel (1950) took t-
terms and sentences containing them to be primarily instrumental, that is, devoid of any referent 
outside the theory and pertaining exclusively to the internai functioning of thé theory. A consen-
sus among logical positivists was however achieved, namely that t-terms are no longer elimi-
nable (Hempel, 1950; 1963). 
Confirmationism îs compatible with falsificationism since it allows H ~ E but not E ~ 
H. However they do differ since, under falsificationism, it is not required to justify the introduc-
tion of t-terms, but only their eventual elimination following falsification. In other words, ac-
cording to Popperian falsificationism, hypotheses are constrained exclusively at the level of the 
'output' predictions, while their 'input' introduction remains completely free of restriction. The 
natural upshot of this freedom is that, in contrast with confirmationism, which requires that the 
introduction and subsequent use of t-terms remains contingent upon the satisfaction of certain 
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observational conditions, under falsificationism, t-terms can enjoy a massive proliferation hin-
dered only by the limits of a scientist' s ability to imagine new hypotheses. The falsificationist 
strategy is therefore to give a chance to every hypothesis, no matter how far-fetched, and hope 
that among the many contenders only few will survive the constant test of falsification. 
Falsificationism and confirmationism compare as follows: 
Falsificationism 
Sentence containing 
t-terms (H) 
Confinnationism 
Sentence containing 
t-terms (H) 
Derivability 
Condition of introduction 
C(fO 
Sentence containing 
o-terms (E 1) 
Sentence containing 
o-terms (E 2) 
Sentence containing 
o-terms (E 1) 
Sentence containing 
o-terms (E 2) 
Figure 2. FalsificatiouÎsm and Confirmlltionism Complll'cd 
Theworld 
According to falsificationism, if El or E2 or both are falsified, His falsified. There are no condi-
tions constraining the introduction of H. In contrast, confirmationism allows the introduction of 
H, but only on condition that C - 0 is satisfied. Once H, which does not reduce to El, is intro-
duced, E2 can be derived. However, if C - 9\0, then H cannot be introduced and, as a con se-
quence, it becomes impossible to derive E2•2 
2 The use of Ramsey sentences (1929) may provide an increased level of flexibility. The basic idea is to con vert t-
terms, from constants, into variables. Braithwaite (1953) further proposed to introduce t-terms as properties about 
which higher level propositions are true and from which lower-Ievel propositions concerning observables can be 
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1.4 Lower-Level ('lnpuO Empirical Com;traints onH...,potlzesis Formation 
By combining confirmationism with fa1sificationism the basic structure of HD. reasoning 
is preserved while taking into account the fact that, often times, 10wer-1eve1 constraints guide the 
formulation ofhigher-level hypotheses. 
Since many theories, mode1s and exp1anations in genera1 are designed in such a way that 
they entai1 an a1ready estab1ished set of empirica11aws, it follows that many scientific hypotheses 
are from the very beginning empirically adequate in respect to sorne pre1iminary data. This posits 
a challenge to fa1sificationism. By fai1ing to distinguish between the empirica1 constraints a the-
ory satisfies by design and the further predictions which it must· entai1 for the purposes of epis-
temo10gica1 justification, one might erroneous1y conc1ude that the theory cannot be fa1sified. For 
examp1e, in Figure 2, El is empirica1 evidence incorporated in the hypothesis H, and as such 
bears no re1evance to the issue of falsification and corroboration; in contrast, E2 counts as new 
consequence entai1ed by H and can be used in order to justify the surviva1 or downfall of H. This 
revised version of HD ensures that most scientific hypotheses are empirically adequate in at 1east 
one respect. 
derived. Thus, instead of enumerating ail t-terms that fit a certain description, it is possible to create a c1ass with an 
indefinite nurnber of rnernbers which contains al! possible values x that fit the required description, sorne of which 
we can narne, sorne of which we haven't thought about yet. For exarnple, we may say that there is an x such that x 
causes drop lets to forrn in a condensation charnber following a certain experirnental procedure (El). x rnay be an 
electron, or it rnay be a proton or a great deal ofrnany other particles. This description fits rnany hypotheses. If His 
the hypothesis that x is an electron, then El (trivial) and E2 (non-trivial) follow. If E2 (say, the bearn ofparticles is 
detlected in a certain way in the presence of a rnagnetic field) is falsified, then, according to falsificationisrn, we 
have to reject H. We are then free to posit another hypothesis, yet not just any hypothesis, but one frorn which El 
can be derived. 
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CHAPTER2 
ÛPERATIONALLY DEFINED COREFERENCE 
2.1 Operationalism and Reference 
Upgrading the HD method with sorne elements of confirmationism provides a second ad-
vantage: it fixes reference. Logical positivism allows theoretical concepts to be defined opera-
tionally, that is, to be equated or correlated to a set of laboratory procedures and protocols 
(Bridgman, 1927). Many authors are quick to note that Bridgman' s operationalism was short 
lived. The approach certainly didn't live up to the philosophical expectations of verificationism, 
but to daim that it is dead is, to put it euphemistically, a bit of an overstatement. As Klee (1997 
pp. 53-54) and many other authors (Stevens, 1963; Hardcastle, 1995) point out, operationalism is 
still very much alive in psychology and, l would add, in biological sciences as weIl. 
Why is this so? Here is a quick example. In psychology, it is imperative that certain prop-
erties can be ascertained of a subject. For instance, one may daim that depressed people evaluate 
causal correlations between actions and their alleged effects more accurately than normal, un-
depressed people, who tend to overestimate their èontrol over the desired effect. This surprising 
finding is known in the psychological literature as 'depressive realism' (Dobson, et al., 1989). 
'Depressive realism' seems to support a higher level theory which establishes a link between de-
pression and cognition, thus giving a further theoretiCal meaning to the term 'depression'. Never-
theless, talk about the cognitive implications of depression is pointless if it cannot be tied down 
to sorne previous description of depression. Most notably, for any studies in this field to be reli-
able, it is absolutely essential that the subjects tested are normal or depressive the same way. 
Thus, before starting their experiments, aIl researchers must administrate the samè depression 
test to their subjects, or at very least tests that consistently yield highly similar results. 
The test measures the symptoms of depression. This is not to say that depression is what 
a depression test measures, as Boring (1923) might have put it. If this were the case, depression 
would be analytically defined as 'what a depression test measures' , and therefore unrevisable. As 
Boyd points out, this conclusion is incompatible with the fact that tests and lab protocols are 
constantly revised (Boyd, 1985); hence, a strict verificationist reading of operationalism is to be 
rejected. Confirmationism is more flexible since it merely ties down t-terms to lab protocols 
without reducing them to the latter (Carnap, 1936). On one hand, depression has many further 
implications, many of which remain quite puzzling, such as 'depressive realism'. On the other 
hand, failure to diagnose depression in a uniform manner undermines the common reference of 
various studies in this domain of investigation, since it would not be c1ear whether these studies 
refer to the same 'normal' and 'depressive' subjects. A 'soft' version of operationalism, com-
patible with confrrmationism and devoid of any anti-metaphysical ambitions, solves the problem. 
22 
2.2 Descriptil'e lllld Causlli ACcOimts of Reference 
The above use of psychological tests illustrates a fundamental aspect of scientific meth-
,. 
odology in general. Any paper published in a respectable scientific journal contains a 'Method-
ology and Protocols' section. Metaphorically, it is a finger pointing to a set of observations: 'Fol-
low this list of procedures and you shaH obtain exactly the same observable results as 1, the re-
searcher who wrote this paper, did.' It is not question of interpreting data. A machine could do 
the operations and, if the laboratory protocols used are any good, they should invariably yield the 
same observations. For example, given cells issued from the same cellline or extracted the same 
way, stimulated in the same way with the same concentrations of the same chemical, harvested 
the same way, lysed the same way, centrifuged the same way, etc., the same bands on an electro-
phoresis gel are observed. Just as in the case of a depression test, the reproducibility of a set of 
observable outputs associated with a given chain of experimental procedures guarantees corefer-
ence. 
The use of experimental protocols links to both the descriptive (Frege, 1893; Russell, 
1905; 1919; Searle, 1983) and causal accounts of reference (Kripke, 1972; 1977; Devitt, 1990). 
Before any investigation and further hypothesising takes place, the referent is fixed by a labora-
tory protocol. For example, the 'normal' (control) and 'depressive' (test) subjects are literally 
produced the same way from one experiment to the next. It is not merely question of describing 
them, but an active filtering of the physical ingredients of the experiment takes place. The 'refer-
ence-fixing' is therefore primarily causal. 
Note however that a distinction should be made between the causal links that constitute 
the experiment proper (i.e., the list of operations and their correlated observations) and the causal 
links allegedly underlying the 'natural' functioning of things, as posited by higher-1evel interpre-
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tative hypotheses. There are no grounds to further assume, as Putnam (1991) might have, that the 
test picks up 'natural kinds' and therefore succeeds in capturing sorne essential structural differ-
ence between 'normal' and 'depressed' subjects. In the context of experimentation, the subjects 
are simply 'produced' the same way during a series of experiments. The depression test is reli-
able simply because a certain number of behaviours tend to occur in an all-or-nothing pattern, 
such that the more symptoms a subject exhibits, the more likely is that he or she exhibits the 
other symptoms as weIl. The correlation of the depression syndrome with the observational re-
sults of a depression test is a typical example of an 'experimental correlation' between empirical 
data and experimental procedures (operations). Whether deeper structural differences are associ-
ated with the 'depressed' and 'normal' subjects is a matter of further investigation. Even if 'de-
pression' actually refers to such differences, it is impossible to know that a priori. The inductive 
association of these symptoms under the larger umbrella of a 'depression syndrome' is empiri-
cally accurate, yet this does not entail in any way that the symptoms necessarily share a common 
cause. 
Although necessary, a purely causal account remains insufficient for the purposes of 
large-scale experimentation. In the actual scientific practice, a description is attached to the 
causal story, namely a description of the protocol - in this particular example, of the test and the 
way in which the test is administered -, as weIl as of its results. From the standpoint of standard 
scientific practice, it is not enough that co-reference is conserved by producing subjects the same 
way. In addition, experimenters must communicate their results to a larger scientific community 
and coordinate their experiments with those of different research groups. 'Reference-borrowing' 
relies therefore on a detailed description of the 'pointing tool', in this case, the depression test. 
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Attaching a 'birth certificate' to each 'birth act' solves a number of difficulties attached 
to purely causal accounts of reference. The central idea is that an experimental protocol is able to 
physically generate or select the relevant object of study; in this sense, the protocol is causally 
linked to an object to which it points. A description is however further needed 011 al least two 
accounts: 
1) in order to establish that the protocol consistently points to objects having highly similar 
observable properties (i.e., it picks the same kind of objects); and 
2) in order to ensure that the same protocol (i.e:, the same 'pointing tool') is used every 
time? 
2.3 Referellce Illcommensurability 
Notoriously, Kuhn' s paradigm account of scientific theories supports the the sis of seman-
tic incommensurability (1970 pp. 102, 128, 149). But if the meaning of a term changes in various 
theories, how it can be ascertained that its referent is always the same? Presumably, under a new 
theoretical treatment, the same term may point to something el se (Kuhn, 1976; Sharrock, et al., 
2002). Kuhn's historicist approach joins Feyerabend's 'contextual theory of meaning', which 
daims that the meanings of scientific terms depend on the theories to which they belong (Fey-
erabend, 1962). We have just seen that, in the context of cognitive psychology, 'depression' is 
3 Note that the above account diverges from most hybrid descriptive-causal accounts available in the literature 
(Evans, 1973; 1982; Devitt, 1981; Devitt, et al., 1999; Devitt, 2004). The latter are concerned with the problem of 
, reference change and, as a rule, propose that reference-fixing is both causal and descriptive while keeping reference-
borrowing primarily causal. The aim here is to avoid problems of misrepresentation and false belief, such as those 
associated with purely causal accounts of a naturalistic or evolutionary sort. For example, fear is typically thought to 
be experienced in reference to dangerous objects, persons or situations, yet a considerable proportion of the popula-
tion fears harmless snakes. According to evolutionary explanations, the fear experienced by the subject refers to 
venomous snakes that are no longer present in the subject's natural habitat. The behavioural response refers to nasty 
snakes which used terrorise sorne remote ancestors, but the subject takes it to refer to something else, namely a 
harmless snake crawling on the asphalt (Murray, 2004). A description (i.e., an internai representation) of that to 
which fear refers helps, ifnot in avoiding feeling fear, at least in realising that the fear refers to something else than 
what triggered it. 
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about evaluating causal relationships in a certain way; in parallel, according to neurological 
models, the same term 'depression' points to a serotonin-norepinephrine imbalance (Castren, 
2005). T 0 this date, there is no available explanatory model establishing a connection between 
the levels of serotonin and the ability of subjects to evaluate contingencies. The example sug-
gests, first, that that it is impossible to reduce one theory to another; and second, that it is not at 
all clear what theories of depression refer to and, more importantly to the issue of incommensur-
ability, if they refer to the same thing. 
In relation to the realism - antirealism debate, Cartwright (1983 pp. 103-104) and Morri-
son (2000) argue that the presence of different models of the same phenomenon entails a com-
mitrnent to incoherent ontologies. The claim is that it is impossible to rationally commit to inco-
herent ontologies, and therefore the multiplicity of models must be an indication that these mod-
els have, most probably, a purely instrumental or pragmatic value. For instance, Morrison ob-
serves that 
"we use different representations for different purposes: the billiard-ball model Ès used for 
deriving the perfect-gas law, the weakly interacting attracting rigid sphere is used for the van 
der Waals equation and a model representing molecules as point centres of inverse-power 
repulsion is usedfor facilitating transport equations. [Thus,] an explanation of the behaviour 
of real gases (something the van der Waals law is designed to explain) requires many differ-
ent laws and incompatible mode/s." 
(2000 p. 49) 
2.4 Reference Contilluity "aœ.s Distinct l~f(}dels ami Theories 
Experimentally (operationally) defined reference can help solve the problem of reference 
incommensurability by dissociating it from the wider issue of semantic incommensurability 
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(Dretske, 1981; Psillos, 1999 pp. 293-300). Back to the depression example, l already noted the 
absence of a theoretical connection between cognitive psychology and neuropsychology: since it 
is not known how a neurotransmitter imbalance can affect contingency judgments (or vice 
versa), there is no theoretical connection between the two. The semantics of 'cognitive depres-
sion' seems therefore to be completely independent from the semantics of 'neurological depres-
sion'. Nevertheless, despite the blatant absence of a theoretical connection, the two usages of the 
term 'depression' definitively co-refer since the subjects used for testing both hypotheses are lit-
erally produced the same way. Without reading the 'Methodology and Protocols' section of sci-
entific papers we could have never figured that out and continued to err in the higher spheres of 
incommensurable paradigms.4 
In the case of Morrison' s example, a theoretical connection is already present: both mod-
els belong to the larger class of mechanical-kinetic models. The problem raised by Morrison 
stems, in part, from an incomplete theoretical understanding of how and why a gas like N2 be-
haves like an ideal gas at room temperature, yet tends to behave more and more like a van der 
Waals gas under high pressure and low temperature. Without further knowledge or assumptions 
about the atomic structure of nitrogen molecules, kinetic models fail to provide an explanation of 
this transition and assume the status of alternative theoretical descriptions contradicting each 
other. Nevertheless, with or without a unified explanation, the two models of the nitrogen gas co-
refer in the sense that they are both models describing the behaviour of the same chunk of matter. 
Instead ofrejecting both because their partial semantic incompatibility, co-reference ensures that 
we are equally justified in accepting both kinetic models. 
4 It is worth noting that Davidson (Davidson, 1984) challenges Kuhn's attempt to abolish the distinction between 
'the given' and 'the interpreted' precisely in relation to the issue of reference. 
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Different models reveal different aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. Their 
conjunction off ers a more complete, but not a unified account; this angle of attack is usually 
, <' ,' •• :.'. • • ,..' • 
known as 'perspectival realism' (Giere, 1999; Rueger, 2005). Note however that the 'perspectiv-
ism' 1 have in mind is limited to cases where partially confirmed models are able to explain two 
phenomena, but not the transition of these phenomena from one another. In other words, 1 con-
centrate on situations where two phenomena are or can be in direct physical continuity ,yet the 
explanatory models fail to reflect this continuity at a theoretical level. This does not inc1ude 
models issued from distinct theories, each postulating different sets of unobservables, yet aiming 
to explain the same phenomena, or again alternate mathematical formalisms equally successful 
in providing a theoretical treatment of the same body of empirical data. 
The net result is that one can accept the truth of several models without having to worry 
about theoretical continuity. The 'billiard baIl' model accounts for the behaviour of N2 at room 
temperature; the 'sticky balls' model accounts for a different phenomenon, namely the behaviour 
of N2 molecules at low temperatures combined with high pressure, and for the eventual liquefac-
tion of nitrogen. In lack of a more complete understanding of the transition between the two phe-
nomena, scientists settle down for a piecemeal understanding of one phenomenon at a time. 
Similarly, 'depressive realism' investigates an empirical correlation between the syndrome of 
depression and cognitive faculties, while neuropsychology investigates an empirical connection 
between the same syndrome of depression and serotonin levels. What is lacking is a unified un-
derstanding encompassing at the same time the empirical correlations of depression with their 
cognitive and neurological manifestations, not evidence that depression has a dual, cognitive and 
neurological correlates. 
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2.5 Cumultltb'ity witlumt Vlli/icathm 
The above considerations suggest that scientific knowledge is open to the addition of new 
co-referential models, where this multitude of models does not necessarily collapse into a unified 
model. In one of his vulgarising books on physics, Asimov makes use of a very compelling ex-
ample which illustrates this point: 
"Imagine a cone constructed of some rigid material such as steel. Ifyou hold such a cone 
point-upward. level with the eye, you will see its boundary to be triangle. Holding if in that 
orientation (point-up), you will be able to pass it through a closely-fitting triangular opening 
in a sheet of steel, but not through a circular opening of the same area. Next imagine the 
cone held point toward you al eye-Ievel. Now you see ifs boundary to be that of a clrcle. In 
that orientation if will pass through a closely-fitting circular opening in a sheet of steel, but 
not through a triangular opening of the same area. If two observers familiar with two-
dimensional plane geometry but not with three-dimensional soUd geometry, were conducting 
such experiments, one may hotly insist that the cone was triangular since it could pass 
through a triangular hole that just fit; the other might insist, just as hotly, that it was a circle, 
since it could pass through a circular hole that just fit it. They might argue thus throughout 
ail eternity and come to no conclusion. If the two observers were told that both were partly 
wrong and both partly right and that the object in question had both triangular and circular 
properties (based on two-dimensional experience) might be an outraged. 'How can an object 
be both a circle and a triangle? ' However, it is not that a cone y. a circle and a triangle, but 
that it has both circular and triangular cross sections, which means that some of its proper-
ties are like those of circles and sorne are like those of triangles." 
(1966 pp. 136-137, vol. 2) 
This fictional scenarIO is meant to provide a metaphorical understanding of the wave-
particle dual nature of electrons. It can however be used as schematic representation for a wide 
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variety of cases. Schaffner (1994) discusses a fascinating example from immunology. In the 
early 70s, on the general background of Burnet's 'clonaI expansion' theory, three mechanisms 
responsible for generating genetic diversity were proposed: the germline hypothesis, the somatic 
mutation hypothesis and the recombination hypothesis (Podolsky, et al., 1997). The initial pro-
ject aimed to establish which of them is true. It turned out that the mechanisms postulated by aIl 
three hypotheses are responsible to sorne extent for generating genetic diversity of mature B-
lymphocytes. 
Asimov' s schematic example shows that in order to provide a higher-order theory capa-
ble of yielding a conceptual model satisfying both empirical constraints - the object behaving 
both like a circle and a triangle, as determined experimentally by making the object pass through 
circular and triangular openings -, the scientists inhabiting a fictional two-dimensional space 
have to postulate the existence of a third dimension and hypothesise that the object in question is 
a cone. Yet whether or not their theoretical resourees enable them to formulate a unified tri-
dimensional mode l, the fact of the matter is that the object is, experimentaIly speaking, both cir-
cular and triangular. 
If a unified model is available, then they conceive no contradiction in asserting that the 
object behaves both ways. If it so happens that a unified model transcends their conceptual abili-
, ties, the scientists fail to conceive how the object can possibly behave both ways and are faced 
, 
with a conceptual contradiction, yet they still have no other choice but to accept the fact that the 
object behaves nevertheless both ways and that the alternative bi-dimensional descriptions de-
picting it as circular and triangular are both true. Coreference maintains and empirically justifies 
a link between two descriptions independently of whether this Hnk is further reflected at the level 
of a higher-level theoretical understanding. 
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Alternatively, assuming that the two-dimensional scientists inhabiting Asimov's fictiomll 
world can hypothesise a tri-dimensional cone-model and that they have the logical means to ar-
gue that this model is the only unified model conceivable, it still doesn't follow that the object is 
a cone. In order to show that a tri-dimensional model is true and not only empirically adequate, 
the scientists must find a way to manipulate the cone in a three-dimensional space, tilt it for ex-
ample, to make it pass through a series of openings matching various combinations of conical 
sections. Then the third dimension would be made accessible to experience, confirming, or at 
very least corroborating the cone model. On the other hand, if it so happens that the scientists 
cannot manipulate the object in the third dimension, then the cone is bound to remain a theoreti-
cal concept, a genuine unobservable that explains, but to which no empirical reality is attached.5 
Ultimately, Asimov' s example indicates that it is not always the case that knowledge, 
reason and concepts succeed in unifying the empirical datum. In the reallife, any scientist is also 
an empiricist and, as an empiricist, he or she knows when to bow in front reality and acknowl-
edge the fact that sometimes it is empirical reality which keeps together our knowledge, our rea-
son and our concepts. In the scientific practice, this 'keeping together' of knowledge by extra-
theoretical factors amounts to experimentally (or operationally) defined coreference. 
5 This last case matches van Fraassen's constructive empiricist approach (van Fraassen, 1980; 1989): the circle and 
triangle two-dimensional descriptions can be embedded in the cone tri-dimensional model, where the cone is merely 
a higher unity postulated via a theoretical unobservable, while only the circle and triangle-like behaviours are ex-
perimentallyassessable. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE OnSERV ABLE - UNOBSERV ABLE DISTINC-
TION IN THE ACTUAL EXPERIMENTALPRACTICE 
3. ] The Obsert'able-Theorelical Di.\lÎnctioll 
The above use of coreference as an argument against incommensurability is very much 
akin to Carnap's two-language approach (Carnap, 1956). On one hand, science relies on a lower-
level observationallanguage La which is essentially uninterpreted and whose vocabulary Va des-
ignates observables; this is, for example, the depression test. On the other hand, there is also a 
higher-Ievel theoretical language Lr whose descriptive vocabulary Vr consists of theoretical 
terms; the hypotheses linking depression to cognition and neurotransmitter imbalance belong to 
this second language. Correspondence rules C connect the theoretical vocabulary Vr with the ob-
servational vocabulary Va; in this particular example, depression is defined both observationally 
and theoretically in such a way that it is impossible to talk about the cognitive or neurological 
implications of depression in the absence of a symptomatic description of depression. 
Unfortunately, Carnap's approach relies on the now infamous observable-theoretical dis-
tinction. At sorne point in his illustrious philosophical career, Carnap wanted to elucidate the un-
derlying logical structure common to all scientific theories (the so-called 'language of science'). 
In order to achieve this level of universality, he relied, among other things, on a fixed observa-
tional and theoretical vocabulary, as determined by a strict criterion of observability. Briefly, a 
predîcate P stands for an observable property of object x if, under suitable circumstances and 
given an inter-subjective consensus, empirical observations suffice to distinguish between Px and 
9\Px; conversely, any predicate failing to satisfy this requirement is deemed to be theoretical 
(Carnap, 1936). 
Carnap's criterion of observability encountered numerous critiques, most ofwhich can be 
classified in two categories. One variety of objections points out that sorne t-terms are observable 
in sorne circumstances, just as sorne commonly observable properties may be unobservable if 
attributed to unobservable entities (Putnam, 1962; Maxwell, 1962). The aim here is to show that 
there is no sharp observable-theoretical distinction in an attempt to rescue realism about unob-
servables. The other class of objections aims to show that all observations are theory-Iaden and 
therefore there are no such things as observables (Duhem, 1906; Hanson, 1972; Kuhn, 1970). 
The deeper philosophical motivations underlying the latter class of objections are more diverse, 
ranging from holism to relativism and social constructionism. 
3.2 Psychological COllsiderations 
Typically, the theory-Iadenness of observation is formulated as a combination between a 
psychological thesis pertaining to the peculiarities of human perception and a thesis about the use 
of observation in science (Heidelberger, 2003)~ Hanson's Gestalt approach to categorisation and 
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object recognition is an example of the former, while Duhem's formulation of the theory-
ladenness the sis illustrates the latter. 
Hanson argues that "al! seeing is seeing as", by which he means to say that sensory data 
is already interpreted in light of previous knowledge: "Observation of x is shaped by previous 
knowledge ofx" (Hanson, 1972 p. 19). To illustrate the notion of 'top-down' processing6, we are 
asked to consider the Necker cube (1972 pp. 8-9). There are three ways in which we can 'inter-
pre!' the drawing: we can see it as a bunch of lines intersecting on a plane, as a cube seen from 
above or as a cube seen from below. The example is meant to demonstrate that there is no 
uniquely favoured 'interpretation' of perceptual observations, where the term 'interpretation' re-
fers loosely to perceptual and activities inc1uding biological conditioning, socially-imposed 
learning, representation, categorisation, recognition, inference, etc. On the basis of this quick in-
sight, Hanson defends a weak forro of perception relativism, that is, the view that what we per-
ceive varies depending on our previous experience ofreality. 
Hanson's insight is certainly in agreement with popular psychological schools, inc1uding 
Gestalt psychology, Neuro-Linguistic Programming, etc., and it is backed up by sorne research in 
cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, if Hanson is right in pointing out that whether a subject will 
recognise a drawing as belonging to a certain category is a matter of learning, especially if given 
an incomplete amount of information, the real question is whether this learning is dependent on a 
pre-existing theoretical framework. This joins a more general analysis applying to the subsequent 
examples discussed by Hanson (the young-old woman optical illusion, the recognition of an X-
ray tube, etc. (1972 pp. 11-16)). 
6 For a quick introduction to cognitive illusions and the distinction between 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' processing, 
see Richard (1997). For the social implications associated to 'top-down' processing, see Palmer (1999). For Helm-
holtz's initial insights, see Helmholtz (1866). 
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For instance, a physicist recognises an X-ray tube via a cognitive mechanism of categori-
sation while a tartar shaman fails to do so. Note however that both the shaman and the physicist 
agree whether they are looking at the same object (or drawing/picture of the object) independ-
ently of the category in which they place the object. Hanson is under the impression that such an 
agreement is impossible because the 
"influence on observations rests in the language or notation used to express what we know, and 
without which there would be little we could recognize as knowledge". 
(1972 p. 19) 
This may very weU be the case, yet, as any experimenter in the field of cognitive psychology 
knows, it is not required that the subjects de scribe the object in words; subjects can draw it, or 
simply choose among several objects the object depicted in the picture of an X-ray tube. Irre-
spective of what the shaman and the physicist think or say, their ability to pick the X-ray tube 
and its corresponding picture cIearly indicates that they just plain 'see' the X-ray tube independ-
ently ofwhat they say or think they 'see it as'? 
This indicates that the disagreement conceming the 'interpretation' of the drawing occurs 
at a further level of perceptual processing, usually pertaining to cognitive activities related to 
categorisation, while we aU agree about a lower level processing whereby the visual impressions 
are produced and become accessible to our consciousness. Typically, psychologists argue that 
categorisation is important for the purposes of decision making. Several findings indicate that 
categorisation is a constantly updated guessing strategy whereby our brains try to reconstruct 
bigger pictures from a limited number of cIues. This guessing activity is essential for survival 
since it triggers rapid decisions based on a limited amount of information, allows a rapid com-
7 Unlike Hanson, it seems that Kuhn understood the problem and tried to address it by making a distinction between 
'data' and 'stimulus' (Kuhn, et aL, 1969). Unfortunately, in his later works he reverted back to a version of original 
views by promoting the notion of a theory-driven 'taxonomy'/categorisation (Kuhn, 1977 p. 310). The present cri-
tique of Hanson's arguments from psychology also applies to Kuhn's 'taxonomical' approach. 
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munication of the essential information in a given situation, etc. It does not follow from here that 
the perceiving of the category hinders our ability to perce ive the original empirical data from 
which the category is inferred in the first place. 
This said, Hanson rightly observes that the physicist and the sharnan disagree about the 
category to which the object belongs because they have been socially trained in a very different 
way. The basic ide a underlying the argument is supported empirically. Presumably, we can show 
the shaman a series of pictures, ask him if the object he sees in the pictures is an X-ray tube, and 
then tell him if he is right or wrong. Soon enough.our sharnan will become an expert in the newly 
created field of X-ray tube recognition. This clearly indicates that categorisation is the result of 
learning. In turn, learning is impossible without a feedback. But where does the feedback cornes 
from? Certainly not our own minds. In the case of the sharnan, the feedback is artificial, but none 
the less externat. We can conclude therefore that categorisation, or what Hanson calls 'interpreta-
tion' , is not transcendental, in the Kantian sense, but remains nevertheless socially-relative. 
It seems therefore that our social upbringing, and in particular our education, can influ-
ence the way we perceive the world. Is however this socially prograrnrned 'seeing as' immune to 
the influence of what we actually see? The answer seems to be "No". It can be easily shown that 
not aIl categories are socially-relative. For instance, a physicist using an X-ray tube knows what 
she can do with it whether or not she can consistently classify pictures of X-ray tubes as belong-
ing to the 'X-ray tube' category. Unlike the sharnan, who uses visual cues, the physicist relies on 
experimental properties in order to construct a category of objects which transforrn electricity in 
X-rays. Although lirnited to the personal experience of the physicist, the category is neither arbi-
trary, nor artificially imposed. In spite of aU the social conditioning in the world, not any object 
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can be viewed as an X-ray tube: only those objects which actually convert electricity in electro-
magnetic radiation bear sorne similarity with an 'X-ray tube' exemplar or prototype. 
A similar argument can be made for other categories: even if they are socially reinforced, 
but they remain open to the influence empirical experience. Categorisation is a constantly up-
dated guessing strategy. Granted, by socially reinforcing certain categories, for instance via ag-
gressive political ideologies or shameless marketing, subjects can be mislead in 'recognising' 
something which does not exist based on an empirically inadequate association of certain cues, 
present in a situation, with other properties, not present, but postulated by the category. Never-
theless, categories are constantly revised. Whatever learning mechanism was responsible for 
forming the category in the first place doesn't cease to function. Even assuming that social train-
ing continues ad infinitum and whoever is responsible for it doesn't run out of resources, which 
by itself is a physical impossibility, at least a conflict arises between the category formed from 
experience and the one imposed via social pressure. 
Thus, even though sorne aspects of perception are relative to the empirical experience and 
the social background of the trained subject, 
1) it does not follow that our access to empirical reality is exclusively mediated via a learn-
ing mechanism; and . 
2) it does not follow that learned perception, such as categorisation, is exclusively a matter 
of theoretical interpretation. 
3.3 Higller-Lel'el Tlleoretical Interpretations 
Duhem's conception of the theory-ladenness of observation stems from a very different 
kind of considerations. Duhem remarks that scientists sel dom work with raw, theoretically un-
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interpreted experimental data. Scientists don't just perform experiments, but try to understand 
what they are doing, such that, ideally at lest, a theoretical explanation is attached to every ex-
periment al protocol, technique, instrument or operation (1906 pp. 147, 159). 
Duhem's argument is not that we have trouble observing, or just 'seeing' as Hanson 
might have put it, but rather that scientists invariably interpret their observations in light of a 
theory: 
"In the first place, [an experiment] consists in the observation of certain facts; in order to make 
this observation it sujJices for you to be attentive and alert enough with your senses. It is not 
necessary to know physics; the director of the laboratory may be less skilful in this matter of ob-
servation than the assistant. In the second place, it consists in the interpretation of the observed 
facts; in order to make this interpretation it does not sufJice to have an alert attention and prac-
ticed eye; it is necessary to know the accepted theories and to know how to apply them, in short, 
to be a physicist." 
(Duhem, 1906 p. 145) 
Evidently, Duhem does not deny the existence or possibility of strictly observational data. 
Rather, he dismisses them as a lesser form ofknowledge proper to younger sciences: 
"When many philosophers talk about experimental sciences, they think only of sciences still 
close to their origins, e.g., physiology or certain branches of chemistry where the experimenter 
reasons directly on the facts bya method which is only common sense brought to greater atten-
tiveness but where mathematical theory has not yet introduced its symbolic representation." 
(1906 p. 180) 
It seems however that the theory-Iadenness thesis is accurate solely in respect to what we 
may calI 'mature sciences' (the textbook version of science), it is reasonable to conc1ude that 
during the development of any science - physics inc1uded, since it too was a young, immature, 
predominantly experimental science at sorne point in the past - an initial body of experimental 
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data is gathered in the absence of a satisfactory theoretical explanation of the experimental meth-
odology, while a full explanation of the 'how' ofmethodology becomes available later. To give a 
banal example, anyone' can ride a bicycle without understanding how this is possible. Even more 
importantly, it is the experimental possibility of riding bikes which justifies the conservation of 
the angular momentum and not the conservation of angular momentum which justifies us riding 
bikes. Similarly, it is possible to separate proteins based on molecular weight without fully un-
derstanding how this feat is achieved. Biochemistry and molecular biology moved forward with-
out waiting for a complete physical explanation of the techniques it uses. 
Thus, while acknowledging that, as Duhem points out, a theoretical interpretation is typi-
cally attached to text-book descriptions of scientific experiments, we must also keep in mind that 
l)a theory-free, observational/experimental description of a phenomenon is also possible; 
and 
2)it is conceivable that experimental data posits an initial (or 'input') set of constraints on 
the formulation higher level theoretical interpretations, as opposed to only theory posit-
ing a constraint on the interpretation of empirical data. 
3.4 KJlowletlge in the Absellce of Il TheoretÎca/ Imerpretation: Ail Example Jrom A-ficrobi%gy 
The weIl known Gram staining technique consists in collecting a bacterial sample (Le., 
white mounds growing in a Petri dish; for the sake of brevity, 1 will skip the experimental proto-
col responsible for producing the 'white mounds' starting from patient blood, sputum, etc.), 
smearing on a glass slide, treating the sample with crystal violet, wash & dry, treat with iodine, 
wash & dry, stain with safranin and fushin, wash & dry, and, finaIly, examine under a light mi-
croscope; for a complete protocol and explanation, see Ryan and Ray (Ryan, et al., 2004). Let's 
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say untreated samples yield little black rods. Certain treated samples yield thicker purple rods, 
sorne samples yield thicker dark blue rods, while other samples yield a mixture of purple and 
blue rods. Since it is possible to tell the difference between the mixing and non-mixing of the 
sample with various recognisable reagents, experimenters know whether they subjected a sample 
to Cornot. The observational outputs are likewise distinguishable, as they involve the presence 
of purple and blue rods: 
Gram negative Gram positive 
Figure 3. GrllIn Staining 
Thus, perceptually indistinguishable input samples are correlated with different observational 
outputs when subjected to the same experimental protocoL No special theoretical knowledge is 
required in order to perform the staining. AIso, no special theoretical language is required in or-
der to describe the procedure or its observational outputs. 
The reader might be curious to find out how this technique was developed without the 
bene fit of a theoretical understanding. As a matter of fact, students who try differential staining 
for the first time often complain that it is really hard to tell the blue rods from the purple rods, 
especially if the sample is over-stained due to a sloppy technique .. It is therefore conceivable that 
Gram might have missed the difference. Yet he didn't miss it. Why is that? The answer is very 
simple. The two bacterial samples he used have different degrees of pathogeneicity in respect to 
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their ability to cause pneumonia. After Gram developed his technique, it was aiso found that the 
bacteria in question differ in their susceptibility to known antibiotics. 8 Thus, the same sampIes, 
when subjected to different experimentai treatments, are consistently associated with a variety of 
respectively different observational outputs, as summarised in the chart below: 
o = mortailly 
varies with the 
sample 
C' = anbbiotic 
C' antibiotic 
samples from two 
pneumonia patients 
treatment 0' = recovery 
~-------- varieswith the 
sample 
C"=Gram 
staining O"=colour 
varies with the 
sample 
O' = recovery 
varies with the 
sample 
Correlations of observational outputs: Gram - (red) - less virulent - susceptible to beta -lactam antibiotics 
Gram+ (blue) - more virulent - resistant to beta -lactam antibiotics 
Figure 4. ConcJations between Obscrvational Outputs and f.mpiricaJ Data 
DifferentiaI staining was perfected precisely so that anyone capable of performing a cer-
tain series of operations (inciuding a machine devoid of any capacity of understanding) can rap-
8 Interestingly, the above strategy relates to Hempel's solution to the 'raven paradox' (Hempel, 1945). In respect to 
enumerative induction, it has been observed that the fact that one particular raven is black confirms, to a small ex-
tent, the generalisation "Ail raven are blacK'. The same inductive rule can be used for 'non-ravens': the fact that a 
non-black thing is a non-raven, say a white shoe, confirms, to a small extent, the generalisation "Ali non-black 
things are non-ravens". But "Ali non-black things are non-ravens" is logically equivalent to "Ail raven are black", 
entailing the paradoxical result that a white shoe confirms the generalisation "Ali raven are blacK'. Hempel's solu-
tion to the paradox is to observe that the actual hypothesis extrapolated via induction is not "Ail raven are black", 
but rather the context-sensitive disjunctive "Everything is either a black raven or it is not a raven". In other words, 
the world is divided in three exclusive categories of objects: 'non-black ravens', 'black ravens' and 'non_ravens,; the 
first category falsifies the hypothesis while the last two confirm it. 
At sorne point in the history of microbiology, Gram applied something very similar to Hempel's solution, but in 
reverse. Ifwe would want to find out ifthere is a category of birds which are ail black, we would start collecting ail 
the birds and place them in two bins depending on whether they are black or non-black. If, at any point during the 
enumeration procedure, there is a certain type ofbirds, say birds of type 'raven" which fall ail in the 'black' bin and 
none in the 'non-back' bin (as Hempel points out, we have to check both bins in order to establish this), then we 
have reason to inductively conclude that there is a category of birds which are ail black. Similarly, in the differential 
staining example, it is not question of establishing a direct correlation between a certain colouring and virulence, but 
of establishing a correlation between a set of recurrent descriptors of the observational output. Thus, a correlation 
between 'blue staining' and enhanced virulence can be established if, within the class of ail observable patterns ob-
tainable foIlowing a certain laboratory protocol, only 'blue staining' correlates with allergy white non-'blue staining' 
patterns don't correlate with high virulence. 
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idly distinguish between more and less pathogenic pneumonia causing bacteria and administer 
the right treatment. No theoretical understanding as to why sorne bacteria stain differently from 
, . 
other bacteria is required. Not onlythe development of the staining technique was a trial and er-
ror process, but microbiologists continued to use this technique in' order to administer the proper 
antibiotic treatment long before a satisfactory explanation of the staining process was proposed. 
In other words, for almost half a century, 'Gram positive' continued to mean 'blue' and 'Gram 
negative' continued to mean 'red', where 'blue' is bad for the patient while 'red' prompts to op-
timÎsm. 
3.5 Properties of ObjectS' vs. Properties of Objects in Certaill Experimelltal C olltexts 
According to Maxwell (1962) and Hacking (1982), instrument-mediated observations al-
low for the 'indirect observation' of objects and properties of objects inaccessible to direct, per-
ceptual observation. It seems therefore that what is unobservable in one context becomes observ-
able in another and vice versa. In this sense, Maxwelllikes to argue that seeing through a win-
dow, through prescription glasses, through low power binoculars, through a lunette, and finaIly. 
through a telescope is always a matter of seeing. Epistemologically, all observations have the 
same status: they are aIl perceptual. 
Although it is correct to assume that instrument-based observations extend the empirical 
knowledge of the world, 1 don't think this demolishes the observable - unobservable distinction. 
Maxwell argues for a smooth, unproblematic continuity between direct and instrument-mediated 
observations. Note however that it is not immediately clear that the observational properties of 
instrument-mediated observations are necessarily properties of the referent of the original naked 
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eye observations. It is not my intention to deny that they are. AlI 1 am saying is that there is an 
inference at work here and that this inference requires sorne additional justification. 
The Gram staining example shows that observability is not about properties of objects, 
but of properties of objects given a certain experimental setup. The uninterpreted observational 
output of a 'differential staining & visual examination of samples under light microscope' ex-
periment is such that we can distinguish colours. The same is not true if the same samples are 
observed through an electron microscope. By contrasting the telescope observation example with 
the Gram staining example, it becomes clear that Maxwell's argument is incomplete, since he 
would most probably like to ascertain that Jupiter is as depicted by the observational output of a 
telescope observation experiment, but deny that Gram-negative bacteria are red independently of 
the technique used to observe them. 
Scientists are absolutely certain about the observability of the property P (red or not-red); 
however, they not sure whether P is a property of the object x or of object x under a certain ex-
perimental treatment. Thus, there is a subtle discontinuity between direct and instrument-
mediated observations that must be bridged by a more or less sophisticated theoretical inference.9 
9 As bonus point, confining the observability criterion to the context of a partieular experiment consisting of a series 
of operations C, C', C"', ... takes care of 'the redness of microscopie. red particles' kind of paradoxes. Maxwell 
argues that the same property Pis observable in one context, but unobservable in another context. This claim yields 
conflicting reactions, for on one hand we are really eager to agree that 'red' is an observable property of objects, 
while on the other we are reluctant to claim that the 'redness' of microscopie particles is something we can observe. 
As pointed out earlier, the solution to the paradox is quite simple: we are absolutely certain about the observability 
of the property (P or 9\P); what we are not sure about is whether P is property of the object x or of object x under a 
certain experimental treatment. 
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3.6 ]'owtlrtls a ,Hore Jtlexible Approach to the Observllble-Unob,5ervllble DislÏnctiân 
With the above comments and examples in mind, it becomes possible to establish a link 
between the observable - unobservable distinction and inferences about the sameness or differ-
ence of several objects of study given an identical experimental treatment. 
The observational outputs of experimental operations are by definition perceptually dis-
tinguishable or indistinguishable. Experiments are designed in such a way so that they yield ob-
servational outputs which fit our natural ability to distinguish, differentiate and recognise. It is 
not required to adopt Carnap's binary mode of comparison; human beings can distinguish at the 
same time between two or more sizes, colours, shapes, sounds, etc., and, as a consequence, they 
can compare at the same time two or more properties of several objects. 
The operations associated with experimental manipulation are likewise assumed to be 
distinguishable. As a general mIe, the central requirement is that the objects under investigation 
receive an identical experimental treatment; accordingly, operations are conducted in such a way 
that variability is reduced to a minimum or at very least is kept under control. The repeatability 
of the technique and the consistency of its test and control observational outputs justify the reli-
ability of the operation and offer internal criteria determining whether the operation was 'prop-
erly' executed (i.e., it does not diverge from the statistically relevant distribution of the positive 
and negative control outputs; this is usually known as 'calibration'). 
If perceptually identical objects yield distinguishable observational outputs under identi-
cal experimental contexts, then the two objects must be different and their difference is empiri-
cally justified: the difference must belong to the object itself rather than the experimental setup, 
which remains unchanged. In this case, the difference is said to be 'observable' since the two ob-
jects behave differently under identical conditions. , 
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In contrast, if the observational outputs associated with the experimental manipulation of 
two perceptually indistinguishable objects of study are identical, it is still possible to claim that 
the two objects are different (or, more rarely, that the seemingly experimental treatment they re-
ceive is different or that both the objects and the experimental treatment are different), only this 
time the differences are unobserved (Le., theoretical or hypothesised) rather than empirically jus-
tified. In this case, their distinguishability is deemed to be 'unobservable' and, as a general rule, 
further experiments are conducted until sorne distinction can be experimentally ascertained. 
Typical hypotheses include further theoretical glossing such as talk about different unobservable 
structures, mechanisms, properties, etc. 
Finally, note that the converse situation whereby an unobserved identity of objects is hy-
pothesised despite a consistently repeatable empirical distinguishability under identical experi-
mental treatment is deemed to be logically inconsistent with the fact that the two objects have 
different experimental properties. 
We are now in position to make a couple of important points about the observable-
unobservable distinction: 
1) Against Carnap's and Maxwell's conceptions alike, the distinction, as drawn in the 
experimental practice, doesn't necessarily have something to do with the properties of 
an object (e.g.: the redness of red cells, where 'red' is deemed to be observable no 
matter what), but rather with a comparison of objects based on a comparison of their 
experimental properties (the redness of the Gram stained samples should be distin-
guished from the redness of the bacteria, the former being an empirical property of 
the experimentally manipulated object while the latter is a theoretically hypothesised 
property of the object). 
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2) The distinction does not entail that every property belongs to either the observational 
part (Va) or the theoretical part (Vr) of the scientific vocabulary; rather it is question 
here of perceptual distinguishability (e.g.: it is not question of deciding whether 'red', 
as a property of an object or of the observational output of an experiment, is observ-
able, but only whether 'red' is distinguishable from other properties, such as 'blue') 
3) The distinction marks the border between knowledge about the behaviour of various 
objects in various experimental setups (e.g.: empirical correlations between bacterial 
samples and various observational outputs) and hypotheses about the objects them-
selves (the bacteria are structurally different). 
4) It asymmetrically justifies the jump from experimental knowledge to hypotheses 
about the structure of the studied objects: we are empirically justified to conclude that 
two objects (usually perceptually indistinguishable, such as the sputum sampi es from 
two patients) are different given their differential behaviour under identical experi-
mental treatment; the same distinction becomes unobservable (or theoretical) the 
moment it hypothesises differences in the objects despite identical behaviour under 
identical experimental treatment. 
5) The justification of the distinguishability of objects given their differential experi-
mental behaviour relies on consistent repeatability; if two objects consistently display 
a differential behaviour in a variety of experimental setups despite the best efforts to 
provide a uniform experimental treatment, experimenters infer that the differences are 
due to the objects themselves; such low-level inductions yield predictions open to 
verification (e.g.: blue-stained sampi es predlct antibiotic resistance). 
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6) The distinction does not require that the differences introduced by theoretical hy-
potheses remain forever unjustified empirically (i.e., unobservable), but it does state 
that they are not justified by and therefore transcend our current empirical and ex-
perimental knowledge. 
3.7 COllcluding Remarks 
The above characterisation refers explicitly to the early stages of experimentation, pre-
ceding theory formation, and may not apply to experiments designed to test models or theories 
(the so-called 'crucial experiments'). In line with this disclaimer, note also that this characterisa-
tion fits common patterns of experimentation in biology and psychology, which are relatively 
. 'young' sciences. It seems however reasonable to conclude that early experiments in physics and 
chemistry obeyed a similar pattern. For instance, it can be easily shown that the initial experi-
mental knowle,dge behind the functioning of devices such as ammeters, voltmeters ohmmeters 
and galvanometers relied on a web of empirical correlations between the various observational 
properties of an electric source rather than on a consistent theoretical interpretation. The same 
goes for the acid-base distinction and the classification of elements in chemistry. 
Ultimately, the initial stages in experimentation amount to something along the lines 
"Keep doing something to two indistinguishable objects until you disco ver a difference in their 
behaviour". Thus, in an initially theory-free context, experimentation is nothing else than a sys-
tematic endeavour to uncover the potential (or 'thus far hidden') empirical properties of objects. 
This change in the premises of the problem entails a divergence from Carnap's formula-
tion of the observable/unobservable distinction. We are no longer cQncerned with providing a 
database of observable properties (the needle of a voltmeter, the height of the red marker in a 
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thermometer, etc.), but with the issue ofperceptual distinguishability: perceptually indistinguish-
able samples, objects, properties, events, situations, etc. are differentiated on the basis of their 
perceptually distinguishable behaviour (different positions of the needle, different heights of the 
red marker, different band patterns, etc.) under identical experimental treatment. While the ob-
servability of properties changes with the epistemological status of the objects possessing them, 
perceptual distinguishability is dependent solely on the functioning of senseorgans. In as much 
as these organs are identical for ail the members of the species, perceptual distinguishability is 
also bound to remain constant for all human observers. 
Once the description of objects in terms of observable properties is replaced by compari-
sons of objects in terms of experimentally-produced distinguishability, it becomes possible to 
retain a stable distinction between purely experimental knowledge and further theoretical inter-
pretations. As discussed previously, this distinction is needed in order to make possible corefer-
ence and thus overcome the problem of reference incommensurability. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
4.1 Tlle Historical Dellelopmellt of Scielltific Knowletlge 
The two main ingredients of a scientific theory are experimental data and theoretical hy-
potheses. Regrettably, logical positivism overemphasised the former at the expense of the latter, 
while post-positivist philosophy of science tends to do just the opposite. Hoping to restore the 
balance, l showed in the previous section how the distinction between observables, or experi-
mental data, and unobservables, or higher level theoretical hypotheses, is drawn in the experi-
mental practice. 
Once we begin to realise that it is possible to gain experimental knowledge preceding any 
theoretical interpretation, we can envisage the possibility that the former can impose constraints 
on the formulation of the latter. This order of determination is required in order to justify the use 
of a wide array of reasoning strategies, including inference to an explanation, devising empiri-
cally adequate theoretical explanations, and establishing a criterion for distinguishing between 
'good' and 'bad' science. 
As the reader may have notice d, science textbooks rarely mention the painful tribulations 
of experimenters and the timid correlations drawn without the guiding light of a suitable theo-
retical interpretation, just as they seldom mention the immense technological payoffs of these 
tribulations. Instead, they provide detailed explanations telling us why what scientists do or have 
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been doing for a long time works. What matters for a typical science textbook is a concise, well 
rounded and consistent theoretical treatment subsuming a handful of key pieces of empirical 
data. What doesn't matter is how scientists acquired the knowledge they c1aim to have. Vulgari-
sation books, especially if bent on a historical perspective, might touch sorne details, yet not too 
many and certainly not too systematically, for a thoroughgoing description would soon bore the 
reader. Rather, a great deal of importance is given to obsolete interpretations initially proposed 
and eventually abandoned in favour of other, more adequate interpretations. This sequence of 
hypotheses adds a bit of suspense and excitement bringing science vulgarisation literature c10ser 
to their more successful competitors, the police investigation and espionage thrillers. 
l make these remarks with a purpose. The material covered in this section is neither a 
technical elaboration of textbook material, nor a more detailed historiography of science, but 
something complementary to both: it presents a chunk of pure experimental knowledge, that is, it 
exposes that portion of knowledge which remains unchanged throughout the series of interpreta-
tions enumerated by the historians of science up to the current interpretation covered by contem-
porary science textbooks. 
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4.2 IHL'âng Direct ObserWltions and Unintel1)J'eted 
Experimental Data: Ail Exmnplefrom Immunology 
The example 1 want to discuss cornes from immunology and was originally introduced by 
Klee (1997 p. 34). As the reader may already know, antibodies (immunoglobulins) are responsi-
ble for humoral immunity. The antibodies are proteins found in blood and on mucosal surfaces, 
where they bind antigens such as allergens or proteins on the surface of bacteria and viruses, 
cross-linking them in order to form heavier, insoluble and hopefully biologically inert aggregates 
or marking them for digestion by macrophages and other cells involved in the defence against 
parasitic organisms. One of the key elements responsible for elucidating the functioning of hu-
moral immunity pertains to knowledge about the structure of antibodies. In particular, it was 
found that each antibody comprises two binding (F ab) domains, capable of preserving the antigen' 
binding specificity of the whole antibody protein, while the rest of the antibody (Fe), which does 
not interact with the antigen, is responsible for the formation of precipitates or is recognised by 
immune cells. The schematic representation below may be of sorne help: 
Antigen 
binding site Antigen 
Figure 5. Molecular Structure of Antibodies 
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Suppose now that we go back to a moment in time where immunologists didn't know any 
of these structural details yet. By analogy with Mendel' s 'long-shot' hypothesising of alleles and 
their segregation as an attempt to explain certain features of sexual reproduction, we can simplify 
matters and state that immunologists eventually hypothesised the existence of bio-molecules 
having a particular geometrical structure in order to explain the phenomenon of humoral immu-
nity phenomena as evidenced by passive immunity, immunisation with inactive pathogen, etc. 
The empirical constraints imposed onto Mendel's genetic theory consist of direct obser-
vations about the relative proportions of various phenotypic traits across several generations. The 
the ory had to be empirically adequate in respect to this body of empirical data describing sexual 
reproduction in order to constitute a scientifically valid hypothesis about the phenomenon of 
sexual reproduction. Thus, in agreement with confirmationism, the introduction of theoretical 
terms is conditional upon entailing at least one empirical feature of the explained phenomenon. 
However, in the case of immunology, there is a complication to be taken into account. 
The empirical data used by Mendel had the bene fit of not needing any further interpretation. 
Shortly put, the statement "25% of the offspring are pea plants bearing yellow bridled fruits" 
means that 25% of the offspring are pea plants bearing yellow bridled fruits. The empirical con-
straints imposed onto the antibody-model of humoral immunity posit a further challenge, as they 
consist of experimental data in addition to direct sense observations. As discussed previously, the 
properties of observational outputs produced via the experimental treatment of objects cannot be 
automatically considered as equivalent to the directly perceived properties of the objects in ques-
tion without running into problems. In order to convert the properties of observational outputs 
into properties of objects themselves a theoretical interpretation of the experimental techniques is 
required. 
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Does this mean that the empirical adequacy constraints imposed onto the antibody-model 
of humoral immunity are bound to be theory-Iaden? Not at aIl. For as long as experimenters 
don't make the mistake of confusing the properties of an observational output with properties of 
the studied objects, and understand that experimental data asserts properties something about the 
studied objects only in light of a further inference, they are free to mix observational and ex-
perimental data without having to endorse any theoretical interpretation of the experimental 
techniques used. Contrary to Duhem's expectations, scientists are not required to assume an un-
derstanding of the techniques used to investigate a phenomenon before they can hypothesise an 
explanation of that phenomenon. Scientists can also first attempt a holistic explanation of the 
sum total of direct observational data and experimental data, and then cross-reference this expla-
nation with other explanations making use of data gathered via the same techniques in order to 
divide it into an explanation of humoral immunity and a theoretical interpretation of the experi-
mental techniques. 
In order to understand this approach, let us consider sorne typical experiments in immu-
nology. As pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, it is not my intention to follow the his-
torical development of immunology [for a thoroughly documented history of immunology see 
(Silverstein, 1989)]. Rather, l want to show by means of a simplified exarnple an exarnple 
roughly mirroring the historical sequence of sorne key discoveries in the field of immunology -
how an interpretation of experimental data emerges from the overall explanation of a body of 
empirical data consisting ofboth direct observations and experimental outputs. 
First there is weIl defined body of directly accessible data. For instance, the initial anti-
body sarnple is, at the origin, serum extracted from the blood of an animal, say a rabbit, exposed 
to an antigen. The antigen is knoVvTI, readily available and chemically characterised. Positive and 
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negative control sera have different biological properties. For instance, if the antigen is an aller-
gen, then whenever injected to a test animal, it causes an observable allergie reaction. Yet if the 
same antigen is mixed with the serum derived from an animal already exposed to the antigen be-
fore being injected, no allergie reaction follows. The negative control sera don't have this prop-
erty. The biological/immunological properties constitute an operational description of the initial 
antibody sample. In terms of low-Ievel inferences, immunologists can furtherestablish that 
something in the blood of the sensitised animal is responsible for 'neutralising' the effects of the 
antigen; they know it is not a ceIl, since ceUs have been filtered out and are no longer observable 
in the serum. 
Next cornes a relatively large body of experiniental data further extending the network of 
already available observational data. A brief description and interpretation of each technique is 
given in parentheses for reference purposes. Note that just as in the case of Gram staining, the 
experimental techniques mentioned here were used before a satisfactory theoretical understand-
ing of the physics and chemistry underlying their functioning was hypothesised; in fact, even if a 
general explanation is available today, the precise mechanism behind most techniques is still un-
certain. 
Here is sorne of the biochemical analysis data. If purified antibodies is digested with pa-
pain (an enzyme which cleaves proteins in several pieces; operation Cl in the figure below) and 
subject the digested antibodies to gel electrophoresis (C2; typically SDS-PAGE, that is, a tech-
nique whereby denatured or partially denatured proteins acquire a negative charge and are then 
separated by molecular weight while traversing a gel medium under the influence of an electric 
cUITent; proteins having different molecular weights travel different distances through the gel; 
bands are visualised by staining the gel with a chemical dye), a certain pattern of bands is ob-
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served on the gel (see 02 below). The electrophoresis procedure ensures that the antibodies were 
successfully digested by papain since a certain smearing of the blobs observed for digested anti-
bodies will not be observed when whole antibodies are used. If the relevant pattern of bands is 
observed, researchers can proceed and purify the rest of the papain treated mixture by means of 
sorne form of chromatography (Cj; a technique whereby mixtures are separated based on their 
molecular weight or binding affinity for the stationary medium which they traverse) in order to 
separate the various fragments and use them for further study. A certain observational output 
(Oj) is associated with Cj. The purified fractions can be subjected to a variety of chemical and 
immunological assays. For instance, during C4 the various fractions purified in Cj are mixed with 
antigen and subjected to a version of the electrophoresis operation described in step C2 in order 
to yield an observational output 0 4 (commonly, co-iommunoprecipitation followed by SDS-
PAGE is used, but for the purposes of this example we can suppose that the antigen is a short 
DNA sequence, in which case EMSA would do just fine). 
The figure below summarises these four steps of the molecular analysis, providing a 
schematic, but fairly descriptive rendering of the observable outputs, together with the standard 
interpretation of each technique used [more details on the theoretical understanding of the sepa-
ration and purification techniques mentioned here can be found in (Tinoco, et al., 1995)]: 
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The observational outputs O2-04 further correlate with immunological assays. After con-
necting observational data with experimental data, researchers are free to return back to observa-
tional data. For example, they can test the chromatography fractions and see if it the latter have 
the same biological property as the initial serum sample. Usually, they don't. On the other hand, 
chromatography purified undigested antibody always does preserve the biological properties of 
the initial serum sample, indicating that the loss of function is not due to the chromatography 
procedure. Curiously enough, if the original antibody is digested with pepsin rather than papain 
while retaining the rest of the protocol, the four observational correlates described above are very 
similar, with the difference that the Fab fraction retains the antigen blocking activity and migrates 
at a slower speed during electrophoresis. The fractions collected on step C3 can also be subjected 
to chemical analysis, which will further enlarge the web of correlations between operations, ob-
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servational outputs, biological properties and chemical properties. More complicated experi-
ments can likewise be conducted. For instance, if papain-treated antibodies are mixed with the 
antigen prior to adding the whole antibody or the pepsin-treated antibody, the animal still devel-
ops an allergy. And so on and so forth. 
There is no immediately evident limit to the extent experimental knowledge can take. 
New experiments can add on the top of previous experiments yielding a huge database of unin-
terpreted or partially interpreted data. It is quite probable that the extent of actual experimental 
correlations roughly determines the initial boundaries of various sciences and domains of inves-
tigations. Higher-Ievel hypotheses explain a phenomenon as described by networks of empirical 
data such that, prior to eventual inter-theoretical reductions and unifications, their empirical ade-
quacy and explanatory power does not transcend the boundaries of the initial empirical descrip-
tion. In the context of this example, we can see how immunology overlaps with biochemistry, 
while it usually fails to invade the do main of psychology given the absence of stable correlations 
between psychological traits and immunological properties. 
4.3 Lower-Lel'ellnductive (Non-Intetpretatil'e) b~/'erellceS' 
Experimental knowledge relies on a subtle web of low-Ievel inductions linking operations 
and observations. Each inductive generalisation, usually amounting to the mode st extension from 
one experiment to the next, counts as a mini-hypothesis. The beauty of experimentation is that 
there is no holistic semantics to worry about. The basic requirement is that C should be perceptu-
ally distinguishable from 9\C and 0 from 9\0. Once thisrequirement is satisfied, each operation 
(C) and each observational term (0) is independent of other operations and observational terms. 
Thus, each inductive hypothesis (C ~ 0) is independent of similar hypotheses concerning other 
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correlations (in the example from immunology, 02 does not follow as a matter of definition from 
C2, just as Cr~ 03 does not follow a priori from Cr'" 02; rather, each material implication are 
the resuIt of an induction generalising over a finite number ofrepetitions). 
These 'baby step' hypotheses remain very close to the initial data and the strength of each 
correlative association is revised on an individual basis. Even though they are deemed non-
threatening for empiricism and empirical justification, it is important to realise that they retain an 
inferential character whereby something substantial is posited, namely 
1) the existence of an 'object' or 'substance-like' entity consisting of 'potential properties' 
existing independently of the experimental treatment which renders them actually ob-
servable; and 
2) different objects given different observational behaviour under identical experimental 
treatment. 
Carnap initially supported the idea that there is no object beyond its perceptual and ex-
perimental properties (Carnap, 1928). Nevertheless, a minimal object must be posited in order to 
account for the reproducibility of experiments. For instance, a Gram-positive result reliably pre-
dicts penicillin-susceptibility before the latter actually manifests. The reliability of such low-
level inductive generalisations - generalisations which concentrate most of the technological and 
practical worth of experimental knowledge - indicates that whether or not we test for certain ex-
perimental properties, and therefore whether or not these properties are actually made empiri-
cally manifest by means of an experimental technique, they are 'potentially' there at least in the 
sense that the expectation to find them there is always confirrned. The old problem of disposi-
tional properties resurfaces again, and it seems the only way out is to make place for an object, or 
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'substance' made of latent properties which become manifest only under specifie experimental 
treatments. 
The second kind of inferences relies on the premise that two observable phenomena can-
not be identical at the level of their unobservable structure if they have different experimental 
properties. Although this principle does not hold true if applied to the entities postulated by 
probabilistic, statistic and stochastic models, it seems to be always taken for granted when deal-
ing with observable phenomena. In other words, scientists don't hypothesise different undedying 
structures for objects that are perceptually and experimentally indistinguishable. To do so would 
be tantamount to recognising that sorne unobservables are by definition bound to remain forever 
unobservable no matter how far we push experimentation and empirical investigation. ID 
4.4 "Navigating By the Instruments '.' 
In the immunology example discussed previously, if the papain digestion (Cl) - electro-
phoresis protocol (C2) yields a certain observed pattern of bands on the gel (02), this further cor-
relates with a certain number of purified fractions (03) subsequently obtained following chroma-
tography (C3); conversely, failure to obtain O2 following CI -2 correlates with a failure to obtain 
0 3 following C3• The same applies to the Cr 0 4 tandem in respect to the previous C3-03 tandem. 
The whole chain must be satisfied ifresearchers are eventually to obtain the Fab. 
Thus, Carnap's tandem of conditionals ((OJO) ---+ T and (OJ9\O) ---+ 9\1) usually maps 
onto what experimenters call the 'positive' (C ---+ 0) and the 'negative' (C ---+ 9\0) controls. The 
idea is that if C ---+ 0 is not satisfied (e.g., a specifie pattern of bands is not observed), chroma-
10 This said, it might be worth noting that the objects and their differences are not immutable givens, but constantly 
revised hypotheses updated as required by the addition ofnew correlations and the eventual demise of older ones. 
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tography separation will not yield the same fractions. Most importantly, separation will not yield 
a F ab fraction which preserves the biding specificity of the original antibodies and which contains 
twice as many individual proteins than the original sample of antibodies. Thus, it makes sense to 
talk about Fab and their properties in reference to the positive control, but not in reference to the 
negative côntroi. 
This analysis prec1udes a possible misconception. It might be argued that experimental 
protocols are complicated procedures pointing to or picking up sorne arbitrary category such as 
'three-Iegged cats with green eyes', or, in this particular case, 'papain treated sera described by 
certain electrophoresis patterns and chromatography fractions'. The 'Fab production protocol' 
differs from 'three-legged cat with green-eye' criterial filter in at least one important aspect: it 
compares pairs of 'positive' l'test' and 'negative' control descriptions. The same serum sample 
containing purified antibodies is divided in two halves. Half is digested with papain, the other 
half is not; then, both are subjected to the same series of operations inc1uding electrophoresis, 
chromatography and binding analysis. This establishes that the observational differences be- i 
tween the positive and negative controis correlate with the presence or absence of a particular 
operation, in this case, the mixing of serum with papain. In particular, this means that researchers 
cannot physically obtain the Fab fraction following chromatography and study it afterwards with-
out having previously subjected the sample to papain digestion. Conversely, researchers can 
gather a whole database of, say, gel pictures (02 in the figure above) whereby they note that di-
gested samples of purified antibodies or other proteins display a similar 'smearing' pattern. This 
induction allows them to infer that, given the observed pattern, the sample might have been sub-
jected to papain (or sorne other enzyme) digestion. There is no such knowledge of experimental 
causes associated with mere criterial filters. 
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True enough, from a strictly operationalist point of view, most of the molecular analysis 
serves the sole purpose of producing 'observational traces' correlating band patterns with other 
pieces of experimental knowledge concerning various allergy and immune reaction assays. This 
is especially true about steps C2 and C4, which rely on physical techniques of separation during 
which the samples are trapped in the gel and cannot be used for further biological or chemical 
assays. Without further knowledge or assumptions, interpreting the observational outputs of 
the se operations remains impossible. Nevertheless, these outputs systematically correlate with 
different operations such as 'papain-treatment' and 'pepsin-treatment', thus allowing the experi-
menter to literally navigate by the instruments in order to achieve the desired results in the ab-
sence of any systematic interpretation of the experimental techniques. 
4.5 Higlter-Levellnterpretative IIJ1Jotheses 
The positivists and logical positivists were so impressed with the potentially unlimited 
expansion of purely experimental knowledge and its ability to generate practical applications in-
dependently of any overarching theoretical interpretation that they begun flirting with the ide a 
that, set aside the requirement of low-Ievel inductions, scientists might not need theoretical hy-
potheses after aIl. The project failed on two accounts. First, it disagrees with the actual scientific 
practice. And second, the moment the positivists tried to translate theoretical interpretations in 
terms of experimental knowledge, they were suddenly left with an unaccounted excess of infor-
mation. Carnap's tribulations from meaning verificationism to confirmationism illustrate the 
problem quite convincingly. 
When it cornes to the interpretation of experimental data, two approaches can be envi-
sioned. The first one is a Duhemian piecemeal interpretation whereby scientists propose an inter-
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pretation for each operation C in relation to observation 0, and, given this interpretation, try to 
infer something about the phenomena under study. The alternative is to propose an interpretation 
consistent with an explanatory hypothesis about the phenomenon under study. Under the first 
approach, the interpretation of experimental data precedes and is independent of the further hy-
potheses about the nature of the phenomena under study. Under the second approach, the theo-
retical interpretation is a corollary of the explanatory hypothesis (i.e., if this hypothesis is true, 
then this particular interpretation of the experimental data must also be true). 
ln reference to the example from immunology, it is quite obvious by now that there is a 
gap between the experimental knowledge exposed so far and knowledge about antibodies being 
Y-shaped proteins. In order to breach the gap, scientists had to abandon the safety of low-Ievel 
inductions and conjecture much bolder hypotheses. The Duhemian approach amounts to the hy-
pothesising of a mechanism for each biochemical analysis technique, and assuming this interpre-
tation is correct, infer that the original sample is composed of whole macromolecules while sub-
sequent operations are concerned with parts of these macromolecules. Ironically, Duhem advo-
cated confirmation holism while arguing that scientists must provide a piece-by-piece interpreta-
tion of experimental data before hypothesising an explanation of a phenomenon. Note also that 
the nature of the interpretation determines, or at very least constrains, the nature of the explana-
tory hypotheses. 
The alternative approach is largely ignored in philosophical circles, so 1 will spend more 
time elaborating it. The idea is to start by hypothesising an explanation and, given this explana-
tion, infer an interpretation consistent with it. Let us suppose that antibodies bind specifie anti-
gens and that papain and pep sin treatment cuts the antibodies in several pieces. It becomes now 
possible to further hypothesise that different pieces migrate at different speeds during electropho-
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resis and chromatography. An electrical current and, respectively, gravitational pull provide the 
motive force, while a porous material retards bulkier pieces more than, smaller and lighter 
pieces. The bottom smearing observed in positive control lane of O2 is due to the production of 
small fragments. Complete digestion must lead to the complete disappearance of the correspond-
ing band in the negative controllane (i.e., the whole, undigested antibody). Incomplete digestion 
would leave it there along with the smaller bands, and sharper bands corresponding to fragments 
of the antibody. This can be verified by varying the time of exposure of the sample to papain or 
pep sin. Additional bands appearing in both the positive and negative controls must be impurities. 
Similarly, the bottom bands in 0 4 must be the free, unbound excess antigen, the middle bands 
must be the free Fab, Fe or whole antibody, while the top bands must be the antigen bound to Fab 
or the whole antibody (Fe does not bind the antigen, hence the presence of only two, instead of 
three bands). But wait a minute! If the bottom line is the antigen and the top one is the whole an-
tibody, then it would be interesting to add three extra control lines along with the three test lanes, 
one to run the original, undigested antibody, one for the digested antibody and one for the anti-
gen. Lo and behold, we have a match! The bottom line is indeed the antigen, the top one is anti-
body, while the middle pieces correspond to the digestion pattern. Let us now add three more 
control lanes containing the three fractions collected in C3 and corresponding to the three peaks 
observed in 0 3• This is indeed our lucky day! O2, 0 3 and 0 4 aU fit perfectly our interpretation. 
Even if we don't understand yet very weIl how electrophoresis works, we can already infer that 
the bands migrating at the same speed (aIl the aligned bands) are or point to the same fragments 
. Il 
or protems. 
Il The interpretation extends to the biological assays as weil. IfFab obtained following papain digestion blocks aller-
gies, we may suppose it binds the antigen in such a way that the latter cannot bind something el se and cause the al-
lergy. We can further hypothesise that the difference between Fab produced by papain digestion and who le antibody 
or Fab produced by pepsin digestion is due to a different cleavage of the initial antibody. On one hand, this explains 
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Fe + Ag Fab (C3) Ab 
Ab + Ag (sa 
Fab +Ag 
Ag 
Fe (C3) 
Digested 
sample 
(C 1) = 
Fab + Fe 
Figure 7. Reading Elertrophoresis Gels 
Historically, the development of the molecular explanation of humoral immunity relied 
on a mixture between the two approaches. For instance, in the case of e1ectrophoresis, sorne as-
pects of the interpretation - most notably the idea that e1ectrostatic forces act on charged macro-
molecules - were borrowed from physics in order to provide a partial interpretation of the tech-
nique. Other aspects - namely those pertaining to the separation properties of the gel, ultimately 
enabling researchers to 'read' the ge1- pertain to an interpretation consistent with a hypothetical 
explanation of humoral immunity and other biological phenomena. What is important to realise 
is that experimental data does not need to be interpreted before an explanation of a phenomenon 
under study can be proposed. Uninterpreted data can also constrain the formulation of higher-
level explanatory hypotheses. 
why pepsin-Fab migrates slower than papain-Fabo On the other, this is compatible with the hypothesis that whole and 
pepsin-digested antibodies link antigens in heavier complexes which precipitate or simply prohibit the antigen to 
reach its target due to its suddenly acquired mass and bulkiness. 
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CHAPTER5 
INFERENCES TO SVSTEMATYC EXPLANATIONS 
5.1 /lolistic Semanlics and Inference 10 lite .Best Exp/analion 
Many realists like to argue that the fitting of aIl observations, experimental operations 
and overall empirical correlations between the various elements of the experiment amounts to an 
'inference to the best explanation' [IBE; (Maxwell, 1962; Smart, 1963)]. The idea behind IBE is 
very simple: it would be very hard to find another explanatory hypothesis that fits experimental 
data as weil as the current one. This links to a fundamental intuition implicit to the scientific 
practice: available empirical data constrains, or posits an 'input-constraint' onto the formulation 
of theories. A more modest, and more honest, way to put it is to state that not aIl explanations 
allow for systematic interpretations of the available experimental knowledge, especially if cross-
referenced against larger and larger domains of investigation. In practice, sorne explanations al-
low for interpretations that can be uniformly applied over a given body of experimental data, 
while others cannot; the former are 'better' than the latter. 
The proponents of IBE remain somewhat vague as to what may ultimately count as the 
'best' explanation. For example, the above sketched interpretation is a partial one. Sorne details 
are left out. Unless we specify that the 'binding' and 'digestion' are chemical processes, we 
might as weIl posit little 'animacules' embracing, fighting or eating each other. Forthe sake of 
the argument, nothing prohibits these 'animacules' to become electrostatically charged and thus 
be propelled against their will through electrophoresis gels. More so, even if we specify that 
these terms should be understood chemically, meaning that both the 'binding' and the 'digestion' 
are functions of the chemical structure of the antibody, antigen and the protease, we still didn't 
specify what kind of chemical interactions are in place (covalent, ionic, H-bonds, etc.). IBE cap-
tures the fundamental intuition that each additional correlation in the web of experimental 
knowledge posits an additional constraint onto higher level interpretations, thus limiting the 
number of viable hypotheses we might propose. However, it does not tell us what counts as a 
complete explanation or what should he the optimal dimension of the body of experimental 
knowledge under interpretation. 
The IBE approach evolved in parallel with two related arguments for realism: the 'no 
miracle argument', also dubbed the 'cosmic coincidence' or the 'convergence' argument [CA; 
(Putnam, 1975; Boyd, 1984)], and the 'experimental success' argument [ES; (Hacking, 1983)]. 
Without entering the details, these arguments state that when a consistent interpretation can be 
preserved not only for several experiments, but over whole domains of investigation, such as 
physics, chemistry and biology, IBE is strengthened to such an extent that it seems to become 
inconceivable that a single interpretation fits such a gigantic amount of empirical data without 
capturing something about the underlying structure of empirical reality. In the case of the exam-
pIe from immunology, the proposed interpretation is congruent with other pieces of knowledge 
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conceming molecular genetics, biology, microbiology, physical chemistry, etc. The implications 
are huge and it takes somebody trained in the field to fully appreciate them. 
Despite its grandiose airs, the realist arguments try to reproduce at a holistic scale what 
low-level inductions achieve for individual empirical correlations. From this perspective, we can 
at least conclude that the strategy behind the argument is legitimate. It remains however to be 
se en how exactly such a large-scale inference would look like in practice and how aberrant inter-
pretations are discarded. 1 will come back to this very important issue in the last chapters of the 
book. 
E'rperimelltl1/ Constrailltf)' am! Justifieatiolt 
Operationalism has a role to play in the overall practice of science and 1 can hardly see 
how experimentation could dispense of il. This said, 1 also think that this role is limited to the 
preservation of reference. Once a particular state, phenorilenon or property can be reliably identi-
fied or produced, bare-bone experimental knowledge is embedded into a higher-Ievel interpreta-
tion. Although it may be possible to push experimental knowledge further in the absence of any 
significant interpretative work and obtain knowledge that can be of immense practical interest, as 
a general rule, once a certain body of experimental data is acquired, scientists do not proceed any 
further without sorne guiding higher-leve1 hypothesis. 
Ideally, a scientifically adequate interpretation of experimental techniques should be 'uni-
form'. It should not ascribe different mechanisms or explanations to experimentally indistin-
guishable procedures or to empirically indistinguishable observations. Nevertheless, there is no 
strict interdiction to attribute different mechanisms to the same technique used in different cir-
cumstances. For instance, there is no formaI interdiction to hypothesise, say, that the whole anti-
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body does not migrate through a gel according to the same mechanism as the Fab fragments. Such 
a situation may arise in cases in which an interpretation fits sorne data, but not all the data asso-
ciated with an experiment. Then, in lack of a better option or because of the. success of the inter-
pretation in relation to other experiments, researchers may decide to keep the interpretation and 
try to uncover sorne subtle experimental differences. 
Note however that to systematically allow theoretical distinctions in the presence of con-
trary empirical data and non-conditional to an eventual empirical justification is tantamount to 
settling down for the view that an interpretation has nothing to do with empirical reality, in 
which case we should seriously ask ourselves what exactly the interpretation in question inter-
prets and to what extent it makes sense to pretend that we deal with a theoretical interpretation 
rather than a dogma. As a former experimental scientist, it is my firm conviction that this kind of 
reasoning is healthy and that it captures the good intention behind empiricist eliminativism. Un-
deniably, this good intention often miscarried, yet, initially at least, it was definitively there. 
Even a convinced empiricist such as Mach understood perfectly well the necessity of introducing 
hypotheses: 
Observation only leads, in the first place, to the conjecturing of laws of motions, which, in 
their special simplicity and accuracy are presupposed as hypotheses in order to try whether 
the behaviour of bodies can be logically derived from these hypotheses. Only if these hy-
potheses have shown themselves to hold good in many simple and complicated cases, do we 
agree to keep them. 
(1893 p. 306) 
We can see from this quote that the ultimate goal of empiricism is not to prohibit the formulation 
of hypotheses introducing excess semantic content, but rather to ensure that aIl hypotheses sat-
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isfy the constraints imposed by actual experimental knowledge and therefore are at least empiri-
cally adequate in respect to it. 
Empiricists disagree about how much excess content should be introduced and whether 
this excess content refers or not. Mach, Carnap and most positivists want to keep the excess to a 
minimum, that is, keep hypotheses as close to experimental data as possible. Usually, they also 
doubt that the extra t-terms introduced by a hypothesis refer and tend to ascribe them a purely 
instrumental role (i.e., they facilitate comprehension and computation, but may have nothing to 
do with reality). In contrast, van Fraassen (1980; 1989) is ready to allow the introduction of hy-
potheses as heavy and complicated as we want on sole condition that empirical adequacy is pre-
served. He also abstains from denying semantic realism or promoting instrumentalism; instead, 
he adopts an agnostic point of view according to which t-terms may refer and be true in a Tarski-
style correspondence theory of truth usually adopted by semantic realists, yet, in the absence of 
proper justification of our beliefs, we cannot rationally commit to the reality of these terms and 
act as if they refer. On the realist side, but in an empiricist spirit, Feigl and Hempel would want 
to keep hypothesising to a minimum in order to facilitate empirical justification. In contrast, con-
temporary realists are not afraid to introduce more substantive hypotheses and rely on IBE and 
the CA-ES arguments as me ans of justification transcending the limits of classic, piecemeal em-
pirical justification. 
5.3 Conclusions 
Ultimately, it seems that talk about better and worse inferences is a function of empirical 
adequacy: an explanation allowing for a single interpretation uniformly consistent with all the 
experimental data is better than an interpretation consistent with only sorne of the data, which in 
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turn is better than an interpretation systematically inconsistent with most of the experimental 
data. To what extent a better explanationjustifies realism remains however open to debate. 
For the time being, l will retire the debate by highlighting a number of more modest 
points: 
1) There is such a thing as a purely experimental knowledge devoid of any significant theo-
retical interpretation and relying solely on low-Ievel inductive correlations between ob-
servations. Sorne aspects of this kind of knowledge are adequately captured by Carnap's 
confirmationism and a version of Brigdman's operationalism. 
2) The main virtues of experimental knowledge are its ability to preserve reference to ob-
servables and to uncover necessary causes responsible for differential observational out-
puts. 
3) More substantial hypotheses are needed in order to provide an interpretation capable of 
unifying several experiments and, beyond that, several domains of investigation su ch that 
knowledge from one domain (for instance, the physical chemistry needed to understand 
electrophoresis) can be transferred in another do main (such as immunology). Standard, 
textbook exposition of experiments relies on interpretative hypotheses which transcend 
strictly experimental knowledge. 
4) Experimental knowledge ties down higher-Ievel hypotheses to observable data, forcing 
them to refer at least partially to phenomenal reality at aIl times, and also posits empirical 
constraints on what may count as an acceptable hypothesis. It is not clear however if ex-
perimental knowledge suffices to force a unique higher-Ievel interpretative hypothesis, as 
postulated by IRE and how this unique interpretative hypothesis would entail realism as 
postulated by the CA -ES arguments. 
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PART II 
THEORETICAL CONSTRAlNTS ON HVPOTHESIS FORMATION 
CHAPTER6 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
6. J Theoretical COlltexts 
In the actual scientific practice, hypotheses are tied down to experimental data. At the 
same time, they are also 'tied up', so to speak, to more general patterns of explanation and inter-
pretation. This 'top-down' determination of hypotheses is tightly linked to the theory-model dis-
tinction in science, as weIl as with issues in explanation and reductionism. 
The intuition at work here is the following: in the immunology example, there is not im-
mediate stringency forcing the 'chemical' interpretation over the 'animalcule' one when judging 
the situation from the standpoint of the experimental data alone; still, if we keep in mind that a 
chemical interpretation is consistent with experimental data issued from a whole host of other 
experiments in various other domains of investigation, there is a net import of information to be 
considered. The integration of a particular set of experimental data into a larger theoretical con-
text can be approached along the lines of a reduction, or that of a conjunction. In the case of re-
duction, the data is entailed by the larger theoretical context as one consequence among many 
other, hopefully confirmable, consequences. Altematively, the experimental data may entail new 
predictions in conjunction with a given theoretical context. 
6.2 The Deducth'e-Nomologica/ Account of Erp/anatioll 
Since many explanations establish a link between an empirical description of a phenome-
non and a set of more general laws or principles, the deductive-nomological (DN) account of sci-
entific explanation proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim (Hempel, et al., 1965) is of immediate 
interest. The guiding idea behind the DN account is that a set of premises consisting of laws plus 
statements specifying initial conditions logically imply an empirical description of the phenome-
non to be explained. The reductive character of the explanation cornes from the fact that the de-
scription contained in the conclusion must be deduced from, rather than merely consistent with 
the propositions stated as premises; this marks a difference between deductive and semantic ap-
pro aches to modelling/explanation. The second requirement, pertaining to the 'nomological' 
component of the account, is that the necessary premises must include at least one law of nature. 
Explanation is thus tightly linked to the notion of 'nomic expectability', that is, to the notion that 
a particular prediction or empirical description is to be deductively expected given a certain set 
of laws (pp. 247-248). 
6.3 Exp/anatùm l'S. Justifietl Exp/anatioll 
The account faces several difficulties [reviewed in (Salmon, 1989; Woodward, 2003)], 
mainly in relation to its 'nomological' component. It has been often pointed out that there are no 
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satisfactory criteria defining the essential characteristics of what counts as a 'law of nature'. Ini-
tiaIly, the 'nomological' requirement was introduced in order to mark a distinction between acci-
dentally universal statements and genuine laws of nature. Hempel contrasts "Ail members of the 
Greensbury School Board for 1964 are bald' with "Ail gases expand when heated under con-
stant pressure". The ideal gas law explains the behaviour of sorne gases, while the fact that a 
person is a member of the Greensbury School Board does not explain why that person is bald. 
Given this common intuition, Hempel argues that the explanatory value of the later proposition 
cornes from the fact that it is a law of nature, while the former is merely an accidentally true 
statement, holding true in respect to a very specific domain of application. 
Unfortunately, the notion that laws of nature are exceptionless, absolutely universal regu-
larities is highly problematic. Most generalisations in biology and psychology, as weIl as most 
empirical laws in physics are not exactly exceptionless. We don't have to search very far for 
counterexamples: the law of ideal gases, which Hempel introduces as a paradigmatic example of 
a law of nature, is not a general statement true of aU gases in aIl situations. 
Presumably, Hempel insists on tying down explanation to 'nomic expectability' in an at-
tempt to ensure that the explanation is not merely conceptually possible, but also justified be-
cause it is the corollary of a universal proposition. But what if it is impossible to decide a priori 
whether a proposition is indeed a 'law of nature'? ln a broad positivist tradition, the key re-
quirement is that the premise-propositions should de scribe empirical reality. However, since in-
duction from parti cul ars is always imperfect, it is often difficult to distinguish between accidentaI 
regularities, confined to particular cases, and genuine 'laws of nature' applying to a whole class 
of phenomena. For example, if our knowledge resumes to a single proposition, "AIl members of 
the Greensbury School Board are bald", then, when facing a bald person, the only explanation 
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we can think of is "He must be bald because he is a member of the Greensbury School Board". 
The explanation is conceptually possible given our current knowledge of the world. This does 
not mean however that the explanation has to be true or empirically adequate. It is merely a hy-
pothesis we formulate. As any non-bald person would soon find, joining the Greensbury School 
Board would not result in her or him becoming bald, thus falsifying the 'because' underlying the 
explanation, as weIl as the universality of the initial premise on which the explanation is built. 
In light of these considerations, l think it is important to distinguish between conceptually 
possible explanations given a certain set of theories and background beliefs and true, partially 
confirmed, approximately true or probably true explanations. The DN account applies readily to 
the former, but fails to provide an adequate characterisation ofthe latter. 
6.4 The Causal COIl1lectiolls Underlying Sciellt(jïc Explanations 
Scriven (1962) pushes the argument further and argues that it is hardly the case that aIl 
scientifically valid explanations rely on universal laws of nature. His conclusion is based on 
cases of singular causal events (e.g.; "The impact of my knee on the desk caused the tipping over 
of the inkwell") which we commonly take as having sorne explanatory value. 
In response to this objection, Hempel observes - correctly in my opinion - that singular 
events, even if genuinely causal in nature, have no explanatory power. Only reproducible causal 
events (causal regularities) have explanatory power (Hempel, 1965 p. 360). Irrespective of first 
impressions, there is always a causal regularity setting the difference between causal explana-
tions and mere chronological narratives whereby events simply follow each other (e.g., we ex-
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plain the tipping of the ink:well based on our previous knowledge that kicking desks results in 
objects on it tipping over).I2 
The exchange between Hempel and Scriven is highly informative. It strongly suggests 
that the deductive, and therefore purely logical, connection between premises and conclusions 
must be doubled by an instance of causation - actual or hypothesised - in the physical world. For 
example, the ideal gas law explains the behaviour of gases because it is possible to obtain an in-
crease in volume (the empirical description standing on the side of the conclusion) by heating air 
at constant pressure (the premises from which the conclusion is deduced). In contrast, it is im-
possible to make a person bald by making him or her join sorne school board. 
Scriven argues that explanations reveal causal connections. Hempel retorts that we cannot 
gain knowledge of causal connections unless the connection in question assumes the form of a 
readily reproducible regularity. Hempel's answer is not entirely satisfactory. Although it seems 
reasonable to conclude that regularity plays a role in the justification of knowledge about causa-
tion, at least in the more selective context of sCÎentific explanations, it is still not immediately 
evident that regularity alone suffi ces to guarantee a causal connection. 
For instance, it seems that universal-like statements can be explanatory independently of 
any reference to a causal connection if they reflect part-whole relationships. This is exemplified 
in the following diagram: 
12 Kitcher's distinction between the 'ideal' or 'full context' underlying an explanation and the 'non-ideal' or 'in-
complete' formulation of the explanation in a given instance supports a similar kind of argument (Kitcher, 1989). 
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Non-causal explanations and universal statements 
i 
1 
Non-causal explanatory 
(part-whole explanations) 
E.g.: violent storms - strong winds; 
erythrocytes - red 
Il seems counterintuîtive to claim that 
violent stonns cause strong winds or 
that strong winds cause violent stonns. 
Note haNever that since strong winds 
may 0CCUf in the absence of violent 
stonns. but not vice VefSa. we 
commonly say that a violent storm 
explains the occummœ of strong winds. 
Non-causal & non-explanatory 
E.g.: bacheIors - unrnarried men; 
this table - square 
Bidirectionaluniversal correlations 
amountto sorne fonn of synonymy. 
white correlations between particulars 
rail to reIIect part-whole relationships. 
ExpIanatory scheme: 
AIl violent stonns are accompanied by 
strong winds 
BUT 
Ali strong winds are not accompanied by 
vioIentstonns 
THEREFORE 
The violent stonns explain the strong winds 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
Strong winds are a constitutive part of the 
greaterwhole of violent stonns 
No explanatory scheme 
figure 8. Non-causal explanatinns associated with universallaws or statements 
Note however that, although popular in the everyday explanatory folklore, this kind of explana-
tions is rather superficial and remains unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view. 
Several counterexamples and study cases strongly suggest that the main shortcoming of 
the DN account stems precisely from its failure to take into consideration the causal connections 
associated with typical scientific explanations. Most notably, the DN account doesn't pay suffi-
cient attention to the causal asymmetries involved in such explanations. This is illustrated by the 
notorious flagpole example. A flagpQle is stabilised in a vertical position by 50 meters wire at-
tached at one end to the top of the flagpole and at the other to the ground 40 meters away from 
the flagpole. The flagpole itself has 30 meters. These propositions fit the deductive scheme pro-
vided by the Pythagorean Theorem any way we want. We can deduce that the flagpole has 30 
meters from the premises stating that the wire has 50 meters and it attached 40 meters away from 
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the flagpole, just as we can deduce that the wire had 50 meters or that it is attached 40, meters 
away from the flagpole from the remaining two propositions. Although deductively sound, 
Bromberger (1966) complains that the explanation merely reflects a geometrical proportion 
without really telling us why the flagpole has this specific height. 
It might be retorted here that what stands on the si de of the premises is the Pythagorean 
theorem, while the estimated height of the flagpole and the length of the wire stabilising it are in 
fact the conclusions of the deduction (i.e., if the Pythagorean Theorem holds true about the 
chunk of space containing the flagpole and its wire, then there is a fixed ratio relationship be-
l 
tween the length of the flagpole and the length of the wire). Then, the claim would be that the 
Pythagorean metric explains the actual measurements asserted above, while the actual empirical 
measurements confirm, rather than explain, the hypothesis of a Pythagorean metric. 
Nevertheless, once the geometrical relationship is complemented with physical laws, 
such as the laws of optics, the explanation becomes inherently asymmetric, while the DN expla-
nation preserves the same symmetric structure. For example, in the case of the 'shadow of the 
flagpole' version of the above example (a 30 meters flagpole casts a 40 meters shadow at a par-
ticular time of the day), we would say that the length of the flagpole explains the length of the 
shadow and not vice versa despite the fact that we can calculate the height of the flagpole given 
the length of its shadow just as easily as we can calculate the length of the shadow given the 
height of the flagpole. 
To make things worse, a version of the 'bald member of the school board' example also 
indicates that failure to take into account information about causal events renders sorne DN-style 
explanations irrelevant or ev en absurdo Consider the following "explanation": 
79 
"Al! males who take birth control pills regularly fai! to get pregnant. John Johns is a male who 
has been taking birth control piUs regularly. [Therefore this explains why] John Jones falls to 
get pregnant." 
(Salmon, 1971 p.34) 
The deductive part is valid and one of the premises is universal non-accidentally, yet it is clear 
that the 'explanation' doesn't explain anything because, pil1s or no piUs, it makes not sense to 
talk about male pregnancy in the first place. 
6.S Stlltistklll Rele,'once 
It seems that the only way around cases of explanatory irrelevancies is to amend Hem-
pel's 'regularity approach' to causality. Salmon's (1971) 'statistical-relevance' (SR) account of 
explanation aims to provide the required corrections without transcending into the realm of 
metaphysics. According to the SR account, an explanation is a 'body of information' relevant to 
an explanandum. Typically, the 'body of information' in question sums up the experimentaIly 
manipulable factors that correlate with an increase or decrease in the probability of a certain 
event (e.g., smoking in relation to lung cancer). 
In Salmon's probabilistic formulation, given a population A, an attribute C is statistically 
relevant to another attribute B if and only if P(BIA.C) "* P(BIA). For example, given a certain 
population of men or women, the correlation between the use of the pill and the absence preg-
nancy is equally weIl supported for men and women. However, the probability of pregnancy 
among men probability of pregnancy among men who take the pill ::::= O. In contrast, the prob-
ability of pregnancy among women is greater than the probability of pregnancy among women 
who take the pili. We can see therefore that the correlation between the use of the pill and the 
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absence pregnancy is 'statistically relevant' for women, but not for men. Shortly put, a correla-
tion is 'non-accidentaI' or 'statistically relevant' if and only if it doesn't de scribe equally weIl a 
suitable control group. 
The SR account is meant to be a fully functional alternative to the DN account: an expla-
nation is no longer an argument conducted on the premise of universallaws - and certainly not 
on the premise of a theory or fundamental hypothesis -, but the expression of a 'statistically 
relevant' correlation. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the concept of 'statistical rele-
vance' is compatible with the general structure of DN explanations. 
According to Hempel, "explanation = deducibility from more general statements + fur-
ther condition X defining an essential characteristic of the statements to be found on the side of 
the premises". Hempel argues that sorne of the premises must be laws of nature and de fines con-
dition X along the lines of 'non-accidentaI regularity'. Problems arise when Hempel further tries. 
to establish a link between 'non-accidentality' and universality over sorne sufficiently large do-
main of application. Most empirical laws hold true only in respect to a limited and often incom-
pletely specified domain of application. This strongly suggests that the 'non-accidentaI' character 
of the regularities they express has nothing to do with absolute universality over a weIl defined 
do main of application. Now, given this difficulty, we can reasonably argue that laws of nature 
are 'non-accidentaI' because they reflect a set of correlations between the occurrence (or prob-
ability of occurrence) of an event E and the presence or absence of sorne factor F. 
6.6 E,<perimentallUallipulation 
ldeally, Salmon's notion of 'statistical relevance' provides an epistemic definition of cau-
sality and, at the same time, a measure of the difference between 'naturally-occurring' instances 
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of E given the presence or absence of F. The underlying premise here is that we decide whether a 
phenomenon is causal or not based on passive observations alone. Alternatively, cognitive psy-
chologists tend to further reinterpret 'statistical relevance' along the Hnes of an artificial algo-
~ithm emulating the unconscious psychological processes behind our everyday causal judgments. 
Nonetheless, in many cases the causal relevance of F in the occurrence,of E is established 
via active experimentation. In the context of a typical scientific study, a correlation between F 
and E is locally evidenced in the context of a specific experimental setup in which researchers 
have direct control over F (say, they can freely add to and subtract F from the experimental 
setup). This means that researchers make a distinction between manipulable and non-
manipulable experimental variables prior 10 and irrespective of the statistical methods employed 
to calculate the difference between test and control groups. This posits an interesting problem 
since, once this distinction is made, it is not at aIl clear whether 'statistical relevance' is synony-
mous to causality or ifit is merely a measure ofmanipulability. 
We can see therefore that, in sorne cases, the SR account overlaps with 'manipulationisf 
accounts of explanation (von Wright, 1971; Woodward, 2003). Manipulationist accounts are par-
ticularly efficient in accounting for the ability of everyday explanations to provide answers to 
'why-questions'. For example, a falling barometer is a reliable indicator of an imminent storm, 
yet nobody c1aims that the barometer explains the occurrence of the storm (Bromberger, 1966). 
Intuitively, it seems that we distinguish between "the storm explains (or causes) the barometer to 
faIl" and "the falling barometer explains (or causes) the storm" on the grounds that a falling ba-
rometer is a manipulable experimental variable while the storm is not directly manipulable. We 
observe that imminent storms reliably correlate with falling barometers, yet we also know that 
artificially placing the barometer under a vacuum pump fails to yield the same correlation. We 
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conclude that since we cannot produce storms by making barometers register lower pressures, it 
must be the storm that 'causes' the barometer to fall. The same goes for the 'shadow of the flag-
pole' example: we know that the height of a flagpole correlates with the length of its shadow, yet 
we also take into account the fact that one can always change the height of the flagpole, while it 
is absolutely impossible to directly change the dimensions of a shadow; we say therefore that the 
height of the flagpole explains the length of its shadow and not vice versa. 
A more systematic classification of the relationship between experimental correlations 
and causal judgements having sorne explanatory value is provided in the figure below: 
1 
1 
Causal explanations and experimental manipulability 
Positive (direct) causal 
connection 
E.g.: temperature -Iength of a 
metalrod 
Negative (inferred) causal 
connection 
E.g.: falling barometer - imminent 
storm 
FaDing baromelers consistently oorreIatewith 
imminentslDrms 
BUT 
Increasing the temperature 
consistentlyoorrelates wilh an 
increase in Iength 
BUT 
Increasing the Iength of a metal rod 
does not correIate with an increase in 
its temperature 
lHEREFORE 
Artificially making barometers register IoviIer 
pressure tails ID correIate with the occurrence 
ofstorms 
AND 
It is impossible ID directly artificially add or 
removestorms from the experimentalsetup 
THEREFORE 
We conclude lhat Ihe increase in 
temperaturecauses (and explains)lhe 
rod to become longer We infer !hat the storm causes (and explains) 
the barometerID tall 
Reciprocal causation 
E.g.: pressure - temperature of a 
constant volume of gas 
Increasing the temperature of a gas 
consistentlycorrelates with an increase 
of its pressure 
AND 
Increasingthe pressure of a gas 
consistenHyoorrelates wilh an increase 
of its temperature 
THEREFORE 
We are equallycomfortable to concIude 
Ihat the increase in temperature cause 
(and explains)the increase in pressure 
and that the increase În pressure 
causes (and explains)the increasein 
temperature 
Figure 9. ClIuslil explanations associated with expel'imenllli manipulation 
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6.7 Cogllitil'e mul ReaU"t lnterpretatùms of E.)qJerimelltll! Jlwûpu!atùm 
Statistical approaches to causation, as well as manipulationist accounts are empirical and 
epistemic. Causality does not constitute a primitive notion, but is merely a body of empirical data 
satisfying certain conditions. It is in sense that Salmon, just as Hempel before him, as well as 
most contemporary researchers in the field of cognitive psychology, tend to talk about 'causality 
(or contingency) judgments' rather than causality proper. 
In as much as it is possible to establish 'statistically relevant' correlations based on pas-
sive observations alone, it is also possible to reduce causality to judgments about statistically 
relevant regularities. However, in most cases 'statistical relevance' is established on the prior 
grounds of active experimentation involving the artificial manipulation of certain aspects of the 
experimental setup. In cases of active experimentation, causality judgments rely on the epistemo-
logically primitive notion of 'experimental manipulability' and cannot easily dispense of it. For 
instance, without the distinction between manipulable and non-manipulable variables, it becomes 
very hard, if not impossible to account for the fact that the symmetric correlation between the 
pressure and temperature of a constant volume of gas grounds a pair of symmetric explanations 
whereby an increase of temperature explains an increase in pressure, just as an increase in pres-
sure explains an increase in temperature, while the equally symmetric correlation between a fal-
ling barometer and the occurrence of a storm grounds an explanation functioning in one direction 
only, namely the storm explains the falling barometer while the falling barometer fails to explain 
the occurrence of the storm. The problem is not at much one of providing the right statistical 
formula capable of emulating most of our causal judgments; 'statistical relevance' is defined the 
same way in SR and manipulationist contexts. Rather, it seems that judgments about 'statistical 
relevance' are a necessary, but insufficient condition for conduding causality. 
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In addition to a strictly empirical understanding of the notion of experimental manipula-
bility, sorne authors choose to attach further interpretations to this notion. At oneend of the spec-
trum, Waskan (2006 pp. 225-253) proposes a cognitive interpretation of manipulability, dubbed 
the 'model model', according to which "explanations for events and physical regularities are 
constituted by intrinsic cognitive models of the mechanisms that produce them" (p. 225). The 
'mechanisms' to which Waskan alludes pertain to strategies or sequences of events whereby cer-
tain effects are produced, in reallife or in our imagination (pp. 227-228). 
This said, it is worth observing that the se intuitive mechanisms may or may not coincide 
with the rnechanisms postulated by physical explanations. Presumably, there is an excellent over-
lap in the case of classical mechanical explanations or vulgarised versions of geometrical expla-
nations in biochemistry and molecular biology; in contrast, quantum mechanics explanations and 
chemical explanations are bound to be much less intuitive. AIso, it is likewise important to keep 
in mind that what we can imagine doing via intuitive mechanisms and what we can do in the ac-
tuaI experimental practice does not perfectly coincide either. For example, it is possible to send 
an electron through two slits at the same time, yet our imagination has a hard time imagining 
how this feat is achieved. Granted, imagination plays a huge role in devising explanations; ex-
amples such as the rock-on-a-string model for planetary motion or Einstein's thought experi-
ments amply demonstrate this. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that we imagine in-
tuitive mechanisms in accordance to an implicit set of fundamental rules. When the se rules are 
rendered explicit then it becomes possible to construct models outside our imagination; most no-
tably, it becomes possible to take into account new rules which our natural capacity to imagine 
may or may not accommodate. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, Baskar (2008) proposes a realist, non-epistemic version 
of the experimentallmanipulationist approach: 
"To ascribe a law, one needs a theory. For it Îs only if it is backed up bya theory, containing 
a model or conception of a putative causal or explanatory 'tink' that a law can be distin-
guished from a purely accidentai concomitance. [ ... ] it must be assumed, if experimental ac-
tivity is to be rendered intelligible, that natural mechanisms endure and acl outside the condi-
tions that enable us to identifY them tha! the applicability of known laws in open systems, i.e. 
systems where no constant conjunctions of events prevail, can be sustained. This has the cor-
ollary that a constant conjunction of events cannot be necessary for the assumption of the el-
ficacy of a law." 
(2008 pp. 12-13)13 
Baskar's approach stems from a criticism of Hempel's DN account in relation to its in-
ability to mark a sharp distinction between genuine laws and accidentaillocai regularities. His 
solution to the problem is to view laws as hypothesising causal mechanisms underlying experi-
mental manipulability rather than being the result of passive observations of naturally-occurring 
regularities. Note however that 
1) the same approach appHes just as weIl to the hypothesising of a causal connection at-
tached to an unspecified 'black-box' mechanism; and 
2) the notion of regularity is sill needed for the justification of the causal connection or 
mechanism. 
For example, a true statement of the kind "An members of the Greensbury School Board are 
bold" can be easily transformed into a hypothesis about a causal connection of the form "If x be-
cornes a member of the Greensbury School Board, x becomes bald". Since, as far as our experi-
13 Baskar illustrates his approach via examples From physics and chemistry (2008 pp. 163-169). 
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ence goes, nobody ever became bald by joining sorne school board, the causal connection is fal-
sified and, as a consequence, we judge this statement to be an accidentaI regularity rather than a 
genuine law of nature. On one hand, Baskar' s approach rightly identifies the statement as being 
an accidentaI regularity on the grounds that it has no deeper causal connection underlying it. On 
the other hand however, his daims to realism are not entirely justified. First, it doesn't matter 
which mechanism is hypothesised, meaning that the realism attached to this interpretation is 
mainly about the existence of a causal connection and not about a particular explanatory mecha-
nism and its associated ontology. And second, the falsification of the statement is justified by an 
experimental regularity whereby we repeatedly fail to produce baldness by making somebody 
joining a school board. This indicates that the distinction between laws holding true over certain 
domains of investigation and accidentaI regularities hinges more on the fact that the former are 
experimentally tested regularities, while the later are passively observed regularities. 
6.8 ClIu.ml jUeclumisms / 
In his more recent work, Salmon abandons epistemic approaches in favour of realistic 
ones (Salmon, 1984). The rationale behind this radical change in approach hinges on the obser-
vation that although many common explanations are indeed nothing el se than 'statistically rele-
vant' correlations, when it cornes to scientific explanations, scientists do not say that smoking 
explains cancer, but only that smoking correlates with lung cancer while non-smokers are far less 
affected by this type of cancer. What explains lung cancer is a series of cumulative mutations 
caused by various carcinogens present in the tobacco smoke. The core idea at work here is that 
statistical relevance only provides a stock of 'black-box' correlations, while a more complete 
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scientific explanation requires the 'black-box' is eventually filled by a causal mechanism and/or 
explained as a theoretical consequence., 
Very briefly, the key notions of the 'causal mechanism' (CM) account can be summarised 
as follows: A causal process is a physical process characterized by the ability to transmit a mark 
in a continuous way; in contrast, non-causal processes fail to transmit marks. For example, if we 
mark a beam of light in a certain way (po 1 arity , wavelength, etc.), the mark is transmitted as light 
propagates through space-time, reflects, refracts, etc.; in contrast, if we try to mark the shadow of 
a ball (say, we modifying its shape by adding a second source of light), the mark doesn't transmit 
as the object and its shadow move in space unless we keep modifYing it at every moment in time. 
We say that two causal processes coming in close spatial-temporal proximity causally interact if 
only if they leave on each other a mark which would have not been present in the absence of 
their interaction. The paradigmatic example is that of two cars colliding: each car leaves a mark, 
namely a deformation, on the other car. 
The main difficulty with the CM account pertains to an internaI tension between a desire 
to keep the account as close as possible to directly accessible empirical features and the fact that 
most mechanisms and fundamental interactions underlying scientific explanations are framed in 
terms of theoretical unobservables. One way to formulate this objection is to argue that the abil-
ity of a process to transmit a mark may or may not be the causally relevant feature captured by a 
scientific explanation (Hitchcock, 1995). For example, although it is entirely true that a moving 
car is able to transmit a ripple when colliding with another car, we commonly explain the final 
motions of the two cars by appealing the notion of a momentum-energy transfer and not to the 
ability of a car to deform another car. 
88 
The CM account faces a dilemma: either we confine ourse Ives to the more superficial 
level of 'experimental manipulability' in order to effectively contain the explanation in the realm 
of the purely empirical, or, if we seek a 'deeper' or more 'complete' explanation - or to put it 
bluntly, a more satisfactory explanation from a scientific point of view -, then we must take the 
risk of introducing theoretical terms and thus plunge straight at the heart of the realism-
antirealism debates raging in contemporary philosophy of science. To put it in a somewhat sim-
plistic formulation, a 'causal mechanism' is to 'experimental manipulability' what a mechanism 
of perception is to perception. Just like perception, 'experimental manipulability' is a self-
justified empirical given; and just as a mechanism of perception provides an explanation of per-
ception, but does not automatically justify itself as being obviously true, a 'causal mechanism' 
explains the primitive notion of 'experimental manipulability', but fails to justify itself empiri-
cally. 
For example, a primarily empirical explanation of the behaviours of gases posits a link 
between volume, temperature and pressure and postulates that a certain manipulation of tempera-
i 
ture results in a certain change in pressure. The explanation rests on the fact that the temperature 
of agas can be manipulated experimentally and that its manipulation consistently correlates with 
certain changes in pressure that would have not occurred, or rather that do not occur spontane-
ously in the particular experimental setup under investigation. In other words, the correlation is 
explanatory because 
i) it mirrors experimental manipulability and 
ii) it is statically relevant. 
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The empirical correlation does not tell us what are the mechanisms or causal interactions under-
lying the manipulation of temperature and pressure, nor does it tell us what is the mechanism or 
causal process linking temperature and pressure. 
In contrast, from the standpoint of kinetic models, pressure and temperature are two mac-
roscopic manifestations of the same microscopic processes consisting of colliding air molecules. 
We can see therefore that kinetic models explain the co-variation of temperature and pressure as 
being the result of a common cause or mechanism. Note however that a CM-style explanation is 
theoretical and hypothetical. It does not reflect available means to experimentally manipulate the 
phenomenon and its associated statistical relevance cannot be calculated. 
One possible solution to this dilemma is to maintain a connection between the empirical 
notion of 'experimental manipulability' and the deeper theoretical notion of 'causal mechanism'. 
For example, by interpreting the laws of dynamics along the lines of experimental regularities 
holding true of everyday macroscopic phenomena (the fundamental hypothesis) and by further 
postulating microscopic entities subjected to the same laws (a model-specific hypothesis) in or-
der to derive an empirical law describing the behaviour of gases (the targeted conclusion of the 
deductive model), three things are achieved 
i) an empirical description from the laws of dynamics is derived from the principles of 
mechanics (the DN aspect of the explanation) 
ii) a causal mechanism in terms of fundamental physical forces and interactions is postu-
lated (the CM aspect), and 
iii) further means of experimental control over the explained phenomenon are hypothe-
sised: assuming that we can push around molecules the same way we push macro-
scopic objects, it is possible to directly manipulate the temperature, pressure and vol-
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ume of a gas, as weIl as the relationships between these macroscopic properties (the 
mechanism is translated in terms ofhypothetical manipulability).14 
Although the manipulationist interpretation of this particular explanation seems bound to 
remain hypothetical, most CM-style explanations in molecular biology, including Salmon's 
paradigmatic 'lung cancer' example, are systematically interpreted in terms of experimental ma-
nipulation. A typical explanation doesn't just state that mutation M in prote in P causes over-
proliferation of a certain kind of cells, but also that, assuming we can directly create or remove 
M, we can directly control the occurrence and non-occurrence of the cancer. The concept of 
'gene therapy' is based precisely on this overtly manipulationist interpretation of the causal 
mechanism. From a philosophical standpoint, this also ensures that the 'deeper' metaphysical 
causal connection can always be translated in the empirical language of 'surface' experimental 
manipulation open, at least in principle, to empirical verification. 
6.9 Gmcepttwl Unfflcatiol1 
Following a different lead, Kitcher (1981; 1989) proposes an unificationist account of 
explanation. The account hinges on the observation that sorne scientific propositions can be de-
rived from other scientific propositions while the reciprocal is impossible. The latter seem to 
'naturally' fit the place of premises, while the former seem to stand 'naturaIly' in the place of 
conclusions, hence the suggestion that laws of nature are 'universal' and 'necessary' (i.e., uni-
versaI and necessary in a deductive scheme relating them to sorne other laws). 
The observation is certainly valid, and the unificationist account tries to make further use 
of it by c1aiming that explanation is tantamount to the highest explanatory power, that is, to the 
14 For a more detailed example, see Woodward's 'manipulationist' explanation of motion on an inclined plane (2003 
pp. 11-12). 
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1 
possibility to derive the maximum of consequences from the smallest set of premises. If the deri-
vation in question amounts to a deduction 15, this conception brings us back to Duhem' s original 
insight, according to which a theory is 
"a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a smalt number of principles, which aim 
ta represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimentallaws." 
(Duhem, 1906 p. 7) 
The notable difference is that while Duhem considers explanation and causation to be distinct 
from deducibility, Kitcher conflates them by arguing that we decide what causes (and explains) 
what based on the systematization of our beliefs (1989 p. 477). 
In sorne respects, Kitcher' s unificationist account captures commonly accepted assump-
tions about what counts as a scientific explanation, yet in sorne other respects it is aIso extremely 
counterintuitive. On the positive side, it puts back on the table the requirement for generality of-
ten neglected by causal accounts. Kitcher's account captures the widespread notion that a scien-
tific explanation should be attached to sorne general explanatory pattern, such as a theory. Ma-
nipulability and causality are certainly important, but many successful scientific explanations, 
especially in physics, also tend to achieve a greater unit y of scientific knowledge by deriving a 
wealth of predictions from a relatively small set of fundamentallaws. Whether unit y is an essen-
tial feature of explanation might be debatable, but the fact is that many scientific explanations 
explicitly aim and often succeed in unifying scientific knowledge. 
On the negative side, Kitcher's quasi-Kantian approach to causality is at odds with both 
the actual scientific practice. Intuitively, just because we can derive empirical laws from more 
general propositions, does not automatically entail that we are granted an increased experimental 
15 Alternatively, Kitcher also envisages multiple physical interpretations of the same set of "schematic proposi-
tions". For example, he attributes the explanatory power of Mendelian genetics to its ability to apply the same con-
cept of, say, 'dominance', to a wealth of different phenotypes. 
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control over the explained phenomenon. At any rate, Kitcher's unificationist account fails to 
make a clear distinction between a theoretically possible explanation and a true, or at very least a 
partially corroborated one. In addition, Kitcher's solution to the traditional objections against the 
DN account is particularly unintuitive. Kitcher solves the problem of causal asymmetry illus-
trated in the 'shadow of the flagpole' example by arguing that adding extra instructions about 
how to ca1culate the dimensions of objects starting from information about the size of their shad-
ows to the currently available stock of explanatory propositions does not enable us to derive 
more consequences. Since it is already possible to derive at least the saine number of conse-
quences without relying on these additional instructions, they don't have any explanatory value 
(1989 p. 485). A similar remark applies to various cases of non-explanatory correlations, such as 
the correlation between the use of the contraceptive pill and the absence of male pregnancy. 
The unificationist approach is rather demanding. As Woodward remarks, in order to con-
clude that the length of the shadow does not explain the height of the flagpole casting it, we must 
prove that it is possible to derive more consequences from a smaller number of premises and us-
ing shorter derivations by ignoring instructions telling us how to infer the dimensions of objects 
from the dimensions of their shadows. It is not at aIl clear how anyone cou Id prove this with full 
mathematical rigour, nor is it in any way evident that this kind of proofs is really required in or-
der to make causal judgements (2003 p. 369). 
Equally alarming, the unificationist account denies any explanatory value to older theo-
ries having a lesser do main of application than their newer rivaIs. Again, this is highly counterin-
tuitive. For example, physicists usually consider that the special theory of relativity is explana-
tory relevant in sorne particular situations, while the general theory of relativity provides a more 
universally applicable pattern of explanation (Woodward, 2003 pp. 367-368). 
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It has also been pointed out that many theories are time-symmetric. For example, given a 
set of initial conditions, classical mechanics allows us to derive the past, as weIl as future trajec-
tory of an object (Bames, 1992). If we accept Kitcher's unificationist account, we have to con-
clude that the theory explains equally well past space-time positions, as well ,as future space-time 
positions open to verification, conclusion that doesn't sit well with the generally accepted notion 
that, typically, explanations are causally asymmetric. 
Finally, 1 would like to add that another concem relates to the introduction of additional 
background assumptions, such as model specific hypotheses. If further assumptions need to be 
added on the side of the premises in order to achieve a derivation under the more modest scope 
of the DN account, it seems reasonable to expect that they will remain Iikewise irreducible under 
the wider scope of the unificationist account and therefore accumulate at the top of the logical 
hierarchy. Ifthis tums out to be the case, then the store of explanatory propositions may prolifer-
ate out of control and thus endanger the very notion of unification. 
Ultimately, 1 think that, just like the original DN account, Kitcher's unificàtionist account 
applies more readily to conceptually possible explanations, but fails to provide an adequate char-
acterisation of what counts as a justified explanation. As noticed previously, it seems that sorne 
propositions are more suited to stand on the side of the premises (or explicans) than others; con-
versely, sorne propositions are more suited to stand on the side of the conclusions (or explican-
dum). This further suggests that sorne models are possible, while other models are impossible for 
purely logical reasons and that a logically impossible model cannot be shown to be true or suc-
cessful for the very simple reason that it cannot be hypothesised in the first place. Thus, it seems 
correct to conclude that empirical justification is asymmetrically dependent on conceptual possi-
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bility. Nevertheless, it can hardly be argued that a conceptually possible model is necessarily or 
probably true. 
By dissociating the issue of justification from the possibility of providing àn explanation, 
it becomes possible to define a more flexible link between explanatory models and theories. 
Given the total store of explanations, the propositions standing on the side of the conclusion (the 
explicandum) remain what they are, a description of the phenomenon to be explained. In con-
trast, the propositions standing on the side of the premises (the explicans) might eventually form 
a theory, where a theory is a set of recurring premises common to several models. This approach 
takes into account Kitcher's requirement that many scientific explanations are grounded by a set 
of propositions that can be applied in wide variety of situations, but does not restrict explanation 
to 'the most stringent derivation from the smallest set of premises'. 
6.10 The Complemellfllrifj' anti Part;al Overillp oftfte Pl'Opused Accoullt.\' of E).1J[alla t;on 
1 
Despite their respective critiques, each of the five accounts of explanation presented in 
the previous sections captures sorne important characteristics of the modelling practice in sci-
ence. What further renders even more difficult a choice is the fact that many accounts overlap 
with each other. 1 already showed how the statistical account overlaps a manipulationist one. 
Given the prevalence of the notion of 'mechanism' and the absence of well-defined laws 
in newly emerging sciences such as molecular biology (Wimsatt, 1972; Machamer, et al., 2000), 
sorne authors argue that intuitive, mechanism-centered approaches to explanation are radically 
different from deductive, law-based approaches (Waskan, 2006 p. 236). Nevertheless, many em-
pirical laws and correlations reflect a 'black-box' kind of knowledge about how certain actions 
yield certain effects in the absence of any further understanding of the alleged mechanism under-
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lying these laws and correlations. For example, it is possible to actively cause cancer without un-
derstanding the underlying mechanism; whether or not we further understand that smoking 
causes mutations and cumulative mutations result in uncontrolled proliferation, to say that smok-
ing explains cancer is still a practically useful explanation. More so, sorne laws are deemed fun-
damental and therefore devoid of any underling mechanism. For example, the first law of dy-
namics states that applying a force result in acceleration of the bodies onto which the force is ap-
plied; in a classical context, there is no underlying mechanism and no further explanation of the 
mode of action of contact forces. This suggests that the difference between fundamental laws and 
more complex mechanisms hinges on the possibility of decomposing a 'black-box' empirical 
correlation into a specific sequence of more primitive correlations. 
If this kind of thinking is correct, then there is a considerable overlap between the DN 
and the manipulationist accounts. The DN account frames explanations in terms of fundamental 
laws and 'black-box' empirical correlations while a mechanism-centered account assumes that 
'black-box' empirical correlations reduce to combinations of more fundamental modes of ac-
tions. For example, the widespread quest for causal mechanisms in the 19th century is at the same 
time an attempt to derive empiricallaws from mechanical theories. Is a kinetic model of air in a 
rigid cylinder aDN-style explanation or a CM explanation of the behaviour of air? Presumably, it 
de pends on whether we adopt an instrumentalist or a realist point of view in regard to the unob-
servables postulated by kinetic explanations. 
Even more striking, mechanisms always function in accordance with a set of rules. For 
example, Mendel' s genetic explanation hypothesises a mechanism for heredity, and, at the same 
time, it is framed as a deductive consequence of a set of 'laws'. On one hand, Mendel hypothe-
sised the existence of 'genetic elements', that is, of particle-like entities, that are transmitted via 
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semen or pollen, that mix with their female counterparts and that later on segregate in a specifie 
pattern before being transmitted to the offspring. The subsequent development of molecular bi-
ology stemmed essentially from the study of the physical making and the mode of action ofthese 
'elements'. On the other hand, the behaviour of the 'genetic partic1es', most notably their distri-
bution along severa! generations, is described by probabilistic 'laws'. These 'laws' 'dictate' how 
the mechanism functions, that is, how the 'genetic elements' segregate following fertilisation. In 
the context of c1assical genetics, the mechanism remains essentially a hypothesis, while the 
'laws' are essentially descriptive, and therefore readily open to empirical verification; thus, the 
'laws' and the deductive character of the explanation is more important and better justified than 
its causal-mechanistic aspect. During the development of molecular biology, the tables turned, 
the mechanism becoming more and more important, while the 'laws' of c1assical genetics degen-
erated into the obsolete. Note however that molecular mechanisms too 'obey' laws. They obey 
the 'laws' of chemistry. The RNA polymerase binds DNA in accordance with the 'laws' of 
chemistry. This is not to say that the polymerase-DNA interaction is a deductive consequence of 
a set of premises; rather, this means that the interaction is dependent on the concentration of the 
substrate, their affinity, turnover rate, etc., as described by the 'laws' of chemistry. Taking into 
account these factors yields predictions· about the behaviour of the interaction and, ultimately, 
about the functioning of the mechanism. 
The above clearly indicates that DN and CM accounts focus on complementary aspects of 
the same explanation. Likewise, CM and manipulationist accounts also overlap. For one thing, in 
the context of classical mechanics, experimental manipulability is not easily distinguishable from 
causal mechanisms consisting of collisions and contact forces. In fact, we can easily argue that 
classical mechanical models are attempts to extend the notion of manipulability, as experienced 
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in the context of average-size macroscopic objects, to phenomena which are not empirically de-
scribed in terms of forces, motions, collisions, etc. In addition, and as discussed on a previous 
occasion, the mechanisms postulated by molecular biology are almost always interpreted in a 
manipulationist sense, as statements about how the behaviour of a phenomenon can be altered by , 
altering its underlying mechanism. 
Finally, scientists don't think of an explanation that fails to subsume a phenomenon under 
the larger umbrella of a more general theory as being entirely satisfactory. As a matter of fact, aIl 
mechanisms are mechanisms of a certain kind. The Mendelian mechanism for heredity is a prob-
abilistic one about mixing particles and then redistributing them. Molecular mechanisms are 
chemical; they function in virtue of chemical interactions. Physiological mechanisms are classi-
cal mechanisms relying on the notion of contact force and the laws 'dictating' its behaviour. And 
so on. It is impossible to talk of mechanisms simpliciter. A set of rules stating sorne fundamental 
ways of action must also be specified. On the other hand, a technologically sterile explanation is 
also deemed to be profoundly unsatisfactory. Although there are exceptions,typically, scientists 
think of their explanatory models as being at the same time a matter of deriving already estab-
lished empirical descriptions and new predictions from more general principles, of uncovering 
the causal mechanisms underlying a phenomenon and of gaining experimental control ultimately 
responsible for developing technological applications. This applies just aswell to physics as to 
newer sciences such as molecular biology and empirical psychology. 
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CHAPTER 7 
1 
MODEI~sRELATED TO THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
7.1 COl1jirmab/e E'<J{/al1atory ll'lode/s 
1 
After paying ~ue consideration to the various accounts of explanation, 1 will now concen-
trate specifically on l version of the DN account which, in my opinion, is able to provide a suÎt-
1 
able philosophical frhmework for most investigations concerning the theoretical constraints on 
1 
hypothesis formation~ 
Before pursuLg any further, note also .that the sense in which 1 use the term 'mode!' in, 
this section should not be confused with the model theory in mathematics [i.e., as a structures 
that makes the sente~ces of a theory true, where a theory is a set of sentences in a formal lan-
1 
guage (Bell, et al., 1977)]. lt is also distinct from the so-called 'models of data' (e.g., fitting the 
curve, statistical anal~sis, etc.) introduced by Suppes (1962). Finally, despite some commonali-
1 
ties, 1 also draw a dis~inction between theoretical and material models. Set aside models used for 
didactic purposes, material models are particular experimental setups, usually reproducing in the 
1 
lab naturaIly-occUITibg phenomena (Hesse, 1966) and that can have an explanatory value in vir-
, . . 
1 
tue of the similarity they bear with the phenomena they mimic (Giere, 1988). In contrast, theo-
, 
, 
, 
retical models explicitly aim to subsume a particular phenomenon under the larger umbrella of a 
1 
more general pattern;of explanation. My CUITent investigation concerns exclusively the latter. 16 
1 
, 
1 
Although highly constrictive, the framing of models as more or less rigorous inferences 
1 
of conclusions from .a set of premises is inevitable. As a former molecular oncologist, set aside 
experimental model~ and scale models used for didactic purposes, the models l worked with 
1 
, 
aimed to explain v*"ious biological functions and phenomena by appealing to biochemical 
1 
mechanisms [this as~ect of contemporary research in biology was already noted by Wimsatt 
1 
(1976) and is being burrently investigated by several philosophers of biology (Darden, 2006)]. 
1 
Nevertheless, ev en t~ough typical thinking in terms of molecular mechanisms does not involve 
i . 
1 
any formaI apparatus and rigorous mathematical derivations, inferences must be made. For in-
1 
, 
1 
stance, in order to e?cplain cell proliferation, l may postulate a mechanism whereby protein X 
1 
1 
binds protein Y at so~e point c during the cell cycle. In order for my model to explain the prolif-
eration of ceIls, l must be able to infer that, given my knowledge of molecular biology, if a cer-
, 
1 
, 
tain sequence of events happens as described by the putative mechanism, cell proliferation 
should occur. Thus, t,he model plus a number of background assumptions serve as necessary and 
sufficient basis for dhiving a number of conclusions. In paraIlel, for the sake of empirical con-
1 
firmation, l must als9 be able to infer sorne easily verifiable prediction. Thus, given my knowl-
1 
, 
edge of biochemistri and physical chemistry, if X binds Yat point c, l might infer that extracts 
from cells in c subjeeted electrophoresis must reveal bulkier XY complexes not present in control 
1 
extracts from cells ,ndt in c. 
i 
16 For a discussion of the ~arious understandings of the term 'mode!' see Frigg (2006). 
! 
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Note that l am not conflating models, explanations and confirmation. l simply say that 
they intersect: many models explain and, in order to have any empirical relevance, they must al-
low for the inference of predictions. Furthermore, l cannot help noticing that mariy inferences at 
play in scientific reasoning are often times straightforward deductions embedded in a realist in-
terpretation under which explanation and prediction overlap. 
According to clear-cut formulations ofthedeductive-nomological account of explanation 
(DN) and hypothetico-deductive method of confirmation (HD), the inferences at play in explana-
tion and confirmation are distinct logical or mathematical deductions. Strictly speaking, the re-
quirement for deduction embedded in classical HD/DN accounts is compatible with instrumen-
talism and does not require that the model explains or represents anything, but simply that it en-
tails sorne target propositions. Nevertheless, many deductive models are physically interpreted in 
such a way that deductive bits of scientific reasoning amount to explanations of empirical phe-
nomena. Stated in general terms, if a deductive model entails the target predictions standing on 
the side of the conclusion, it is hypothesised that the sum total of the propositions used to derive 
the conclusions in question hold true of the target phenomenon. No su ch hypotheses are formu-
lated if it is assumed from the very beginning that the model has a purely instrumental use. 
Sometimes, hypothesising that certain propositions hold true of a phenomenon postulates 
new means of experimental control over the phenomenon in question., This is the case, for exam-
pie, of Newton's gravitational model for planetary motion, which predicts deductively that a 
body having a sufficient initial speed may be launched into orbit around Earth. The prediction is 
correct, meaning that Newton's mechanical explanation provides a 'recipe' for physically con-
structing 'planet-like' motions (i.e., the laws of mechanics are 'laws of nature', as opposed to 
mathematical propositions used to generate predictions). In other words, realistically interpreted, 
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Newton's model also specifies the 'mechanism' responsible for physically generating planetary 
motions. 
In other cases, the propositions standing on the side of the premises describe the proper-
ties sorne entities must have in order to explain the target phenomenon. In an attempt to explain 
genetic inheritance, Mendel hypothesised the existence of physical entities transmitted from par-
, 
ents to offspring and which are responsible for determining the phenotypes of the studied organ-
isms. These entities are transmitted from one generation to the next and determine the phenotype 
in a peculiar manner, as described by 'Mendel's laws'. Once again, it is worth mentioning that 
Mendel's genetic explanation constitutes a hypothesis only in reference to the existence of physi-
cal parti cl es obeying 'Mendel's laws'. If these laws are not intended to describe the behaviour of 
physical particles, they retain their instrumental value as algorithms for predicting the target phe-
notypic distributions, but fail to constitute confirmable or falsifiable hypotheses about external 
reality. Mendel's explanation gained empirical relevance the moment it was discovered that 
chromosomes segregate during meiosis in agreement with 'Mendel's first law': there are physi-
cal entities playing a role in the determination of the phenotype and these entities are transmitted 
from parents to offspring as postulated by 'Mendel's first law'. 
For Newton and his followers, the gravitational model was at the same time a deduction 
of conclusions from premises and an explanation of how planetary motion was physically gener-
ated as dictated by 'laws of nature'. Likewise, in the mînds of most geneticists Mendel's model 
was and still is a rigorous deduction of predictions from a set of premise-propositions and, at the 
same time, a partially specified explanatory mechanism whereby chromosomes are paired and 
segregated during meiosis. 1 conclude therefore that even if scientists often reason in terms of 
mechanisms responsible for physically generating certain phenomena, this does mean that mod-
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elling in science has nothing to do with deductively deriving propositions form other proposi-
tions for the purposes of explanation and confirmation. After aIl, mechanisms function according 
to a set of rules specifie to the kind of mechanism we are dealing with and without which it 
would be impossible to talk about the functioning of the mechanism in abstracto, that is, in the 
absence of a physical, actually functioning mechanism. 
7.2 Fllmlame/ltal Hypotheses llnd the Motlel- TheOl:F Distillction in Sciellce 
As discussed above, 1 believe that several key aspects of the practice of modelling in sci-
ence are captured by a combination between DN accounts of explanation (Hempel, et al., 1965; 
Kitcher, 1989; Salmon, 1989), and sorne version of the HD method [as originally described by 
Newton and Descartes, or again by Popper's falsificationism (1959; 1965)], which further trans-
forms the premises present in deductive accounts into hypotheses about the phenomenon targeted 
by the model. The guiding idea is that a set of premises consisting of general laws, model-
specifie assumption plus statements specitying initial conditions logically or mathematically im-
ply a description of sorne aspect of the phenomenon under study, where the implication relation-
ship is further given a realist interpretation explaining how the phenomenon is generated and, by 
the sarne token, predicting novel means of experimental control. 
1 already quoted Morrison in reference to the semantic incompatibility problem (Morri-
son, 2000 p. 49). With that occasion, 1 noted that the exemplified models belong to the same 
family of explanations: the guiding idea underlying ail kinetic models of gases and heat proc-
esses is that these processes reduce to particles interacting mechanically. Compressibility, rare-
faction, liquefaction, diffusion, osmosis, Brownian motion, divisibility, heat, chemical experi-
104 
ments, etc., all corroborate to some extent the fundamental hypothesis according to which agas 
is composed of partic1es in motion, or at very least some other version of atomism. 
In principle, there is some freedom as to how one might use this information in order to 
formulate higher-level hypotheses concerning the structure of the phenomenon and the behaviour 
of the aIleged partic1es of which it is made. However, the preferred fundamental hypothesis 
states that whatever atomic explanation we may choose in order to model (and explain) a given 
phenomenon will not contradict the fundamental laws of c1assical mechanics, such as the law of 
inertia applied in reference to the 'mechanical atoms' agas is presumably made of. In other 
words, aIl the models considered are models of c1assical mechanics. This is not to say that the 
laws and principles of c1assical mechanics ho Id true a priori (i.e., by convention) in respect to gas 
and heat phenomena. Rather, the fundamental hypothesis common to aIl these models aims to 
extend the domain of application of c1assical mechanics to new phenomena; whether the exten-
sion is justified or not remains a matter of empirical investigation. 
Thus, it can be easily argued that the general propositions of c1assical mechani~s, such as 
the three laws of dynamics, de scribe certain particular experimental setups and phenomena like 
rolling balls, colliding balls, pushing carts or one observer pushing another observer. As funda-
mental principles of the mechanical theory, these empirical laws are raised at the rank of general 
principles which aIl mechanical models must satisfy if they are to be models of c1assical mec han-
ics. In as much as mechanical models are also meant to de scribe or assert something about a 
phenomenon, one of the fundamental hypothesis common to aIl mechanical models for various 
phenomena is that the three laws of dynamics hold true of the phenomenon, for instance in the 
sense that they de scribe the experimental control one can gain over the phenomenon (von 
Wright, 1971; Woodward, 2003). 
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Formulating these correlations as empirical laws such as F = ma relies on further low-
level inductions extending the correlation for any force, mass and acceleration magnitudes, 
where 'any' refers to the arbitrarily assigned domain ofreal number values (a do main larger than 
that of actual observations, where the latter is only a subset of rational numbers). Typically, it is 
only required that the mathematical representation of empirical correlations such as the second 
law of motion remains empirically adequate in respect to a range of possible measurements. No 
claims of truth are attached to such representations and the mathematical apparatus behind this 
representation is not said to have a reality outside the theory; quite on the contrary, the latter is 
more or less explicitly assumed to be purely instrumental. Since the induction at work here is 
low-Ievel, that is, no new entities, properties or relationships are posited, mathematical represen-
tation of empiricallaws is usually not a matter of dispute between realists and antirealists. Note 
however that, as discussed in the previous chapters, the mathematical representation of empirical 
knowledge undermines strict verificationism and operationalism. It also undermines strict falsifi-
cationism, since a minimal form of induction must be accepted in order to subsume empirical • 
data under a convenient mathematical format. 
As fundamental principles of a theory aiming at universality, the laws of classical me-
chanics are raised to the rank of general propositions which all mechanical models must satisfy if 
they are to be models of dassical mechanics. Conversely, in as much as mechanical models are 
also meant to de scribe or assert something about a phenomenon, one of the fundamental hy-
pothesis common to all mechanical models for various phenomena is that the three laws of dy-
namics, together with a law of addition of scalar and vectorial physical magnitudes, hold true of 
the phenomenon. Assuming a manipulationist interpretation of the truth relationship, we can fur-
ther daim that these laws are true in respect to the modelled phenomenon in the sense that they 
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describe the experimental control one can achieve over the phenomenon (i.e., the desired motion 
can be achieved as hypothesised by the se laws). 
7.3 Target Empirica/ Laws 
Many scientific models are designed from the very beginning not only having in mind a 
set of theoretical propositions which they must satisfy if they are to be models of a given theory, 
but also with the specific aim to allow the derivation of an already empirically established law 
starting from the general propositions of the theory. A simple example is Newton's gravitational 
model for planetary motion. More complex examples are provided by kinetic models for gases or 
heat phenomena (Morrison, 2000). In both cases, the strategy is the same. On the si de of the 
premises stand the three laws of dynamics. On the side of the conclusion stands a set of empirical 
laws, such as Kepler's laws or Boyle's law; once again, these laws constitute approximations of 
actual measurements summarising a great amount of data under a simple mathematical formula-
tion. This indicates that scientific models are designed from the very beginning in such a way 
that 
1) they must satisfy a set of theoretical propositions if they are to be models of a given the-
ory (the explicans); and 
2) they allow the derivation of already empirically established laws describing the phe-
nomenon to be modelled (the explicandum). 
In the above mentioned examples, classical mechanics constitutes a higher-Ievel theoreti-
cal constraint on the formulation of hypotheses concerning the behaviour of gases and heat ex-
change phenomena. We can see right away that 'theoretical' does not necessarily mean 'concep-
tuaI', 'logical' or 'mathematical' since the laws of mechanics are already interpreted, hold true in 
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respect to sorne phenomena and experimental setups and are, at their origin, empirical proposi-
tions. Instead, it is question here of unifying several domains of investigation in such a way that 
the laws proper to one domain are extended to a new domain. 
7.4 A/ode/-Specifie Hypotheses 
As Putnam, Lakatos and others pointed out on numerous occaSIOns (Duhem, 1906; 
Quine, 1951; Lakatos, 1970; Putnam, 1991), it is not always possible to derive the desired em-
piricallaw from the laws of the theory alone. 17 In many cases, modelling becomes a constructive 
problem solving strategy. Assuming that the fundamental hypothesis holds true of the modelled 
phenomenon, we have to ask ourse Ives what other assumptions are required in order to derive the 
target empirical law. At this point, additional, model-specific hypotheses usually need to be in-
troduced, such as hypotheses concerning the shape, size and interactions between gas particles 
thus yielding models for ideal gases, van der Waals gases, etc. From the conjunction of the two 
sets of hypotheses, the general ones belongi~g to the theory and the particular ones belonging to 
each individual model, predictions, such as positions, correlations between observables or laws, 
again involving observables and observable relationships between observables, are derived. 
Assuming that the atoms are quasi-infinitesimal, non-interacting, perfectly elastic little 
balls, then Boyle' s law should hold true of them, as postulated by the ideal-gas model. Or again, 
assuming that the atoms are weakly interacting spheres of non-negligible radius, then the laws 
hypothesised by the van der Waals model should hold true. In as much as the model-predicted 
laws match or approximate empirically established laws, it is inferred that if the principles of 
17 Of particular interest is Kitcher's solution to the problem of the 'underdetermination of theories by empirical evi-
dence' (Quine, 1975; Laudan, 1996). Once the distinction between a fundamental hypothesis ('core theOl-Y') and 
model-specific hypotheses ('background assumptions', 'auxiliary hypotheses', etc.) is made, it becomes possible to 
argue that even if two theories are empirically equiva1ent, when supplemented with distinct model-specific hypothe-
ses, they yield distinct predictions about observable phenomena (Kitcher, 1982). 
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classical mechanics ho Id true about the studied gas and for the given temperature and pressure 
conditions under which the empirical laws holds true, then the gas in question is empirically in-
distinguishable from or empirically equivalent to a collection of point-like partic1es in random, 
elastic collision, or aga in indistinguishable from and equivalent to a collection of 'sticky balls', 
etc. 
7.5 80me Remarks COllcernÎllg Commoll Post-Positil1ist Concerns 
1 don't think that the above treatment of the modelling practice will impress anyone as 
being radically novel and osé. Nevertheless 1 have to point out that it has the advantage of pre-
serving the simplicity of traditional deductive accounts, while being flexible enough to accom-
modate sorne common post-positivist concerns. Most notably, acknowledging the necessity of 
model-specific hypotheses is tantamount to acknowledging at least a partial autonomy of models 
in respect to the theory. In reaction to the positivist, or syntactic view, which reduce models to 
physical interpretations ofaxiomatised theories (Campbell, 1920; Nagel, 1961), adepts of the 
semantic view c1aim that theories are collections of related models (van Fraassen, 1980; Giere, 
1988). A more recent tendency is to argue out that it is reasonable to see models as essentially 
independent of theories. At the very extreme of this tendency, Cartwright discusses examples of 
models commonly used in engineering and experimental physics, yet not attached to any theory 
in particular (Cartwright, 1983; Cartwright, et al., 1995) and argues that theories do not provide 
efficient templates for constructing models (Cartwright, 1999). Following a different lead, Dar-
den and Maull (Darden, 2006 pp. 128, 130-132) argue that the traditional positivist view accord-
ing to which theories consists of a set ofaxioms used in the derivation of prediction-propositions 
should be replaced by the more flexible notion of 'field', where a field comprises a numb'er of 
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propositions consists of a problem, presumably relevant data and associated experimental tech-
niques used to acquire this data, and explanatory strategies revealing how the relevant data can 
be used towards providing a solution to the problem. The authors further argue that in order to 
provide the solution for any given problem, researchers may use data, techniques and explana-
tory strategies belonging to distinct fields of investigation, thus generating "interfieId' theories 
relying on an extensive body of background knowledge, assumptions and explanatory strategies 
(2006 pp. 132-143). 
The "fundamentai vs. model-specific hypotheses' approach which 1 advocate links mod-
els to theories and treats them as attempts to extend the domain of application of pre-existing ex-
planations usually amounting to theories, that is, to general, and ideally universal patterns of 
explanations - to new phenomena and domains of investigation. On one hand, my approach re-
tains sorne similarity with the positivist view, in the sense that different models represent at-
tempts to apply the same theory to different phenomena, thus preserving an important role for 
theories in the development of models. On the other hand, since the internaI resources of a theory 
must often be upgraded via additional hypotheses external to the theory in order to explain new 
phenomena, models should be regarded as partially independent constructions. This remark joins 
Morrison's (1999) daim that models are autonomous from theories in respect to their construc-
tion and to their role in the overall economy of scientific knowledge, as well as Redhead's 
(1980) observation that, often times, theories are incompletely specified and require additional, 
model-specific constraints before they can be applied to various situations. 
My account is also partially compatible with Darden's 'field' approach. Since each modei 
amounts to an attempt to extend the domain of application of existing explanatory strategies to 
new phenomena and since, as a general ru1e, such extensions require the introduction of model-
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specific hypotheses external to the theory, the formulation of models must rely on sorne form of 
'out-of-field' thinking. Even more striking, typical fields of investigation in biology (such as cy-
tology and Mendelian genetics)· can be characterised as being bodies of knowledge about a cer-
tain target phenomenon (the 'bits and pieces' living organisms are made of and sexual reproduc-
tion) obtained via the use of a specific experimental technique (microscopy & associated staining 
techniques and, respectively, artificial breeding) and eventually subsumed under the umbrella of 
a higher-Ievel theoretical or explanatory hypothesis supported by the available data and entailing 
novel predictions about the target phenomenon (the cell is the smallest functional unit of life, 
which is a theoretical generalisation of the fact that aIl the studied organisms were made of cells 
and, in the case of genetics, Mendel's allele explanation). It seems therefore that, minimalIy, a 
field is a body of data acquired via certain technique of investigation; what 1 calI a model is noth-
ing else than an 'intrafield' explanation. In as much as it is possible to extend such an 'intrafield' 
explanation to a new domain of investigation consisting of seemingly similar or radically differ-
ent phenomena without dropping any of its constituent hypotheses - although this may not ex-
clude the addition of new, model-specific hypotheses - the model is officially upgraded to the 
rank of theory. Furthermore, the above understanding of the model-theory distinction in science 
is compatible with Darden's suggestion that new theories are developed by importing and ad apt-
ing explanatory strategies already present in other fields of investigation (2006 pp. 150-151). AI-
ternatively, nothing prohibits the generation of parallei 'interfield' explanations which may or 
may not be consistent with 'intrafield' explanations in respect to entailed predictions, necessary 
assumptions or postulated entities. In as much as 'intrafield' explanations are consistent with the 
'interfield' explanation, theories can be delimited as a set of recurring hypotheses common to 
both 'intra-' and 'inter-field' explanations. Obviously, in neither case the fundamental hypothe-
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ses associated with the the ory are necessarily axioms; quite on the contrary, they typically do not 
provide sufficient theoretical resources for the derivation of all the propositions entailed by the 
various models artached to the theory. N evertheless, they do provide an initial body of premises, 
that is, the incomplete draft of a deductive argument which, once complemented by model-
specific hypotheses, allows for the derivation of target empiricallaws responsible for the empiri-
cal adequacy and the explanatory value of the model, as well as novel predictions eventually 
submirted to empirical testing. 
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CHAPTER8 
THE CHALLENGES OF CONFIRMATION HOLISM 
8. f COl~/'irmation Holism 
Since model-specific hypotheses are required in order to derive the target empiricallaw 
from the fundamental hypothesis, confirmation (or corroboration) becomes holistic. But if con-
firmation is holistic, then it is not clear what is targeted by confirmation, the fundamental hy-
pothesis or the specifie hypotheses introduced by the model (Putnam, 1991). 
Given this ambiguity, Lakatos (1970) further argues that a theory can always 'digest' its 
counterevidence by producing more complex models, correcting inadequacies by adding more 
and more assumptions, until one model is finally verified. Lakatos's argument goes as follows: 
Imagine two true propositions. One is the fundamental hypothesis, which we take to be true a 
priori because we want to save the theory; the other, is an empirically established law, correla-
tion, co-variation, etc, which is true in virtue of its empirical status. Now, given these two propo-
sitions, where the first one belongs among the premises and the second is the conclusion, we ask 
ourselves what other propositions are required in order to bridge premises and conclusion. It 
seems that the game is rigged. In as much as we can devise a suitable set of bridging auxiliary 
assumptions, we are bound to win. In extreme cases we can choose to defend a theory by postu-
lating certain unobservable or difficult to confirm facts via auxiliary assumptions. Thus, Lakatos 
concludes, whether we keep or abandon the theory has nothing to do with confirmation and falsi-
fication, but rather with our determination to save the theory. Typically, we begin by defending a 
theory, but, if in the long run the hypothesised background assumptions are not verified, new 
theories are developed and the old one is eventually abandoned [for a discussion of the specific 
example of Newton's theory of gravitation, see Lakatos (1970 pp. 125, 133-8)]. 
Ultimately, this conclusion reiterates by means of particular examples the general argu-
ment for verification holism originally formulated by Duhem: 
"The physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole 
group ofhypotheses." 
(1906 p. 187) 
"The only thing the experiment teaches us is that, among ail the propositions used to predict 
the phenomenon and to verify that il has not been prod~ced, there is at least one error; but 
where the error lies is just what the experiment does not tell us." 
(1906 p. 185) 
Picking up on this central idea, Quine frames a more radical form of holism: not only we 
don't know where the error lies, but, in principle, we could save any proposition within a theory 
by making enough adjustments elsewhere in the theory. He famously illustrates sorne of the most 
extreme consequences of holism by means of a rather compelling metaphor: 
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"the totality of our so-called knowledge [ ... ] is a man-made fabric which impinges on experi-
ence only on the edges. [ ... ] A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjust-
ments in the interior of the field. [ ... ] But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-
evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. [ ... ] Any statement can be held true 
come what may, ifwe make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system." 
(1951 pp. 39-40) 
8.2 Newton 's Gral'itational !Hode! of Phmetal'y lHotioll 
In order to better understand the problem, and a possible solution, it is becomes profitable 
to introduce first a simple example that illustrates it. The example 1 have in mind is Newton's 
gravitational model of planetary motion. 
The fundamental hypothesis underlying Newton's explanation states that any model of 
planetary motion should be a mechanical one. In conformity with at least the first two laws of 
dynamics, this means that the model must yield the unique spatial and temporal distribution of 
forces responsible for deflecting what would have otherwise been a uniform rectilinear motion of 
planets into the closed paths observed by astronomers. This unique distribution of forces is 
common to aIl mechanical models for planetary motion and will not change from one model to 
another. Any model that fails to comply with this fundamental requirement cannot be a model of 
classical mechanics. 
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Fundamental hypothesis: 
The three laws of dynamics 
• First law: 
- An abject will stay at rest or move at a constant speed in a 
straight li ne unless acted upon by an unbalanced force. 
• Second law 
- The rate of change of the momentum of a body îs directly 
proportional ta the net force acting on it, and the direction of the 
change in momentum takes place in the direction of the net 
force. 
-;' _ .d(miJ) or F- = k -F······ k-- ma dt 
• Third law 
- Ta every action there is an equal but opposite reaction (if obje ct 
A exerts a force on abject B, abject B will exert the same 
magnitude force on A, but in the opposite direction). 
Figure Hl, The Three La\'rs of Dynamit's 
Note that from the standpoint of the theory, it doesn't matter how the distribution of forces is ob-
tained. Each model will offer a different solution. One model may postulate attractive forces act-
ing at a distance, while alternative models may appeal local contact forces, such as friction, jet 
propulsion, angels pushing the planets, etc. 
The target empirical laws responsible for the empirical adequacy of the model are Ke-
pler' s laws. Assuming that the Copernican interpretation stands true, these laws subsume in a 
suitable mathematical form a great number of astronomical observations about the space-time 
positions of planets. Any model, mechanical or otherwise, that fails to approximate these laws 
cannot be a true model of planetary motion because it would fail to be empirically adequate in 
the first place. The figure below provides a quick review of the three laws which made Kepler 
famous: 
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Empirical adequacy constraints: 
Kepler's laws 
• The first law : The orbit of 
every planet is an ellipse with 
the sun at one of the foci. 
• The second law: A Une joining 
a planet and the sun sweeps 
out equal areas during equal 
intervals oftime. 
• The third law : The squares of 
the orbital periods (P) of 
planets are directly 
proportional to the cubes of the 
semi-malQfaxis ~a) of the 
orbits. (P- IX a ) 
Figure 11. Kepler's Laws 
Aside the se two points of commonality between aIl empirically adequate mechanical 
models of planetary motion, each individual model adds its own, model-specific hypotheses. As 
holists like to point out, in many cases the theory fails to provide aH the propositions required for 
deriving predictions. We have already seen that in the case of kinetic models additional proposi-
tions are supplied as model-specific hypotheses. Given the presence of these extra hypotheses, 
Duhem (1906), Quine (1951), Lakatos (1970), Putnam (1991) and many others argue that a sci-
entific a model can never be derived from the theory alone, but a mimber of 'background as-
sumptions' must be taken into account. 
In a now classical analysis of Newton's gravitational explanation of planetary motion, 
Putnam makes the following case: 
"What do we do, then, when we apply this theory to an astronomical situation? Typically we 
make certain simplifying assumptions. For example, ifwe are deducïng the orbit of the earth 
we might assume as a first approximation: 
(I) No bodies exist except the sun and the earth. 
(II) The sun and the earth exist in a hard vacuum. 
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(III) The sun and the earth are subject to no forces except mutually induced gravita-
tional forces. 
From the conjunction of the theory of universal gravitation (U G.) and these auxiliary state-
ments (A.S.) we can, indeed, deduce certain predictions - e.g., Kepler 's laws. [ ... ] But it is 
important to note that these predictions do not come from the theory alone, but from the con-
junction of the theory with A.S." 
(1991 p. 124) 
We retain therefore a number of idealisations, to be discussed later on, and a core model-specific 
hypothesis, namely Newton's inverse square for grayitational forces. This law is further required 
to bridge the fundamental hypothesis (the premise) and Kepler's laws (the conclusion). 
The figure bellow summarises the alleged path of reasoning which led Newton to postu-
late the inverse square law as a necessary model-specific hypothesis required for the derivation 
of Kepler's laws from classical mechanics: 
Model-specifie hypotheses: 
what else is needed for the derivation? 
• Fundamental hypothesis 
• Further assumptions 
• Kepler's laws 
• Fundamental hypothesis 
Model-specifie hypotheses 
- Required forces are 
gravitational 
_ For a hypolhelical planel on a circular 
orbil ( QI Moon around Earth): 
,= mv2 / r , where v = 2" r / 1 
(circumference /Iime) 
=>f=4,,2 mr /I' 
For Iwo planels on circular orbits, 
',/ f, = m, r, t/ / m, r, l,', where Il/ 
1,' = r,3/ r,> (Kepler's 3n! law) 
=>f,/f,= m, r//m2 r,z p 2 a:! 
ln general CJ .. Cl(M + m)" 
• Kepler's laws 
Figure 12. Auxiliary Assllmptions 
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Due to its length, 1 will not reproduce the derivation in full mathematical detail. The 
reader can easily find several proofs in the literature, as weIl as simplified versions in introduc-
tory textbooks. For Newton's initial insights, see his Principia, Proposition XI (Newton, 1687). 
F or a derivation of Newton' s inverse square law from Kepler' s laws, see Michels (1973). For a 
derivation of Kepler's laws from the inverse square law, see Hyman (1993). The figure below 
provides a quick overview of the main steps of the derivation: 
Delivationof the 1"1aw 
For Iwo masses m, and trio the 
solution 10 the Iwo body probIem is 
an equation of motion. In in polar 
ooordinaies (r. 0). 
r:: II' 1 G{m,+",,)(1 + e cos 0), 
where h il; a conslanl and e il; the 
eœentricily of the ortlit. This is the 
polar equation of a oonic section. 
Whoo !he plane is pe.rpendicuIar 10 
the oone's axis, the ~ is a circle 
(ellpIicily e '" 0); when il is paralIeI Jo 
one &ide, the resull is a paraboIa (e 
'" 1); intermed"late angles resutt În 
ellipses (0 < e < 1). A hyperboIa 
resulls when the angle the plane ~ 
makes with !he cone's side is greater e>1 
than the opening angle of the COlle 
(e> 1). Tho figure al the righl dcpicls Con ica 1 sections 
the orbils of particIes having 
dilferenllolal eoergies. 
Dert\latIon of the 2'"' Iaw 
A body is moving on an eIIipIjçal orbi! wiItJ a veIocity v al 
a distance rCmm the focus F. During a short tîme 
inletval t. the body moves from Plo Q and the radius 
vootor sweeps through the angle AO= VI Mr. where VI is 
the çomponent of v peq>endicu!ar 10 r. During lhis tîme. 
the radius vootor has swept out the triangle FPO. the 
ares of which is approximately AA " tVNJ2. In the Iimil 
given Dy t approa<:hing zen>. _ have 
dAIrIt:: w{2 :: %i'(d8IdQ. 
The anguIar momentum L = rX p = m Ir X v) of the body 
(perpendicuIar 10 the plallQ defined Dy , and v) is 
L=mv,r= mi' rIIlIdt 
Thus, the rate of sweeping out ailla is gjven Dy 
dAIrIt= %i'(d8IdQ:: L 12m. L and m am oonstanIs, 
Iharef_ dAMl, the raie of sweeping out aœa must be a 
constant 
DeriYatIon of the 3'" iaw 
Giveo. Iwo bodies III, and trio. OIbîting Iheir 
centre of mass al distances r, and '2. 
F __ = F,:: IDtv,21 r, = 4Ji1 m,r, 1 Pl:: 
F,. = m,.V22 1 '2 :: 4Ji1 ""'2 1 Pl. 
Thorefore ,,' r2 '" "" , m, (the more massive 
body 0IbiIs doser 10 the common centre of 
mass!han the less massive body). The Iotal 
separation of the Iwo bodies is given by 
a = " + '2, which givas r, :: m,a 1 (m, + m,.). 
Thus, Pl :: 4Ji1 a' 1 G(m, + ",,1. 
Centre of mass 
", 
If m, is the Sun and m, a plane!, Ihen m, » 
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8.3 AltenUlte il/ecltonÎCa/ il/ode/.'" of Plmzetary .MotiOll 
It is worth noting that different model-specific hypotheses bridge premises and conclu-
sions for non-gravitational models, For instance, Putnam suggests alternate models in which a 
friction medium or a different kind of force is responsible for the acceleration of planets: 
"When the predictions about the orbit of Uranus that were made on the basis of the theory of 
universal gravitaüon and the assumption that the known planets were ail there turned out to 
be wrong, Leverrier in France and Adams in England simultaneously predictedthat there 
must be another planet, ln fact, this planet was discovered - il was Neptune. Had this modifi-
cation on the A.S. not been successful, still others might have been tried - e.g., postulating a 
medium through which the planets are moving, instead of a hard vacuum or postulating sig-
nificant non gravitation al forces." 
(1991 p. 125) 
Likewise, a different bridging law is attached to the friction model telling us how friction 
forces vary along the path of a planet in order to yield the observed orbit, thus revealing some-
thing about the hypothesised medium responsible for friction. Or, assuming that the planets 
move by themselves, yet a different law will state that there are no forces acting anywhere except 
on the planets such that, if launched into outer space, a particle will simply continue its eternal, 
straight-line inertial motion, undisturbed by anything else than an eventual collision with sorne 
other body. And so on. 
8.4 Direct Confirmation (~f MiHiel-Specifie ll,JJpotlteses 
As Putnam argues in the above quote, in the event of falsification we can choose to aban-
don the fundamental hypothesis or choose to save. the fundamental hypothesis by conjoining it 
with an alternate model-specific hypothesis. The latter option is illustrated by the alternative 
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'friction-medium' and 'self-propulsion' models ofplanetary motion. It follows from here that the 
falsification of a mechanical model does not entail the falsification of the fundarnental hypothe-
sis. This is indeed a very significant result since it constitutes a counterexarnple to Popper' s 
claim that it is easier to falsif)r theories than justify them. In this case, it seems that the falsifica-
tion of classical mechanics would require the falsification of aIl possible mechanical models of 
planetary motion. Nevertheless, an argument against Popper's anti-inductionism is not what re-
tains Putnam's attention. As stated in the introduction of the chapter, Putnarn is more concerned 
by the fact that it is not clear what is targeted by confirmation, the fundarnental hypothesis or the 
specific hypotheses introduced by the model. 
1s there a solution to this problem? 1 think there is, if not a general solution, then at least 
particular, case by case solution. The confirmation of any mechanical model of planetary motion 
can be achieved on two distinct levels. The first kind of confirmation is inferential and relies on 
modest extrapolations; the second is experimental and allows the direct testing of sorne elements 
of the model. 
The first level of confirmation is achieved by associating the phenomena responsible for 
the distribution of forces with the relevant observations. For instance, if the force distribution is 
achieved via gravitational forces acting at a distance, then neighbouring massive bodies must be 
present; alternatively, if the forces are frictional, then an significant interplanetary medium must 
be present; if gaseous jets propel the planets, then the jets or volcanoes must be observed; and so 
on. At this level, confirmation relies on the extrapolation of low-Ievel correlations. For example, 
in order for the discovery of Neptune to count as a confirmation of Newton' s gravitational 
model, we must assume that since ail objects on earth have a mass and since aIl masses attract 
each other on earth (we can consider here Lord Cavendish's experiments), the sarne holds true 
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for celestial objects as weIl. The risk associated with these extrapolations is comparable to those 
associated with any low-Ievel induction. 
The second level of confirmation is open to active experimentation. Since aIl models 
must yield an identical space-time distribution of forces along the observed planetary motions, it 
is pointless to argue that they must be true because they explain the motion of planets. New pre-
dictions must also be confirmed. 18 Most notably, a true model must also predict the behaviour of 
a test particle or body outside any known planetary orbit. For example, it must predict the distri-
bution of forces responsible for shaping the motion of an artificial satellite, of a cornet penetrat-
ing the Solar System or of a self-propelled spacecraft. In as much as empirical measurements fit 
the predicted trajectory predicted by a model, that particular model is corroborated while the 
other models are falsified. 
The second level of confirmation targets directly and individually the model-specific 
laws giving the distribution of forces required to obtain the observed planetary motions inde-
pendently of any correlation with further observations of corroborating phenomena such as the 
discovery of a new planet capable of exerting gravitational forces or the presence of star dust re-
sponsible for friction. For example, given the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus, even if Nep-
tune were not discovered let' s say it reftects very little of the solar radiation it receives -, if a 
cornet penetrating the Solar System or if a manmade spacecraft exiting it are suddenly deftected 
from their path in a way that correlates with the hypothesised gravitational forces resp~msible for 
the perturbations of the orbit of Uranus, but not with Putnam's hypothesised presence of a me-
dium responsible for creating friction forces, then Newton's gravitational model ofplanetary mo-
18 Initial/y, Lakatos argued that a prediction is 'novel' if the predicted phenomenon was never observed prior to the 
prediction (Lakatos, 1970). Later on, he deemed a prediction to be 'novel' if it is not among the problems or phe-
nomena which the theory to which the prediction belongs initially aimed to solve or account for (Lakatos, et al., 
1976). My distinction between the empirically adequate conclusions aimed at by the deductive structure of a model 
and the further predictions following from it matches the latter definition. 
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tion receives further confirmation while Putnam's friction model fails to do so (presumably, the 
two models can be c1early distinguished since Sun exerts gravitational forces throughout the So-
lar System while a medium can exert frictional forces only 10caIly; more so, gravitational accel-
eration, and therefore resulting motion, is the same for aIl masses, while the same is not true for 
friction). We may continue to doubt that there really is a planet responsible for the deflection, yet 
we will have no other choice than to agree that, with or without a planet to cause it, something 
empirically indistinguishable from a gravitational field of forces is really present out there. 
8.5 Direct l'S. Holistic Confirmation 
Although a theory do es not favour any of its models, direct confirmation of model-
specific hypotheses corroborates sorne models while eliminating other models, which are bound 
to remain mere theoretical alternatives. In contrast to model-specific hypotheses, the fundamen-
tal hypothesis - which amounts to the extension of the theory to a new phenomenon - cannot be 
confirmed independently of sorne mechanical model of planetary motion. The latter is confirmed 
holistically, along with the model ofwhich it is a constitutive part. 
The figure below enumerates the various ways a model might receive empirical justifica-
tion: 
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background further assumptions 
THEORY knowledge (e.g., (not open to direct 
initial conditions) confirmation} 
1 MOD~-·~-t~-h~-.~:~-.J---· -C-~~-L-J' 
EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY 
intended empiricallaw 
(entailed by design) 
f ~ DIRECT CONFIRMATION / / . of some model • . specifie hypotheses 
HOLISTIC CONFIRMATION HOLISTIC CONFIRMATION 
of other propositions of the fundamental 
entailed by the model hypothesis 
Figunl 14. Direct and Holistic Confirmation 
8.6 Falsification Ctmditüms 
It is also possible to establish falsification conditions. Putnam and Lakatos rightly point 
out that the falsification of a model of a theory should be distinguished from the falsification of 
the theory itself (the falsification of the fundamental hypothesis). However, they erroneously 
conc1ude that a theory cannot be falsified, Their argument is based on the presupposition that, in 
order to falsify a theory, we must show that aIl its models are false; this cannot be easily done, as 
it is not c1ear if someone could be even in position to enumerate aIl the models of the theory in a 
first place. 
Nevertheless, in this case, and presumably in other cases as weU, falsification conditions 
can be established without having to eliminate one by one all the models of the theory. For ex-
ample, if the inverse square law is verified on an individual basis, then it would take c1assical 
mechanics to be fundamentally wrong about planetary motion in order to obtain a true conjunc-
tion of the principles of c1assical mechanics as established by local experiments, Newton's in-
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verse law, the right distribution of massive objects and the presence of frictional forces, as dem-
onstrated by the existence of a significantly dense inter-planetary medium. If such a conjunction 
of observations were ever shown to be true empirically, it would mean that the law of addition of 
torces holds true on Earth, but not in Heavens. Then the fundamental hypothesis would be ex-
plicitly and unambiguously falsified, classical mechanics shown to be false about planetary mo-
tion and, as an immediate and unavoidable consequence, aU mechanical models for planetary 
motion falsified. 
8.7 Dissolving the Holist LIJilUntlrum 
In summary, the following confirmation and falsification strategies àpply' to mechanical 
models of planetary motion: 
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Figu re 15. Confirmation and Fa lsitïcation Conditions 
There are several points of divergence between the above outlined path of scientific rea-
soning and the Putnam-Lakatos version of it. First, there is a fundamental hypothesis common to 
aU mechanical models not stated by Putnam and only tangentially alluded to by Lakatos. This is 
unfortunate, because this essential premise indicates that aU explanations of planetary motions, 
including Newton's model and Putnam's suggestions of alternate explanations, must be state-
ments about forces. The holist argument relies on the implicit assumption that the distance sepa-
rating the premise of the fundamental hypothesis from the desired conclusion could be bridged, 
in principle at least, by any kind of propositions, introducing as many unobservables and purely 
theoretical explanatory principles we wish.' This is not so. The propositions mediating the link 
must be statements about forces. 
This realisation leads to a second point. Statements about forces are not purely arbitrary, 
but link to our previous knowledge of forces. The assumption here is that the same kind of me-
chanical forces with which we might be concerned in our daily life shape the path of the planets. 
Among other things, our current knowledge about forces includes laws stating how forces cause 
changes in motion and a collection of correlations between different forces and phenomena (e.g., 
gravitational forces are associated with the presence of massive bodies, friction forces with me-
dia for motion, etc.). This initial knowledge about what causes and what kind of phenomena are 
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associated with a given kind of forces is extrapolated to planetary motion. The extrapolation is 
not as gratuitous as it may seem. It states that the motion of a body in the Solar System can be 
controlled in order to travel to a desired destination precisely because it is a question of counter-
ing naturally occurring forces with artificially produced ones. This assumption contains the seeds 
of potential technological applications whose eventual success will directly contribute towards 
the confirmation of the relevant model. 
Third, Putnam assumes that the three 'background assumptions' listed in his version of 
the analysis are independent of Newton's inverse square law, meaning that they could be re-
placed by a different set of assumptions. It can be shown that they are not independent and there-
fore they cannot be replaced by any other set of assumptions. Assumption (II) "The sun and the 
earth exist in a hard vacuum" and (III) "The sun and the earth are subject ta no forces except 
mutually induced gravitational forces" are inseparable from the gravitational model. Within the 
limits of empirical observation, planetary motion is eternally repetitive and seems to conserve 
itself ad infinitum. One way to construct this kind of motion starting from the three laws of dy-
namics is to hypothesise that the planets undergo an inertial motion constantly deflective by a 
force acting perpendicularly on the direction of the motion, hence the 'rock on a string' model 
for planetary motion proposed by Newton. This prec1udes forces acting in the direction of mo-
tion. In particular, this prec1udes friction forces and therefore the existence of a medium such as 
au. 
The fourth point of divergence pertains to the fact that not any set of propositions about 
forces is consistent with c1assical mechanics. The inverse square law is consistent with c1assical 
mechanics only if we assume that planetary motion is shaped by gravitational forces alone. Clas-
sical mechanics is deterministic. If gravitational forces suffice to obtain the distribution of forces 
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required to preserve empirical adequacy, then other kinds of forces can bepresent only if we ei-
ther modify the inverse square law or, ifthis law is confirmed on an individual basis, by modify-
ing classical mechanics. Thus, Newton' s inverse square law is consistent with classical mechan-
ics only if certain other constraints are satisfied. This clearly indicates that the theory posits a 
constraint on the sets of propositions which may count as its models. 
The confirmation of Newton's law constitutes a fifth point of divergence. Putnam explic-
itly assumes that Newton's law for universal gravitation cannot be confirmed directly and/or in-
dependently. This is not so. The inverse square law can be empirically verified for objects travel-
ling on trajectories other than planetary orbits. It is certainly true that the distribution of forces 
postulated by the fundamental hypothesis is set in such a way as to preserve empirical adequacy; 
however, the empirical adequacy in question concems solely already observed planetary orbits 
used as an empiricalconstraint on the formulation of the model. Each model-specific law further 
hypothesises a particular distribution of forces outside planetary orbits; this distribution can be 
used to predict trajectories for bodies like cornets, artificial satellites and spacecrafts. 
This leads us to a sixth and most important point. If the inverse square law is confirmed, 
then it would take classical mechanics to be fundamentally wrong about planetary motion in or-
der to have a true (confirrned in actual experience) conjunction of the principles of classical me:-
chanics as established by local experiments (the three laws of dynamics), Newton's inverse law, 
the right distribution of massive objects and the presence of frictional forces. Thus, despite Put-
nam's and Lakatos's daims, there is a point when the theory cannot be saved by appending new 
explanatory clauses and its most fundamental principles must be revised. 
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8.8 COllcluding Remarks 
Although significantly more detailed than Putnam' s, the above analysis is still incom-
pIete. For instance, when postulating the existence of gravitational forces, Newton assumes an 
unequivocal assignment of the active and reactive forces; this assumption was eventually chal-
lenged by Einstein's equivalence principle. Nevertheless, my aim is not to support Newton's 
views on gravitation, but to defend the hypothetico-deductive (HD) method against the objec-
tions raised by Putnam and Lakatos. The above analysis suffices to show that confirmation ho-
lism does not necessarily entail that theories cannot be falsified, or worse, validate a jump from 
Popper's epistemological (or allegedly 'naïve') falsificationism to Lakatos's methodological fal-
sificationism, which in the end seems to suggest a conventionalist epistemology fundamentally 
incompatible with the requirements of empirical science. 
Since the criteria of confirmation are different from the criteria of falsification - in the 
above example the latter being more demanding than the former - it is reasonable to conclude 
that a single crucial experiment cannot decide between the truth and falsity of a the ory in respect 
to a given phenomenon. In this sense, Lakatos's point against "instant rationality" is well taken. 
On the other hand however, it is erroneous to conclude that scientists are forever stuck in a vi-
cious circle of a reasoning they can escape only by making an arbitrary choice to either pursue 
the defence of a theory at all costs or abandon it in favour of sorne other theoretical option. There 
are confirmation and falsification criteria, sorne of which are open for testing at the time the the-
ory and its relevant models are proposed. Knowing that at least sorne of these criteria are satis-
fied provides an empirically-justified impetus to continue to work on the premise of a so far 
plausible theory or to abandon a so far implausible one. 
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Quine (1975) himself admits that the holistic scenario whereby a theory can be saved no 
matter what is just a possibility, not something necessarily true of science in general. Based on 
the initial argument by Quine, Newton-Smith reminds us that 
"this holistic assumption that [ ... ] any aspect of a theory can be maintained by making suit-
able adjustments elsewhere, is question begging in the context of discussions of underdeter-
mination. For, unless we already assume underdetermination, there is no reason to think that 
[ ... ] scientists can pull off this trick. What we find in practice is that sooner or later one ave-
nue becomes blocked." 
(2000 p. 535) 
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CHAPTER9 
MODELS AS IDEALISED REPRESENTATIONS 
9. J Illtroduction 
Different philosophical accounts of representation tend to apply better to particular kinds 
of models. Scale models and diagrammatic representations, especially those used for didactic 
purposes, are literally meant to function as illustrations or simplified reproductions of the target 
phenomena. It is tacitly assumed by teachers and students alike that inferences about their re-
spective targets should be drawn in light of sorne perceptual analogy. In contrast, instrumental or 
instrumentally-used models such as computer simulations and mathematical models are used 
primarily as means of surrogate reasoning. Such models are not thought to resemble target phe-
nomena beyond their similarity at the level of inferred prediction-propositions. 
ln this chapter, 1 argue that there is also a third, very common kind of models that serve 
primarily an explanatory purpose largely responsible for their technological and experimental 
relevance: 1 have in mind common scientific explanations framed in a hypothetico-deductive 
format. Neither inferential, nor resemblance accounts do full justice to this kind of models. In-
stead of passively describing the phenomenon, as postulated by resemblance accounts, or merely 
allow for surrogate reasoning, as postulated by inferential account, such models assess the influ-
ence of a number of factors that have a direct or indirect incidence on its manifestation. In this 
sense, they provide a 'dynamic representation' best captured by experimental and manipulation-
ist accounts of explanation. 
9.2 The Resel1lblance amI Inferential Accollnfs of Scientific Representation 
If hypotheses are meant to assert something about the target phenomena, it seems rea-
sonably to assume that the model amounts to sorne kind of representation of the said phenomena. 
ln the remaining of the paper 1 will compare the above approach to modelling with rival accounts 
in respect to the specific issue of representation. 
Semantic approaches to the modelling practice, such as van Fraassen's isomorphism ac-
count (van Fraassen, 1980; 2002) and Giere's similarity account (Giere, 1988; 2004), explicitly 
endow models with direct representational power whereby model and target phenomenon resem-
ble each other. 19 Unlike linguistic denotation, which is a matter of arbitrary stipulation, similarity 
19 Using van Fraassen's seven-point geometry example (van Fraassen, 1989 pp. 218-220), Giere summarises the 
difference between positivist, or syntactic (Campbell, 1920), accounts and semantic accounts as follows: 
"On the dassical view [ ... ] a theory is (i) a set ofuninterpreted axioms in a specifiedformallanguage 
plus (ii) a set of correspondence rules that provide a partial empirical interpretation in terms of ob-
servable entities and processes. A theory is true if and only if the interpreted axioms are ail true. [ ... ] 
A semantic approach requires looking at the axioms [ ... ] a little differently. [ ... ] Rather than regard-
ing them as free-standing statements, consider them to be part of a theoretical definition, a definition 
of seven-point geometry. The definition could be formulated as follows: Any set of points and fines 
constitutes a seven-point geometry if and only if A 1, A2, and A3 [A 1, A2 and A3 being the axioms of 
seven-point geometry]. Since a definition makes no daims about anything and is not even a candidate 
for truth or falsity, one can hardly identifY a theory with a definition. But daims to the effect that vari-
ous things satisfY the definition may be true or false of the world. Cali these claims theoretical hy-
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& isomorphism are thought to provide more or less accurate 'mirror images' of the target phe-
nomena. And, in contrast to inferential approaches to the modelling practice in science (Hughes, 
1997; Suarez, 2004), similarity & isomorphism allow for a direct mode of representation 
whereby the representation relationship concems solely the model and its target.20 . 
Stripped from a technical description of the notion of resemblance - such as isomorphism 
and similarity, both subjected to heavy attack on the grounds that they fail to display the logical 
properties ofrepresentation -, the core intuition behind them is fairly easy to grasp: 
"Models are relata of analogy relations; that is, a model is an analogue. [ ... ] For example, 
DNA models built of painted balls and metal struts are positively analogous to DNA mole-
cules in spatial structure and connectedness, but negatively analogous in size, material, 
shape, and colour of the constituents, etc. These models have a neutral analogy with mole-
cules insofar as their further detailed properties are used to explore as yet unknown features 
of genetic materials. The dividing line between these three sorts of analogy will of course 
shift as research goes forward - the better the model, the more of the neutral analogy will 
eventually be accepted as positive, whereas a poor model will become more and more nega-
i 
tively analogous. Models served' [ ... ] to introduce unobservable entities and processes by 
analogy with familiar observable entities and processes, thus providing pictures of the ex-
planatory entities held to underlie phenomena. [ ... ] Realists held that successful models are 
potheses. So we may say that, on the ~emantic approach, a theory consists of (i) a theoretical definition 
plus (ii) a number oftheoretical hypotheses. " (Giere, 2000 p. 519) 
Thus, we may say the model is 'true' in respect to the theory, although the 'truth' in question here has nothing to do 
with empirical (or correspondence) truth, but with the satisfaction of a set of propositions. Empirical truth is re-
placed by the notion of isomorphism (van Fraassen, 1980; 1989), whereby a derived consequence of the theory is 
indistinguishable from an empiricallaw, or again by the notion of similarity (Hesse, 1966; Giere, 1988; 2004; Teller, 
2001). 
20 As a side corollary, it further follows from here that representation exists independently of the scientist's judge-
ments and intentions, a conclusion deemed problematic by sorne authors (Suarez, 2003; Frigg, 2006). Tt seems how-
ever that neither Giere, nor van Fraassen explicitly favours a naturalised account of representation. On the contrary, 
they seem to argue that similarity, isomorphism and other forms of resemblance are common means of representa-
tion rather than sufficient conditions for representation. Thus given a certain phenomenon a scientist aims to study, 
he or she may propose a suitable model in virtue of sorne resemblance relationship (Suarez, 2003 p. 230; Chak-
ravartty, forthcoming). 
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positive analogues of the real world; positivists denied the reality of the theoretical entities 
referred to, and regarded models as working pictures to be dispensed with in accepted theo-
ries, having at best a formai analogy with the world. " 
(Hesse, 1966 pp. 299-300) 
The guiding idea is highly intuitive and seems to be adequate in a number of cases. To 
use Hesse's own example, although the pictures of nucleic acids one can find in biochemistry 
textbooks are idealised and highly simplified schematic representations, this doesn't mean that 
they are to actual DNA or RNA molecules what a rose might be in respect to love or the symbol 
of a number in respect to the mathematical number. Such diagrams are neither denotational, nor 
metaphorical. The scientists who wrote the textbooks and the students who learn from them take 
these pictures to literally mirror geometrical aspects of macromolecules, as opposed to arbitrary 
interpretations of a formaI language or as intuitive aids for grasping sorne underlying complex 
concept. In short, the diagrams resemble their targets and it is in this precise sense that they are 
thought to represent. 
At the other end of the spectrum, instrumentally-interpreted models are suitable illustra-
tions of the inferential approach to representation. Elaborating on Hertz's views on scientific 
theories, Hughes argues that a representation consists of three parts: the denotation of phenom-
ena and their properties by means of variables and other devices such as equations, mathematical 
functions, diagrams, etc; the demonstration of the "dynamical consequences" of the representa-
tion, such as the derivation of predictions; and the physical interpretation of these consequences 
in terms of empirical phenomena and properties (Hughes, 1997). 
Historically, sorne of Hertz' s insights on scientific representation were further developed 
by Mach (1893), and later on by logical positivists (Menger, 1979). One of the core realisations 
that shaped the development of logical positivism was the Humean notion that many empirical 
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laws are mere correlations. As correlations, they do not point to any specific underlying mec ha-
nism, causal connection or fundamenta1.mode of action (in general, they don't favour any par-
ticular physical, realist or ontological interpretation of the correlation). Rather, they represent 
surface relationships between observables that could be realised by a variety of unspecified 
mechanisms/causes/modes of action. In fact, Mach further insisted that scientists shouldn't as-
sume the existence of something underlying these correlations in the first place. 
In many simple cases, observables are denoted by variables, while their correlation over a 
more or less weIl defined chunk of space-time is represented by linear mathematical functions; 
more complex formalisms introduce differential and partial differential equations (the derivation 
of Kepler from Newton being an example of the latter). The variables are interpreted as proper-
ties of a physical system, while their various relationships remain generic structures, as it doesn't 
matter what the relationship is from a physical point of view (van Fraassen, 1997 p. 516). Back 
to Hertz's insight, we can see how, at the most basic level, a deductive-style model can consist of 
several correlations, each embedded in a suitable mathematical formulation, further combined in 
order to derive new correlations, which are ultimately related back to empirical reality via the 
physical interpretation of their variables. Thus, to use Hertz' s terminology, a model is an instru-
mental surrogate whereby "intellectually necessary consequences" represent the "naturally nec-
essary consequences" (Hertz, 1899 pp. 9-10; Preston, 2008). 
Borrowing from the literature on representation in art, Suarez proposes a more general 
approach meant to circumvent altogether the requirement for structural resemblance between an 
empirical correlation and its mathematical formulation. According to Suarez, the primary func-
tion of scientific representation is to aIlow for "surrogate reasoning and inference" such that 
"A represent B only if (i) the representational force of A points towards B, and (ii) A allows 
competent and informed agents to draw specifie inferences regarding B." 
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(Suarez, 2004 p. 73) 
Condition (i), amounting to denotation, is meant to take care of a number of problems plaguing 
structuralist accounts of representation, most notably objections pertaining to the logical proper-
ties of representation (non-reflexivity, asymmetry and non-transitivity). Condition (ii) aims to 
provide a general enough condition for representation, capable of handiing cases in which the 
model and its target do not share a common structure (Suarez, 2003 pp. 230-237). Since both 
conditions presuppose an inferring agent, Suarez argues that misrepresentation occurs when an 
uninformed agent intends the model in reference to the wrong target or incorrectly draws infer-
ences from the model about the target (Suarez, 2003 p. 238). The account is therefore apt to han-
dIe the logical properties of representation and allow for misrepresentation, two feats notoriously 
difficult to achieve by resemblance accounts. 
9.3 Strengths (lml Wetlkllesses of the Inferential Account 
If Suarez is right, it follows that a model can serve the purpose of representation inde-
pendently of a poor or absent resemblance with the target; in other words resemblance is not 
necessary (the non-necessity argument), which further entails that sorne models can represent 
without resembling their targets (the argument from variety). From an inferential point of view, a 
rock spinning on a string doesn't necessarily represent the motion of Moon around Earth in vir-
tue of sorne structural similarity or identity, but rather in virtue of the fact that inferences about 
the Moon revolving around Earth are drawn based on a study of a rock-spinning-on-a-string ex-
perimental setup (or what is sometimes called a 'material model'). That the aécuracy of sorne of 
these inferences is, or could be justified by a structural resemblance is merely a peculiarity of the 
study case. 
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The potential irrelevance of isomorphism, similarity or any other kind of resemblance to 
the issue of representation becomes more obvious in cases where the resemblance between the 
experimental setup and the target is either assumed for the purpose of generating a preliminary 
experimental setup or constitutes the hypothesis under test. For example, the in vitro HIV infec-
tion of immortalised T -ceIll~nes is commonl;, used as a substitute system for studying the in vivo 
human infection of HIV. The inferences from the cell line infection to the in vivo infection are 
hypothetical, that is, it is not clear a priori if the in vitro model accurately models the in vivo HIV 
infection. Granted, the cellline system is selected in virtue of sorne initial ,similarity (T -celllines 
are immortalised T -cells collected from lymphoma patients, and therefore easier to work with; 
HIV remains HIV in both cases, although a less virulent strain is usually used), but whether the 
same mechanisms are responsible for the infection in both cases is merely a conjecture. In this 
case, an in vitro experimental setup is intended as a physical substitute to the actual HIV infec-
tion, but the ability of the experimental setup to generate correct inferences about the. target re-
mains conditional on the confirmation of the weIl founded of the inference/extrapolation from in 
vitro/cell-lines to in vivo/primary cells. This suggests that whether the experimental ~etup accu-
rately resembles the target - by whatever means, including structural resemblance - remains sec-
ondary to the fact that it is used by scientists as a substitute for the target phenomenon. More so, 
the inferences about in vivo HIV infection based on the study of in vitro systems may turn out to 
be false, in which case, instead of representing, the experimental setup actually misrepresents its 
target, thus ruining the possibility of isomorphism, and presumably that of strong similarity as 
weIl. 
The above considerations strongly indicate that Suârez is right in claiming that represen-
tation has a lot to do with pragmatics and cannot reduce to a factual relationship between the rep-
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resentation and its target. Nevertheless, despite the net progress, I don't the think the question is 
settled. Even if it is true that, in general, resemblance is not necessary to representation, and even 
though, in particular, sorne scientific models may not resemble their targets, many models simply 
cannot dispense of resemblance. Too much is assumed on very general grounds and too many 
cases supporting sorne form of resemblance are ignored. 
Suarez insists that a distinction should be made between the conditions for representation 
and those for accurate representation. Prima facie, this doesn't constitute a problem, but an asset. 
After aIl, an account of representation should be flexible enough to allow for misrepresentation. 
On the other hand, this requirement entails a rather puzzling consequence: if a representation 
doesn't have to be accurate in order to function as a representation (Suarez, 2003 p. 226), then 
the inferences it grants don't have to be accurate, reliable or truthful either. It follows from here 
that given sufficient will, 'representational force' or intent, anything can be used as a representa-
tion of anything else. 
I assume Suarez is confident that representation will not collapse into denotation because 
of condition (ii). Still, it is not aIl that clear what prohibits aberrant inferences. In arts, and the 
realm of the social in general, suffices to declare the intention, that is, claim that A represents B, 
and 'competent and informed agents' will do the job of inferring something about B based on the 
properties of A. The underlying premise is that within any given socio-cultural circle agents 
abide to similar standards for what counts as acceptable inference and therefore come to a com-
mon understanding ofhow and in what sense A represents B. This accounts for the fact that what 
is used as a representation usually succeeds in functioning as a representation. As for misrepre-
sentation, it is bound to occur when individual agents ignore or are unaware of the declared in-
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tent of the representation~ or again when their inferences diverge from the standards specifie to 
their social and cultural milieu. 
It seems therefore that, given a dec1ared intent and a set of tacit social rules defining 
standards of acceptable inference, representation is ensured to be for the most part functional and 
reliable, while allowing for an occasional misfiring. This strongly indicates that, in addition to 
the two conditions highlighted by Suârez, there must also be a third condition for representation, 
namely a relative socio-cuItural context fixing acceptable inference. Consider that given the pho-
netic structure of the English writing system, it is tacitly assumed that we should not infer some-
thing about roses based on the physical shape of the letters forming the word 'rose'; this is not 
the case in other cultural contexts, where equally competent and informed agents are allowed to 
draw such inferences. 
Ifthis conclusion is correct, it follows as a special case that scientific representation must 
depend on a third condition fixed by the standards of acceptable scientific practice. Ironically, it 
seems to me that acceptable scientific practîce requîres that representation 'mirrors' at least one 
key aspect of the target phenomenon. For instance, if an epithelial cell-line is used instead of a T-
cell line, researchers will legitimately infer that HIV is not an infectious agent after aIl, conclu-
sion inconsistent with the very purpose of the experimental setup, which is to study HIV infec-
tion. The epithelial ceIl-line system is meant to represent HIV infection, but fails to do so, not 
because mistargeting or incorrect inference, which are human errors, but because the representa-
tion fails to objectively capture, mirror, depict, in short, resemble its target in respect to sorne 
fundamental properties. As discussed above, if the mechanisms responsible for i~fection and cell 
death are not the same, an in vitro infection of immortalised T -cells will provide an inaccurate 
representation of the in vivo HIV infection. In contrast, an in vitro infection of immortalised 
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epithelial cells is not, scientifically speaking, a model, accurate or inaccurate, of in vivo HIV in-
fection for the very simple reason that HIV fails to infect and multiply in epithelial cells. 
This conclusion is in agreement with my account of explanatory models, as illustrated in 
the analysis of Newton' s gravitational model of planetary motion. It can, and it has been argued 
that the model amounts to a theoretical representation of Mars revolving around Sun, Moon 
around Earth and, under sorne idealisation conditions, of the Solar System as a whole (Giere, 
1988). Alternatively, according to inferential accounts, the model represents planetary motions 
because it allows for surrogate reasoning. Both approaches capture sorne aspects of the actual 
scientific practice. In agreement with inferential accounts, the model allows for the inference re-
garding the existence of gravitational forces, 'perturbations' in the orbits of planets, 'wobbling' 
of their spinning axes, tidal effects, etc. A number of conclusions about planetary motion, sorne 
true, sorne faIse, are inferred from the model, Ieaving plenty of space for misrepresentation. Nev-
ertheless, it is also the case that Newton specifically used a set of propositions that entails Ke-
pler's laws, assumed to describe the orbit of Mars. As discussed previously, Newton explicitIy 
constructed his model in such a way that it allows for at least one empirically accurate, or what 
he took to be an empirically adequate inference, namely the Keplerian description of Mars's or-
bit around Sun. 
Something very similar must apply to experimental setups (' material models' used for 
purposes other than didactic), like cell-line systems. Just because a cell-line experimental setup is 
used as a substitute study system for in vivo HIV infection and allows for reasonable inferences, 
doesn't mean that the former is a model of the latter. The system used must be able to physically 
sustain HIV replication if it is to model and represent in any scientifically useful way the in vivo 
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HIV infection. Failure to comply with this minimal requirement for resemblance is a sure recipe 
for disaster. 
9.4 To Wlwt Extent It10dels Resemble tlzeÎI' TlI1-gets-? 
It seems therefore that scientific representation is not just any kind of representation. Or 
again, it might be that the conditions spelled out by Suarez only pick up what is used as a repre-
sentation in most domains of human activity, and not necessarily what successfully functions as 
a representation in the context of the scientific practice. Whatever the problem is, it has some-
thing to do with the fact that any scientific model, even a purely instrumental one, is empirically 
adequate in at least one respect, and, in that respect, it inevitably 'mirrors' its target.21 
As a general rule, logical positivists assumed that theories are used instrumentally to-
wards the derivation of ultra-specific predictions referring to phenomena occurring at specific 
points in space-time. In the actual scientific practice, the target predictions usually refer to regu-
larities; furthermore, it is not raw descriptions of the phenomena themselves which are targeted, 
but rather models of data, such as statically relevant correlations matching a linear function 
within the limits of experimental error (Suppes, 1962). This is the case ofNewton's gravitational 
model, targeting Kepler' s laws, kinetic models of gases, targeting the ideal gas law or sorne cor-
rected variation of it, or again Mendel' s genetic explanation, whose· target is the phenotypic 
composition of a given offspring population mathematically expressed as proportions, frequen-
cies or probabilities. Since both the model and its target are structures, it is possible, at least in 
21 French (1999) argues that ev en if insufficient for representation, 'resemblance' - a notion which can be conceived 
of in terms of isomorphism or partial isomorphism - is always present, not only in science, but also in arts. This 
suggests that 'resemblance' plays a role in ail kinds of representation. 
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principle, to have an isomorphism or homomorphism between the conclusion proposition of de-
ductive model and a model of data. 
More ambitious projects propose a further morphism - embedding (van Fraassen, 1980), 
homomorphism (Lloyd, 1988), partial isomorphism (French, et al., 1999) - between the exp lana-
tory model as a whole and a model of data describing the target phenomenon. Most of the objec-
tions raised against the isomorphism/similarity accounts of scientific representation have in mind 
this latter, more ambitious conception. 
Developing an argument by Cartwright (1999 p. 39), Frigg points out that "structure S 
does not apply unless sorne more concrete description of the target system applies as well": 
"Take transitive relation, for instance. There are many transitive relations: taller than, aIder 
than, hotter than, heavier than, stronger than, more expensive than, more recent than, etc. [ ... ] 
transitive relation is true of a relation only if either greater than, or aider th an, or ... is true of 
it as weil. [ ... ] There simply is no such thing in the physical world as a relation that is nothing 
but transitive." (2006 pp. 45-46) 
In addition, Frigg further argues, a model doesn't have a structure, but rather many structures 
which are not necessarily isomorphic. For example, 
"[t]he methane molecule (CH,,) consists offour hydrogen atomsforming a regular tetrahedron 
and a carbon located in its middle. [ ... ] What is the structure of a tetrahedron? [ ... ] A natural 
choice seems to regard the corners (vertices) as the objects and the lin es that connect the ver-
tices (the edges) as the relations. As a result we obtain the structure Tv which consists of a 
four-object domain {A, B, C, D} and the relation L (Lxy = 'x is connected to y by a line 'J, 
which has the extension {(A, B), (A, C), (A, D), (B, C), (B, D), (C, D)}. However, this is neither 
the only possible nor the only natural choice. Why not consider the lines as the objects and the 
vertices as the relations? [ ... ] Following this idea we obtain the structure Ts with a domain 
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consisting of the six edges {a, b, c, d, e f} and the relation 1 (Ixy = 'x and y intersect 'j, which 
has the extension {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d) (a,j), (b, c), (b, d), (b, e), (c, e), (c,j), (d,j), (d, e)}," 
(2006 p. 47) 
The introduction of 'mode1s of data' provides half of the solution to the problems pointed 
out by Frigg. To make things as simple as possible, we can conceive of Kepler's laws as being a 
set of space-time positions, and argue that there is a one-to-one mapping of the elements of this 
set and those of a set derived via Newton's gravitational model (or again, argue for the 'embed-
ding' of an array consisting of actual observations within the structure of Newton's predicted or-
bits or Kepler' s geometrical description of planetary orbits). The other half of the solution stems 
from the fact that both the prediction and the target empirical law are already interpreted, this 
being the case even for predictions issued from a purely deductive/instrumental use of models. 
Newton's gravitational model yields predictions or conclusions about motions and Kepler's laws 
are also about motions; Mendel's explanation yields predictions or conclusions about phenotypic 
distributions from one generation to the next; etc. In such cases, there is a structural identity or 
embedding, as weIl as a uniform physical interpretation specifying what counts as an 'element' 
and what counts as a 'relationship between elements'. As discussed previously, many predictions 
and target empirical laws take the form of correlations whereby the variables involved are inter-
prete d, while the relationships between them are not; this ensures that 'physically interpreted 
e1ements' and 'structural relationships' do not switch roles in the manner described in Frigg's 
tetrahedron example. 
What is less clear is how the same line ofreasoning applies to the mode1 as a whole. Fol-
lowing Suppes' instantiation approach to modelling, it can be said both the rock-on-a-string and 
Moon-revolving-around-Earth are instances of the same theoretical model involving a centripetal 
force perpendicular on speed determining a rotational motion. A variety of forces can play the 
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role of the centripetal force (tension in the string, gravitational force, electrostatic force, etc.), 
such that several kinds of phenomena can fit the sa me 'force perpendicular on velocity determin-
ing motion according to the laws of dynamics' structure. Note however that this particular model 
is incomplete, or idealised, in the sense that it makes abstraction of the reactive forces which, 
according to the laws of dynamics, must affect, however slightly, the overall behaviour of the 
system, external influences, deformation, etc. 1 believe that, as a general rule, models are bound 
to be idealised or at very least make abstraction of sorne characteristics of their target phenom-
ena, such that no phenomenon is capable of perfectly instantiating sorne theoretical construct and 
no theoretical construct can perfectly describe a given phenomenon; the reasons for this will be-
come clearer in a moment. 
At this point two options are available. One, take into account the idealisations and focus 
on the conditions under which sorne factors tend to be null or have null effects on the overall 
manifestation of the phenomenon, as it is usually done in college textbooks and as described in 
my own hypothetico-deductive framing of the idealisation practice (see below); or two, claim 
that the model bears an overall approximate resemblance to its target, where the resemblance in 
question amounts to a weaker alternative to isomorphism. 
Both approaches have strong and weak points. The positive side of the hypothetico-
deductive approach 1 favour is that a model, ev en if idealised, remains unambiguously attached 
to its parent theory, and hypothesises that each empirical instantiation satisfies the theoretical 
model in all theoretically-relevant respects. However, in as much as idealisations are framed as 
hypotheses about the target phenomenon, the approach has the disadvantage of forcing a realist 
interpretation about entities which may not be observable for theoretical reasons. In the context 
of the example discussed in the previous section, the model may postulate the existence of negli-
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gible, and therefore extremely hard or even impossible to measure, reactive forces. However, this 
is an issue pertaining to confirmation and transcends the scope of the present paper.22 
The alternative, 'weak resemblance' approach has the advantage of dropping a too rigid 
realist interpretation, but achieves this by introducing the relatively vague notion of 'similarity'. 
Most notably, Giere (1988; 2004) proposes that a theoretical model is an abstract and/or ideal 
object similar to a target phenomenon. The similarity relationship intervenes at two distinct lev-
els. First, when it cornes to matching conclusions/predictions of the model and target empirical 
laws/models of data, Giere argues that instead oftalking about the omnipresent 'matching within 
the limits of experimental error' or 'statistical relevance', we should rather talk about degrees of 
similarity. Giere justifies his proposaI as follows: 
"The margins of error rarely appear in the descriptions or calculations until one gets to the 
point of comparing theoretical predictions with actual measurements. This practice strongly 
supports interpreting the original equations, without explicit margins of error, as referring 
not to actual things but to abstract models ofwhich they are true by definition. When it cornes 
lime to compare the abstract model with reality, the deltas may then be understood as speci-
22 My solution to the problem would be to argue for partial confirmation, whereby sorne elements of the theoretical 
model match empirical descriptions of the target phenomenon, while other elements remain hypothetical. The latter 
are entailed by the model, realistically interpreted, and might be indirectly confirmed when several models combine 
in order to jointly yield confirmed predictions. This approach is extensively used in molecular explanations and 1 
suspect it might apply to other fields of investigation as weil. 
Alternatively, van Fraassen (1980) is famously known for adopting a stronger agnostic position by appealing to 
the notion of 'partial structure': only sorne elements of the theory are interpreted - in this case, those pertaining to 
space-time positions and derived notions, such as velocity and acceleration - and the target phenomena, or rather 
target models of data, are isomorphic only in respect to this interpreted 'fragment' of the overall structure provided 
by the mode!. The remaining, non-interpreted structure has no empirical relevance and therefore cannot be instanti-
ated by any phenomenon. More recently, van Fraassen (1997; 2002) revised his position by arguing that even though 
many theories were developed on the premise of a realist interpretation, science could have very weil evolved with 
no significant loss in the absence of realism. Elegantly formulated, van Fraassen's approach is drastically minimalis-
tic and does not allow for a reframing of conclusions concerning theoretical terms as hypotheses about empirical 
reality. Most notably, talk about underlying mechanisms, microscopic structures and fundamental modes of action 
becomes largely irrelevant, as aH that matters are the correlations between surface observables. While such a mini-
malist account may prove useful in sorne situations, there are also documented cases when the physical interpreta-
tion played a crucial role in the development of theories. For instance, the development of present-day molecular 
biology was largely motivated by an attempt to elucidate the physical nature of the entities postulated by classical 
genetics. 
145 
fying the degree of similarity (either expected or actua!) between the abstract mode! and the 
rea! system." 
(2004 p .. 648) 
In short, the margins of experimental error, error bars, etc. are interpreted as a measure of the 
degree of similarity between an abstract object (the model of data) and the actual empirical de-
scription of the phenomenon (the raw data). The autonomous existence of an 'abstract object' is 
justified by the fact that, when developing theories and explanations, scientists drop the raw data 
and use the model of data as a substitute. (Note that Giere's insistence that a model is an ab-
stractlideal object used as a substitute for the empirical phenomenon suggests that resemblance 
accounts should be treated as a subset of broader-scope inferential accounts.) 
Similarity intervenes a second time, at a higher level: the theoretical model as whole is 
also an abstract object bearing an overall similarity with a target phenomenon. According to 
Giere (1988; 2000), a model is constructed in accordance with a set of fundamental laws and 
principles and, just like a model of data, this higher-Ievel the?retical construct has an independ-
ent existence as an object bearing a certain similarity with a target phenomenon. For example, 
Giere argues that, in respect to the resulting sinusoidal position as a function of time description 
of motion, both a mass-on-a-string and a pendulum oscillating at small. angles are more or less 
perfect instantiations (similar within different rilargins of experimental error) of a theoretical ob-
ject called the 'ideal linear oscillator' (1988 pp. 68-76). From a practical point of view, this al-
lows for the modelling of a more complex phenomenon, in this case the two-dimensional motion 
of the pendulum, in terms of a simpler phenomenon, namely the weight on a string described by 
motion in only one dimension. However what interests Giere is the fact that the two systems are 
not "special cases of a general relationship" since each bears its own, specific degree of similar-
ity with the theoretical construct. 
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Once again, little can be objected here. The defining feature of the 'ideallinear oscillator' 
is the absence of a dampening effect, hence its perfectly sinusoidal motion. This implies that no 
kinetic energy is lost during its forth and back transformation in potential energy via friction, de-
formation, heat, etc. Thus, the model is both ideal and abstract. It is ideal because it posits a very 
peculiar 'no loss of energy' condition, typically non-satisfied by real systems. And it is abstract 
: 
or general enough because it does not specify what kind of potential energy is transformed forth 
and back into kinetic energy and what are the possible ways in which energy may 'leak' out of 
the system. It seems therefore that Giere's claim that a theoretical model is· entitled to an 
autonomous existence as an abstract object is reasonably justified. l also agree with Giere's 
claim that the same theoretical model or theoretical treatment may be applied to different phe-
nomena with different degrees of accuracy, and under distinct idealisation circumstances, as il-
lustrated in his discussion of the linear oscillator. 
This said, it is not clear yet how a theoretical model, understood here as a c6mplex ab-
stract object, can be compared with a phenomenon. Predictions are about limited number of as-
pects of the phenomenon under study and it is in those specific respects that individu al predic-
tions entailed by a deductive model are compared with raw measurements or models of data. 
Predictions about the orbit of Mars are not compared with the phenomenon of Mars revolving 
around Sun, but with the observed orbit of Mars; predictions about phenotypic distributions are 
not compared with the phenomenon of genetic inheritance, but only with the relative proportions 
of various offspring phenotypes; and so on. The actual phenomenon of Mars revolving around 
Sun, or again genetic inheritance comprises many more aspects, features and properties; the 
same applies to the models aiming to explain these phenomena. Things get even more compli-
cated if we take Newton' s gravitational model and Mendel' s genetic explanation as representa-
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tions of the 'inner workings' underlying the functioning of the Solar System and genetic inheri-
tance. 
Borrowing from the literature on exemplar and prototype theories in psychology (Medin, 
et al., 1978; Nosofsky, et al., 2000; Posner, et al., 1968), Giere's solution is to decompose the 
overall similarity between model and target in several respects, each having its own specific de-
gree of similarity. For instance, in the case of Newton's gravitational model, we are told that 
"[t]he positions and velacities of the earth and maan in the earth-maan system are very close 
ta thase of a twa-particle Newtanian madel with an inverse square central force. Here the re-
spects are position' and 'velacity', while the degree is claimed ta be 'very close '." 
(1988 p. 81) 
Note however that in doing so, several problems arise. First, in the broader tradition of 
semantic approaches, it is assumed that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the relationship 
of 'satisfaction', which links theory and mode l, and that of 'resemblance', linking model and 
empirical reality. The former is explicitly and rigorously formulated, while the latter seems to 
belong to the realm of implicit judgments. In this respect, Sklar observes that 
"[i]t is aften emphasized that the degree of similarity of madel ta warld, and the specification 
of the cantext in which the madel is sufficiently similar ta the warldfar the laws ta have genu-
ine predictive and explanatary value, are, once again nat explicit in the theary itself The ap-
plication of lawlike theary ta warld, then, partakes of a kind of implicit learned scientific 
practice, samething autside the explicit content of the theary in question." 
(2002 p. 42) 
To simplify matters as much as possible, let us begin by considering a purely material 
model. Since we are dealing with perceptual objects it is not necessary to pro vide an explicit ac-
count of how the comparison is achieved; we tacitly rely of our natural ability to compare per-
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ceptions, be them real or imaginary. For instance, it is possible to construct small-scale models 
reproducing planetary motions in the absence of any thorough knowledge of the principles of 
mechanics. Presumably, such small-scale material models preceded Newton's deductive model 
and it is very probable that Newton made use of the former in order to develop rus own deductive 
model. T 0 keep things simple, there is an anal ogy between a rock spinning on a string and Moon 
revolving around Earth. By changing the scaling factors for velocity, length and strength of the 
string, volumes, 'heaviness' and inertia, etc., it is possible to generate an imaginary movie of an 
object the size and 'heaviness' of Moon spinning around a fixed point marked by the center of 
Earth. 
Compared with the observed motion of Moon relative to Earth, this imaginary perception 
is both similar and dissimilar. From a strictly perceptual standpoint, there is an analogy between 
the imaginary spinning of a rock the size of Moon and the actually revolving Moon since the 
shape of the orbits almost coincide. On the other hand, the anal ogy is faulty because there is no 
string connecting Moon and Earth and we have no empirical knowledge about an agent giving a 
first impetus to Moon. Granted, the anal ogy is fruitful because it provides an insight about how 
the quasi-circular motion of Moon could be achieved (e.g., God spins it around Earth on an in-
visible string), yet, just as in Hesse'sexamples, the overall degree of similarity between the al-
leged model and the actual phenomenon remains limited and rather difficult to assess rigorously. 
Oddly enough, it is not possible to establish a stronger degree of similarity without intro-
ducing the concept of force and a law stating how forces determine motions. From a post-
Newtonian perspective, the most striking similarity between a rock spinning on a string and 
Moon revolving around Earth is precisely a fundamental principle of classical mechanics stating 
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that, independently of their nature, forces of identical magnitude, direction and orientation cause, 
or at very least correlate with identical changes in motion.23 
This preliminary hitch reveals a more general problem: explanatory and theoretical mod-
els in general can be compared with their targets only in theoretically-relevant respects. In the 
case of Newton's gravitational model, the target phenomenon - say Moon revolving around 
Earth - can be compared in tenns of motion, mass, shape, volume and derived properties such as 
density, momentum, torque, etc., but not colour, chemical composition, possibility to sustain life, 
etc., since the latter are not considered to be relevant by the mechanical theory and therefore 
have no place in a mechanical model. On the other hand, a scale material model of the Moon-
Earth system can be compared with its target in respect to colour and chemical composition. This 
indicates that there is more then one way of defining r,espects of comparison. 
If this is the case, then it is not clear whether theoretically-irrelevant respects of compari-
son are simply to be dismissed or whether they count as respects having a high degree of dissimi-
larity. If the latter, Hegelian stance is adopted, then most models are bound to be highly dissimi-
lar to their respective targets in an indeterminate number of respects; this must be the case since 
most theories specify which features of the target phenomena are relevant and not those which 
23 By themselves, most notably in the absence of the rules used to infer something about a target phenomenon from a 
substitute experimental setup, material models don't explain anything. For example, the rock-on-a-string substitute 
experimental setup explains the motion of Moon around Earth only if we appeal to the general notion of force (i.e., 
the tension of the string = gravitational force = centripetal force) and assume that the laws' of classical mechanics 
hold true on Earth and in Heavens. Furthermore, without these assumptions, there is not enough resemblance be-
tween the model and target in sorne key respects and it is not clear in what sense the former can al\ow for surrogate 
reasoning, thus threatening not only the explanatory relevance, but also the representational value of the mode\. 
Similarly, the in vitro infection ofT-celllines by Hf V is meant as a substitute system for studying the in vivo human 
infection of HfV. Despite sorne obvious surface similarities between the target and the substitute phenomena, the 
model explains sorne key aspects of AlOS and human HIV infection only in as much it is further assumed that the 
same mechanisms responsible for the in vitro infection are at play in vivo. Without this assumption, which explicitly 
attaches a theoretical dimension to an otherwise purely 'material' mode), it is not possible to infer something about 
the target phenomenon from the model and the door is !eft wide open to major points of dissimilarity that can 
quickly neutralise the initial similarity. To use's Harré's terminology, a material model is a 'homeomorph' and does 
not bring new ideas in theory construction. In contras t, an explanatory model derived in light of a pre-existing theory 
is a 'paramorph' and posits an analogy "between certain characteristics of different pro cesses" (Harré, 1960 p. 87). 
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are irrelevant. 1 conclude therefore that this option must be avoided at aIl costs. Although less 
damaging, the tirst strategy is also imperfect. If adopted, then Giere's approach retains an arbi-
trary character, for it assumes that the respects of comparison imposed by the theory are some-
how more important or fundamental than those inherent, say, to visual perception.24 
Finally, even if we limit ourselves to theoretically-relevant respects of comparison things 
can go bad. Again, back to the planetary motion example, Newton tirst considered a simplitied 
model consisting of a point-like planet revolving around a point-like Sun, where Sun alone exerts 
a gravitational force over the revolving planet (Lakatos, 1970 p. 135). Thus, this preliminary 
model relies on idealisations conceming 
i) the size and shape of Sun and planets; 
ii) the number of gravitational interactions; and 
iii) the third law of dynamics. 
The three idealisations inherent to Newton's tirst model count as theoretically-relevant respects 
of comparison, yet the degree to which they differ from the intended phenomenon is maximal: 
Respects of similarity Degrees of similarity 
very dissimilar neutral very similar 
fitness of the c 
-derived orbits 
size and shape • (Sun and planets idealised 1 
as material points) 
presence of many -body 
1 .1-interactions 
(no planet -planet interactions) 
presence of reciprocal .. 
attractive forces • 
(no redprocal planet -Sun force ) 
24 Suârez (2003 p. 235) exacerbates the objection by remarking that if logically possible properties are possible, any 
object is trivially similar to any other object. 
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Figure 16. Respects of Compllrison 
Unless it is decided from the very beginning that the theoretically-relevant respects inwhich the 
model is idealised are not that important, the 'average tendency inclines towards an overall dis-
simi1arity rather than an overall similarity. Giere doesn't say a word about how the various de-
grees of similarity proper to each respect of comparison are to be weighted in a non-arbitrary 
manner.
25 
9.5 A JJypothetico-Deductive Tre{ltment l?lJde{l/isatioIlS 
A deductive approach to modelling faces its own difficulties that must be accounted for. The 
main advantage of the similarity approach is that idealisation is embedded into the similarity re-
lationship; the bad part is that, as shown above, similarity brigs about its own set of problems. 
Conversely, a deductive approach doesn't have to deal with the problems associated to similar-
ity, but it must give a clear answer to the issue of idealisation. 
In my example, background assumption (1) in Putnam's list ("No bodies exist except the 
sun and the earth") is a direct allusion to a computational problem imposing an idealisation on 
Newton's gravitational model. In order to be thoroughly consistent with its fundamental and 
model-specific hypotheses, a gravitational model of planetary motion must take into account the 
gravitational interactions between aIl the masses in the Solar System; mathematically however, 
Newton could derive Kepler's laws only in as much the model reduced to a one or a two-body 
25 Sklar (2002 p. 42) openly complains that 
"il is difficult to see how the introduction ofthis notion ofmodel and the adoption of a relation ofsimi-
larity of model to world will be of much help in understanding the applicability of law to world. We 
still are left with ail the problems we may have had initially about explaining how lawlike assertions, if 
literally false, can be relevant to us in our predictive and explanatory tasks. For ail the problems of 
characterizingjust what the applicability oflaw to world consists in, and, in particular, ail the original 
problems generated by inexactness, contextuality, and the ceteris paribus clause, still remain. These 
problems are now simply embedded in the notion of similarity, and the unpacking of that notion re-
mains as obscure a task as was understanding the original notion of applicability of law to world." 
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problem. Unfortunately, not knowing how to solve a many-body problem is tantamount to rec-
ognising that it is impossible to derive the target empirical laws, in tum meaning that there is no 
model to begin with. It follows from here that, at least under a deductive treatment, any gravita-
tional model is bound to be an idealised one. This simply shows that, within a deductive frame-
work, the idealisation issue must be addressed frontally, and not lateraIly, as a side-effect of less-
than-perfect similarity. 
Lakatos provides a short description of the idealisation inherent to Newton's first gravita-
tional model and of the subsequent attempts to alleviate the nefarious of idealisation effects by 
devising "a chain of ever more complicated mocjels simulating reality": 
"Newton first worked out his programme for a planetary system with a fixed point-like sun 
and one single point-like planet. It was in this model that he derived his inverse square law 
for Kepler 's ellipse. But this model was forbidden by Newton 's own third law of dynamics, 
therefore the model had to be replaced by one in which both the sun and planet revolved 
around their common centre of gravity. [ ... ] Then he worked out the programme for more 
planets as if there were only heliocentric but no interplanetary forces. Then he worked out 
the case where the sun and planets were not mass-points, but mass-balls. [ ... ] Having solved 
this puzzle, he started work on spinning balls and their wobbles. Then he admitted inter plane-
tary forces and started work on perturbations. [ ... ] It was then that he started to work on 
bulging planets, rather than round planets, etc." 
(1970 pp. l35-l36) 
Two common difficulties are associated with idealisation. First, Lakatos argues, New-
ton's 'faith' in his project rests on a 'methodological decision' to save at aIl costs the gravita-
tional hypothesis by making the model more and more realistic. The suggestion here is that New-
ton's initial gravitational models are 'false', or, to be more precise, fail to contribute to the con-
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firmation of the theory from which they are derived, not as much because they fail to entail the 
target empirical descriptions, but rather because they explicitly ignore data deemed relevant by 
the mechanical theory used to construct the model. This incompatibility between models and 
their parent theories (and, in this case between the model and sorne of its model-specific hy-
potheses as well) is particularly upsetting for deductive accounts, which hold that a model 
amounts to the derivation of target empiricallaws from more general theoretical propositions. 
And second, there is a logical problem often pointed out: 
"On the deductive nomological model of scientific theories [ ... ], a theory is a deductive 
scheme which uses laws and initial conditions to der ive predictions of events or lower-Ievel 
laws. A deductive scheme should yield true consequences when the premises are true. How-
ever, if idealizations are admitted as premises, the premises are, strictly speaking, false, and 
the conclusions need not be true even if the argument is valid. " 
(Ben-Menahem, 2000 p. 169)26 
Hopefully there is a possible solution to both difficulties. Laymon observes that, in deriv-
ing a solution for Einstein's field equations, 
, 
"an idealized description is employed: the Schwarzschild 'solution' assumes a perfect sym-
metrical non-rotating sun and no other masses. Together the field equations and the 
,Schwarzschild idealization yield a solution for the metric." 
(1984 p. 109) 
There are however more realistic models, such as the approximation of Sun to a rotating, spheri-
cal object used to derive the Kerr metric. Given a cascade of more and more realistic models, 
Laymon argues that 
26 In the context of a counterfactual interpretation, the 10gical problem disappears, since the premises are true in re-
spect to a counterfactual description rather than the actual phenomenon. The strategy in this case is to argue that 
sorne counterfactual states of affair are more similar to the actual phenomenon than others, and that models true 
about counterfactual states closer to actual reality are more 'truth-like' than models true about more distant counter-
factual states (Oddie, 1986; Niniluoto, 2000). 
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"a theory is confirmed if it can be shown that il is possible to show that more accurate but 
still idealized or approximate descriptions will lead to improved experimental fit; a theory is 
disconfirmed when il can be shown that such improvement is impossible". 
(1984 p. 117) 
ln a analogue fashion, it can be argued that the main goal of Newton's model was to es-
tablish whether a mechanical model for planetary motion can be empirically adequate. The initial 
task was to approximate Kepler's laws. More elaborate versions of the initial model surpassed 
the empirical adequacy established by Kepler' s laws and were able to explain additional phe-
nomena. Since an increased experimental fit provides confirmation beyond the empirical ade-
quacy aimed at initially, Newton was empirically justified to continue working on his project. 
The above provides a patch for the inconsistency issue, but fails to really address the 
logical problem. The other half of the solution relates to what Sklar caUs 'controllability', that is, 
to the notion that sorne idealisations are granted by the theory in light of which a phenomenon is 
modelled. This should provide a satisfactory c10sure to the logical problem. For example, in rela-
tion to the external interferences on an allegedly c10sed system, Sklar remarks that 
"the scientist believes, rightly or wrongly, that such interferences, even if unavoidable, are in 
general controllable. What does ;cohtrollable' mean? The scientist believes that current scien-
tiftc theory, including the substantial background theory that runs weil beyond that part of cur-
rent theary directly applicable ta the system in questian, passesses the resaurces necessary. ta 
tell the scientist in some cases that the outside interference is negligible." 
(2002 p. 44) 
1 further propose that an idealised model introduces its own hypotheses stating that cer-
tain features of the phenomenon, acknowledged by the theory to play a role in determining the 
overall behaviour of a phenomenon, have nevertheless a negligible contribution in the particular 
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case of the phenomenon under study. This approach takes into account the fact that, typically, a 
scientist doesn't just choose an idealised model because it is simpler this way, or in virtue of 
sorne vaguely specified anal ogy , but on the grounds that, assuming that the theory used to model 
the target phenomenon is true in respect to that phenomenon, then the disregarded features ig-
nored by the idealised model must have a negligible contribution to the overall behaviour of the 
phenomenon. 
Thus, the problem can be framed as follows. Technically, Newton was able to derive Ke-
pler's laws -laws deemed to accurately de scribe the motion of Mars around Sun - from an ideal-
ised two-body model. The empirical adequacy of the model is insured. However, Newton and his 
1 
successors considered a two-body model to be idealised in the sense that data that should have 
been relevant given the fundamental and model-specific hypotheses of the model is not used in 
the derivation of Kepler's laws. Note that the model is not idealised because it ignores the colour 
of Mars and Sun, their chemical composition, the fact that there Mars may or may not support 
life, etc., but because it ignores the gravitational influences of other bodies present in the Solar 
System, the density distribution of the two bodies, rotation effects and other theoretically-
relevant aspects of the phenomenon of Mars revolving around Sun.27 
The final solution reads as follows. Once he was able to derive Kepler's laws, Newton 
and his successors had to do one of the following two things: 
i) theoretically justify the fact that sorne theoretically-relevant data is 'negligible' towards 
the derivation of the target empirical laws/description, that is, show: that the theoretical 
approach used allows for certain idealisations; and/or 
27 Conversely, taking into account theoretically-irrelevant data is just as inconsistent with the theory as not taking 
into account ail the theoretically-relevant data; in fact, if it can be shown that theoretically-irrelevant data plays a 
raie in determining the target empirical description, then the theory is technically falsified. Neither Lakatos, nor 
Laymon discuss this aspect of idealisation. 
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ii) show that more realistic models taking into account the theoretically-relevant data ne-
glected by idealised models allow for the derivation of more detailed empirical descrip-
tions of the studied phenomena, not targeted by the initial models (Laymon' s solution)o 
The advantage of (i) is that it allows for idealised models to directly contribute to the empirical 
justification of the theory from which they are derivedo If it is possible to show that sorne data is 
negligible for theoretical reasons, then idealised models can be shown to be consistent with their 
"mother theories'! such that the empirical adequacy of such models can count towards the confir-
mation of the theory underlying themo 
In reference to Newton's gravitational model, it can be easily argued that the three ideali-
sations exemplified by Lakatos, and which must necessarily mark points of dissimilarity, bec orne 
three additional model-specific hypotheses, as explained in the figure below: 
as dissimilarities 
concerning 
• the size and shape 
of Sun and pla nets 
• the number of 
gravitational 
interactions 
• the third lawof 
dynamics 
Idealisations 
as model-specific 
hypotheses 
• the size and shape of 
Sun and planets is 
negligible 
• the planet -planet 
interactions are negligible 
• thethird lawofdynamics 
can be ignored 
as model-consistent 
hypotheses 
• the size and shape of Sun and pla nets 
is negligible in respect to the overall 
distance separating Sun and planet 
• since Fg a 1/ d Sun-planet 2, if dSunopianet » 
r Sun and r ~I ' then the gravttational 
force acting on the poles is equal to 
that acting to the equatorialline 
• the planet -planet interactions are 
negligible in respect to the Sun -planet 
interactions 
• since Fg a ml m2 , if the mass of Sun is 
considerably greater than that of any 
planet, then FSunopianel » F ~I 0iEnei 
• the mass of any planet is negligible in 
respect to that of Sun, such that the third 
law of dynamics can be ignored 
• since Fg = miEnei aplanet = mSun aSun , if 
mSun » miEnel , then aSun « aj:Aane1 (Sun 
is stalionary) 
Figu,oc 17. Deductivc Trcatmcnt of Idealisations 
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AlI three idealisations can be theoretically justified in relation to sorne initial conditions. Un-
doubtedly, Newton simply assumed that Sun is significantly more massive than any of the plan-
ets, just as he made a number of assumptions about the Sun-planet distances based on the Coper-
nican interpretation of astronomical observations. Nevertheless, he did not introduce any of the 
above idealisations as arbitrary dissimilarities justified by pragmatic concerns. Rather, he intro-
duced them as consequences deductively granted by the model if certain initial conditions hold 
true. The end result is that instead of having to justify the assumptions themselves as additional, 
independent propositions required for the derivation - and therefore external to the theory -, it is 
only required to justify the conditions under which they follow as certain limit cases of the fun-
damental hypotheses used to formulate the model. 
A hypothetico-deductive treatment of idealisations may provide sorne other advantages as 
well. For one thing, treated as model-consistent hypotheses, Newton's idealisations are not false 
premises, but consequences which obtain given specific initial conditions. Hence, they do not 
necessarily refer to a counterfactual state of affairs, but also to actual special cases or circum-
stances [what Sklar refers to as 'limit cases' (2002 pp. 61-62)]. Just like similarity, counterfactu-
aIs are useful, but not perfect, since they allow straightforward solutions for old problems while 
creating a bunch of new and potentially more difficult problems. 
Secondly, under Giere' s similarity treatment, simpler and more complex models contra-
dict each other since they represent differently the same phenomenon. Under deductive treat-
ment, simpler and more complex models equally contribute to our theoretical knowledge of the 
phenomenon. Knowing that sorne parameters have a negligible effect adds to the total knowledge 
about a certain segment of empirical reality since we are provided with a piece of knowledge not 
explicitly included in more complex models. Simpler models show that, in sorne conditions, 
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sorne parameters do not have a significant effect in the overall manifestation of a phenomenon, 
while more complex models progressively take into account inore variables as they become rele-
vant in various situations, thus yielding more generally applicable descriptions and predictions. 
1 think it is reasonable to assume that any the ory claims that certain aspects and laws are 
more fundamental than others. For instance, classical mechanics states that aU physical motion is 
determined solely by the three laws of dynamics. Although not always explicitly stated, this in-
cludes a clause of sufficient grounds of determinatiorl. Force, mass and speed suffice to describe 
and determine motion, while the colour and the chemical composition of moving bodies don't 
contribute to knowledge about motion. It is for this reason that 1 believe that many, if not most 
explanatory models are inherently reductive in the sense that they hypothesise that only sorne 
features of the target phenomenon are 'dynamically interlinked' and affect each others manifes-
tation, while the remaining features are 'inert' and, if changed, do not affect other features (this 
distinction is usually part of the 'fundamental hypothesis' common to all the models associated 
with a given theory). Simplified models further add their own negligibility hypotheses stating 
that certain aspects, ev en if relevant from a theoretical point of view, have nevertheless a mini-
mal impact in sorne particular circumstances. 
Thus, ev en if, due to the introduction of model-specific hypotheses, simpler and more 
complex models of a theory cannot always amount to special cases of the same general relation-
ship, they do share the same fundamental hypothesis, as weIl as sorne of the model-specific hy-
potheses. This common theoretical backbone should allow for a convergence of the predictions 
yielded by simpler and more complex models in those cases in which the initial conditions allow 
for idealisations: 
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Convergence and cumulativity 
simpler model 
(e.g., one -body idealisation) 
more complex model 
(e.g., two -body idealisation) 
CONFIRMATION 
full description of 
the interaction between 
two massive bodies 
(e.g., Pluto -Charon system) 
EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY 
similar degree of 
approximation of 
intended empiricallaws 
(e.g., orbit of Mars) 
CONFIRMATION 
similar degree of 
approximation of the 
laws describing the 
behaviour oftest particles 
(e.g., orbits of cornets, artificial 
satellites, spacecrafts) 
Figure 18. The Convergence and Continuity of Scientîtic Knowledgc 
In turn, the convergence of simpler and more complex models may provide an answer to 
the objection from ontological incoherence. As cited earlier, Morrison is concerned that the same 
chemical compound cannot be at the same time an ideal and a van der Waals gas. Presumably, 
some gases fit the equation describing ideal gases, in part, because the size of the particles is 
negligible in respect to the overall volume of the gas. It is clear however that no volume of gas 
can ever be compressed ad infinitum, meaning that no gas is an ideal gas, but rather behaves like 
an ideal gas under certain conditions. At some point during the compression the size of the parti-
cles is bound to become non-negligible in respect to the overall volume of the gas, hence the 
switch from PO T/V to P 0 T/(V-b), where P is pressure, V is volume, T is absolute temperature 
and b is the volume of a mole of particles. 
9.6 Jlodels as Representatiolls of tlte 'Dyllllmic Structure' of Ph en omella 
Thus far, l argued that a theoretical model must resemble its target phenomenon at the 
level of the empirical laws and/or predictions. l related this requirement to the fact that, in order 
160 
to function as a representation, a model must accurately represent sorne aspects of the target phe-
nomenon. Under a strictly deductive framing, a model consists of mathematical propositions ar-
ranged in a deductive argument. Thus, it is not problematic to c1aim that sorne of these proposi-
tions are isomorphic, similar and many cases plain identical with target models of data also con-
sisting of mathematical propositions. 
However this essentially positivist point of view fails to c1arify the main issue: How ex-
actly scientific models represent empirical reality? Inferentialists argue that models represent by 
pro vi ding a means for surrogate reasoning, while adepts of the resemblance approach argue that 
models are abstract/ideal constructs mirroring sorne structural aspects of the target phenomenon. 
The dispute is primarily about which of the two is absolutely necessary for representation in gen-
eral and to scientific representation in particular. 
Although the most generally applicable and compatible with a strictly deductive or in-
strumentalist framing of the modelling practice, l think that Suarez' s account fails to address the 
fact that any scientifically useful representation must allow for accurate inferences in at least one 
specific respect. l understand perfectly well that many scientific models and theories were used 
instrumentally in the past and that the recent proliferation of computer simulations and mathe-
matical models in traditionally empirical domains of investigation such as biology and psychol-
ogy justifies to a large extent Suarez's point ofview. On the other hand, it seems to me that this 
point of view applies more accurately to theoretical science and since, qui te obviously, theoreti-
cal science cannot constitute by itself all science, l tend to disagree with Suarez's suggestion that 
models are first and foremost conceptual devices allowing for surrogate reasoning. To use an ex-
ample very dear to me, it is minimally required that an experimental setup is sufficiently similar 
with the target for which it is substituted in respect to the studied feature. l think it is quite obvi-
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ous that the material models used for experimental purposes aim to reproduce sorne naturally-
occurring counterpart, as opposed to denote it or metaphorically represent it. Furthermore, even 
the computer simulations used as low-cost alternatives to highly expensive or impossible to real-
ise experimental setups still aim to reproduce available empirical laws and models of data given 
via instrumental algorithms. Granted, such models do not claim an overall resemblance with the 
target phenomenon, yet they have to yield at least sorne empirically accurate inferences. 
At the other end of the spectrum, while attractive for its empiricism and ability to com-
bine ideas from very diverse sources, l find that Giere's similarity approach needs to be further 
developed. On one hand, l assume that the notion of similarity can be further refined. By decom-
posing the overall similarity into a set of non-overlapping theoretically-relevant respects of com-
parison and assuming that, at least in sorne respects, the degree of similarity is 100%, similarity 
should collapse into a technical partial isomorphism. This suggests that the notion of similarity 
may receive a fully rigorous description. On the other hand, it is not c1ear what is the recipe for 
carving reality in 'respects of comparison' and how the degrees of similarity attached to each 
respect add together in order to yield an overall measure of the similarity between a model and 
its target. 
Given these difficulties, l much prefer the less audacious, but easier to use traditional hy-
pothetico-deductive sc he me according to which a model hypothesises that only sorne properties 
of a phenomenon are 'dynamically linked' to other properties and play a role in determining the 
manifestation of the latter. That is, if the model is true, the variation of sorne features of the tar-
get phenomenon can be achieved by varying (or correlate with the variation of) sorne specific 
features and not other. The difference is subtle, but may suffice to save claims to partial resem-
blance. For Giere, theoretical models 'passively' reflect selected features of the target phenom-
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ena with various degrees of similarity. The model is literally a map highlighting sorne aspects of 
reality while ignoring others; the 'similarity' part of the account is meant to take -care of the fact 
that the map is not the same as a picture of the terrain in describes. 
Note however that it is not c1ear why sorne features of the phenomenon are represented 
(or misrepresented) by the model while other features are not. In contrast, under a hypothetico-
deductive treatment the model aims to represent the 'dynamic' or rather the 'experimental struc-
ture' of the phenomenon and usually succeeds in doing so every time it turns out the desired re-
sults can be achieved by experimentally manipulating only the theoretically-relevant variables. 
Suarez (2003 p. 237) complains that "the case of representation of a well-establishe~ physical 
phenomenon by means of a difJerential mathematical equation is the hardest case for [isoJ to 
accommodate". My reading of representation ai ms precisely to take into account this shortcom-
ing of resemblance accounts. While it might be true that in sorne individual aspects there might 
be a divergence between model and target, this is not necessarily a problem, because the model 
still accurately represents the 'dynamic interplay' between theoretically-relevant features. For 
example, the mass of an artificial satellite is negligible for theoretical reasons in respect to the 
Earth-satellite interaction, but certainly not in respect to the interaction between the satellite and 
an astronaut. In other words, the mass of the satellite is not negligible simpliciter, but rather in 
reference to its effects in the context of a given interaction. This kind of flexibility is impossible 
under Giere's approach: irrespective of the context, the mass of the satellite remains a rigid re-
spect of comparison in which the model is either similar within a given margin of error or sig-
nificantly dissimilar. 
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9.7 ConcllUling Remarks 
ldeally, the final goal would be to achieve a convergence between inferential and resem-
blance accounts of scientific representation. Suarez objects to the appending of an intentionality 
clause to resemblance accounts on the grounds that not aH models resemble their targets and that 
isomorphism does not allow for misrepresentation; the main line of attack here is that resem-
blance is too strong, and therefore something must be subtracted from it rather than added to it 
(Suarez, 2003 p. 238). I think he is right. The amended resemblance approach fails to treat scien-
tific representation as a special case of representation in general. I think that it is best to adopt the 
reverse strategy, namely start with Suarez's general conditions for representation and realise that, 
in order for surrogate reasoning to function reliably, representation must be further subjected to 
context-relative constraints fixing standards of acceptable inference. In particular, scientific rep-
resentation further requires that a model directly represents sorne 'essential feature' of the in-
tended target phenomenon. Thus, instead of appending intentionality and surrogate reasoning to 
resemblance accounts, it is resemblance that is appended to inferential accounts. In other words, 
resemblance doesn't represent by itself, although it is a necessary component of certain kinds of 
representation. 
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PART III 
TUEREALISM - ANTIREALISM 
DERATE: THE CASE OF MOLECU-
LARBIOLOGY 
CHAPTER 10 
REALISM AND ANTIREALISM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF 
SCIENCE 
10.l /-;'cielltiflc Realism 
1 showed, via specifie examples, how individual scientific explanations can be con-
strained, on one hand, by the available empirical data, and, on the other, by general patterns of 
explanation. 1 would like now to integrate these two levels of determination and address, once 
again by means of study cases drawn from the actual scientific practice, one of the hotte st mat-
ters of debate in contemporary philosophy of science. The example 1 have in mind is the devel-
opment of the present day genetic theory. The matter of debate is that of scientific realism. 
In a weIl known essay, Boyd (1984) defines scientific realism as a doctrine embodying 
four central theses, which can be summarised as follows: 
1) Theoretical terms, that is, unobservables to which scientific theories may appeal, refer 
to something existing in reality. 
2) Scientific theories, interpreted realistically, are confirmable. 
3) Science progresses towards more and more accurate approximations of the truth. 
4) Reality is largely independent of thoughts, concepts and theoretical considerations. 
Thus, scientific realism can be said to comprise three kinds of 'realism, namely metaphysical, 
semantic and epistemological realism. Metaphysical realism (thesis 4) states that the world exists 
outside us and has an intrinsic structure independently of our minds. Semantic realism (thesis 1) 
states that theories, models and the propositions of science in general as sert something about re-
ality and are true or false in respect to reality. Finally, epistemological realism (theses 2 and 3) 
states that it is possible to establish the truth or falsity of scientific knowledge and that it is pos-
sible to progress towards a more accurate and complete knowledge of reality. 
10.2 A rgumell ts for 1.4etaphysicfll Realism 
Metaphysical realism stands in opposition to subjective and objective idealism. Subjec-
tive idealism - usually attributed to Berkeley, although Berkeley himself adhered more to a ver-
sion of objective i,dealism where God and God's mind play a very important role - states that 
reality reduces to the mental activity of a given human subject. Objective idealism maintains that 
the human mind has access to non-material entities transcending the mental activity of any sub-
ject in particular; the se non-material entities might be the ideas of Plato, the conceptual catego-
ries of Kant or again language for Hegel. Following a somewhat different approach, for contem-
porary metaphysical antirealists such as Dummett (1978) and late Putnam (1990), what we caU 
the 'world' amounts to certain epistemic practices and conditions. 
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A metaphysical realist, especially in the context of scientific realism, will typically want 
to argue that there is an external reality in addition to or more fundamental than the reality of 
mental and linguistic items. This defines the metaphysical antirealist as sorne one who denies the 
existence of anything outside mental and linguistic reality. Many realists are also materialists, 
either rejecting mental activity as entirely inexistent and adopting a strong eliminative material-
ism (Churchland, 1988) or reducing it to a particular kind of material phenomena (Smart, 1968). 
It is worth noting however that the metaphysical realist can be content with a dualism accepting 
reality as being both mental and material, or rather extra-mental and extra-linguistic (Niiniluoto, 
2000 p. 27). 
Metaphysical realism is typically justified by the fact that sorne linguistic terms can be 
'triggered' extra-linguistically. For example, a patient subjected to brain surgery tries to recon-
stmct the chain of events that led him on the operation table. He conjectures that he must have 
lost control of the vehicle he was driving, which led to a collision, which led to him knocking his 
head against sorne hard surface, which in turn would explain why he is now on the operation ta-
ble. His internaI discourse might be a purely linguistic entity subjected to a set of mIes linking 
the term 'brain damage' with other linguistic terms such as 'car accident'. The discourse might 
refer or it might not. If it refers, it might be tme or it might be false. In the mean time, one of the 
surgeons accidentally touches a specific area of the patient' s brain with a needle. At the same 
moment, the internaI discourse of the patient is interrupted by the vivid sensation of bright red 
and the linguistic term 'red' inserts in the middle ofhis mental discourse. The arbitrary insertion 
of the term 'red' is allowed neither by the mIes of grammar, nor by the mIes correlating the term 
'brain damage' with other linguistic terms. The insertion is therefore something that transcends 
the internaI logic of language. Completely absorbed by his thoughts, the patient failed to notice 
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that the surgeon touched his brain with a needle. In addition, he doesn't know anything about the 
structure of the brain and the mechanisms of perception. The patient might try to rationalise the 
sudden insertion of the term 'red' in the middle of his mental discourse. Note however how his 
mental discourse is unlawfuUy disrupted tirst and only afterwards the disruption is rationalised 
by appealing to further rules correlating the term 'red' with other linguistic terms. It is the sud-
den introduction of the term 'red' which caUs these further rationalisation, thus determining the 
sudden change in the mental discourse, and not the initial discourse, with its terms and rules, 
which brought about the term 'red' and the new thread of thoughts that followed afterwards. 
The example shows that sorne elements, even if represented in language and having an 
effect on the linguistic discourse, have an extra-linguistic origin. Metaphysical realism holds that 
intrusions occur independently of the will of the thinking agent and that they do not obey the 
rules of the language to which his or her thoughts are subjected. Thus, they faU outside any lan-
guage game to which a reasonable agent might wiUingly be adhering. 
The question that remains to be settled is whether the reality transcending the mind of the 
patient is objective. A common way to address the question is to appeal to the argument from 
, 
intersubjectivity (Niiniluoto, 2000 pp. 36-41). Here is my own version of the argument. If the 
brains of two patients are simultaneously touched with a needle by the same surgeon, then, after 
consulting the testimonies of the two patients, presumably each thinking of different things, the 
surgeon can easily pinpoint the introduction of the term 'red' in the discourses of the two patients 
as correlating with the intrusion of his needle and not with the subject matter of the discourses of 
the patients. This is indeed a most interesting tinding. Somehow, the surgeon' s train of thoughts 
concerning the simultaneous brain surgery of two patients intruded the trains of thoughts of the 
two patients. Three independent discourses, each belonging to different minds and each involv-
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ing their own terms and laws somehow intersected in the most miraculous manner. 1 say miracu-
lous because the surgeon didn't communicate by means of language what he was doing to the 
patients, yet even in the absence of a linguistic connection, the three discourses intersected none- . 
theless. Further investigation from the part of the surgeon will most likely establish that he is 
able to repeat exactly the same intrusion over and over again in any patient independently of 
what the patient is thinking of and of how he rationalises the intrusion afterwards. The correla-
tion between the term 'red' in the discourses of the two patients and the term 'needle' in the sur-
geon's discourse transcends at the same time the limits of any mind in particular. 
Naturalistic accounts (Prinz, 2002; Kornblith, 2003; Murray, 2004) take advantage ofthis 
kind of examples and further argue, correctly in my opinion, that sorne linguistic terms, explic-
itly connected to one another by rules of language, are also extra-linguistically connected either 
to other linguistic terms (such as the 'red-needle' correlation), or to something transcending lan-
guage altogether (the term 'red' irrupting in the discourses of the patients). Most often, the extra-
linguistic connections are thought of in terms of causal chains mediated by perception mecha-
nisms. Thus, perception anchors specific terms in an extra-linguistic reality and subjects the logi-
cal structure of a linguistic discourse to external influences. 
10.3 Issues Re/atet! 10 Seml11ltic ant! t.'pistemological Realism 
Whether the above considerations suffice to establish metaphysical realism is still a mat-
ter of debate. Since the realism-antirealism debate in philosophy of science is typically con-
cerned with semantics and epistemology, for the purposes of this book, 1 will simply take meta-
physical realism as a premise of the investigation. 
The next three chapters are dedicated to the problem of semantic realism. As discussed 
previously, positivist verificationism amounts to an eliminative reductionism oftheoretical terms 
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to observational ones. Strong verificationism usually implies that theoretical terms cannot refer 
to anything else than certain combinations of observables and, in this sense, it represents a form 
of semantic antirealism about the former. Of course, as statements about observables, scientific 
theories, models and propositions have a truth value. Nevertheless, they assert something about 
observables al one and do not point towards the existence of theoretical entities hypothesised by 
scientific explanations. Instrumentalists (Nagel, 1950; Fine, 1984) push matters further and argue 
that scÏentific theories and models serve solely pragmatic purposes and should not be taken liter-
ally, but rather as means to summarise and organise knowledge, as reliable methods or computa-
tional algorithms for predicting phenomena, etc. The argument here is that semantics doesn't add 
anything to scientific theories and models, which can function just as weIl without it. In contrast, 
semantic realists argue that semantics adds something to the scÏentific discourse. More specifi-
cally, it is thought that the entities, mechanisms or structures hypothesised by scÏentific theories 
and models underlie and determine the manifestation of empirical reality at the observable level 
(Bunge, 1973; Psillos, 1999; Niiniluoto, 2000). Thus, realists typicaIly believe that a phenome-
non can, or at very least could be, accessed and manipulated at two distinct levels, at the level of 
its observable manifestation and at that of its underlying structure, mechanism, etc. 
Epistemological realism, discussed in more detail in the last chapters of the book, states 
that truth can be ascertained and contrasts with agnostic (van Fraassen, 1980; 1989; Laudan, 
1984) and sceptical (Feyerabend, 1987) stances. Epistemological antirealists do not deny that 
theoretical terms refer, and not even that currently accepted theories and models are true, but 
rather that we cannot legitimately daim that we are in the possession of truth. In fact, most epis-
temological antirealists push matters further and argue that irrespective of whether theoretical 
terms refer or not, science can function by providing explanations alone, without bothering to 
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prove that the entities it postulates for explanatory purposes exist or not. Note that, unlike in-
strumentalists, epistemological antirealists endorse semantic realism in respect to theoretical 
terms contributes to the explanation; what doesn't contribute to the overall functioning of science 
is justification. On the realist end of the debate, it wasinitially argued that the c1aims made by 
scientists can be confirmed or falsified (Popper, 1959; Hempel, et al., 1965). However, since 
confirmation is usually only partial and since it is not c1ear to what extent the confirmation of 
sorne elements of a model justifies claims about the model being true, it is nowadays common to 
argue that the inferences and justification methods employed by scientists are reliable and tend to 
yield the truth (Maxwell, 1962; Smart, 1963; Hacking, 1983; Boyd, 1984; Psillos, 1999). 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE PHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF MENDEL'S GENETIC EXPLANA-
TION 
11.1 ümcepw(I! Et:plrwatiol1.s: The Example of i'rJemielian Genet je,., 
The historical development of classical genetics provides a suitabl6 study case for exp lor-
ing issues related to semantic realism. The phenomenon under investigation is sexual reproduc-
tion. In a first time Mendel (1866) - as well as de Vries, Correns, and von Tschermak shortly 
after observed patterns of phenotypic frequency from one generation to the next and repre-
sented them mathematically as proportions (Olby, 1985). The phenotypic frequencies constitute 
the empirical constraint on hypothesis formation. By analogy with the gravitational model, the 
patterns of frequency represent an essential empirical description of the phenomenon under study 
which that any theoretical explanation must entail as a conclusion in order to be empirically ade-
quate. 
Given this empirical constraint, Mendel hypothesised a rather complex story whereby en-
tities called 'alleles' are somehow responsible for phenotypic traits. Each organism must possess 
two alleles, one inherited from each parent. The two alleles contribute to the manifestation of the 
phenotype, yet it is not always the case that an organism which inherited two different alleles 
from its parents has a mixed phenotype. Instf~ad, sorne alleles are dominant, while others are re-
cessive. The phenotype of the organism inheriting two dominant alleles is indistinguishable from 
the phenotype of an organism inheriting a dominant allele and a recessive one, meaning that, 
when present, the dominant allele determines the phenotype alone. The phenotype associated 
with recessive alleles manifests itself only if an organism inherits two copies of the recessive al-
lele. 
low: 
For reference, the classical case of complete dominance is illustrated in the diagram be-
x 
@ dominant allele 
GJ reœssive allele 
l 
~green phenotype 
o yellow phenotype 
Parents 
First generation 
Second generation 
)(ro ssing 
Figure 19. Mendclian Inherîtance 
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Variations of the above explanatory strategy require that sorne alleles are partially dominant or 
that two alleles determine conjointly the phenotype. 
By analogy with the Newtonian model discussed in the previous chapter, the 'allele story' 
constitutes the fundamental hypothesis. Since this is an entirely new hypothesis, custom-tailored 
for the needs of a particular body of empirical data, and not a pre-existing pattern of explanation 
applied to new phenomena, we don't have to worry about the distinction between fundamental 
and model-specific hypotheses. Different patterns of inheritance (partial dominance, inherit~ 
for non-diploid organisms, etc.) are explained not by extending Mendel's initial hypothesis to 
these new phenomena, but by modifying Mendel's explanatory story in order to accommodate 
new phenomena case by case. Nevertheless, the family of explanations associated with Men-
delian genetics shares a common theme, namely the supposition that there is something in each 
organism, namely the 'alleles', which determine its phenotype (this would be the fundamental 
hypothesis common to all Mendelian models); to this common supposition, different genetic ex-
planations add sorne further assumptions specifying how many alleles are required and how they 
interact in order to determine the phenotype (the model-specific hypotheses). 
Mendel' s explanatory hypothesis is not explicitly formulated as a set of mathematical 
propositions and, as consequence the deductive character of Mendel' s explanation is less evident. 
As noted on a previous occasion, Mendel' s genetic explanation hypothesises a mechanism for 
heredity, and, at the same time, it is framed as a deductive consequence of a set of 'laws'. On the 
mechanistic side, Mendel hypothesises the existence of 'genetic elements', that is, of partic1e-
like entities, that are transmitted via semen or pollen, that mix with their female counterparts and 
that later on segregate in a specific pattern before being carried on to the offspring. On the de-
ductive side, the behaviour of the 'genetic partic1es', most notably their distribution along several 
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generations, is described by probabilistic 'laws'. These 'laws' 'dictate' how the genetic mechal 
nism functions, that is, how the 'genetic elements' segregate following fertilisation. 
From an intuitive point of view, if things happen as postulated by the hypothesis (i.e., . 
each organism contains two alleles determining its phenotype, which segregate randomly be-
tween distinct gametes, subsequently fused together in order to produce the fertilised egg), 'the 
observed phenotypic distribution should obtain. AIso, it seems that in developing his explanation 
Mendel applied the principles of combinatorial mathematics to discrete elements of inheritance 
called 'alleles' (Gayon, 2000). Furthermore, the hypothesis can be easily reframed in terms of 
combinatorial probabilities and given a rigorous mathematical formulation [see, for example, the 
Hardy-Weinberg law (Edwards, 1977)]. 
J 1.2 lnstrumentali.sm llnd the Indepemlence l?l Ear(1/ (ielletic Theories 
from Biochemistl)', JUo!ecu!ay Biology {lml I>evelopmental Bio!ogy 
The version of Mendel's genetic explanation presented in most genetics textbooks com-
prises no further hypotheses about what alleles are made of, where they might be located in the 
organism, how they replicate, segregate and determine the phenotype. In this sense, the mecha-
nistic si de of Mendel' s explanation is incomplete. 
It seems however that Mendel believed that microscopie 'elements' are transferred from 
parents to offspring during mating or fertilisation, and, if found in sufficient quantity, the se 'ele-
ments' are responsible for the observed phenotypes (Gayon, 1998 pp. l05-146). Although the 
physical interpretation endorsed by Mendel was not retained during the subsequent development 
of genetics, this indicates that Mendel thought of his genetic theory along the lines of semantic 
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realism, that is, as hypothesising the existence of physical entities and of a mechanism of action, 
rather than a purely conceptual schema serving the sole purpose of explanation. 
Since, initiaIly, aIl the entities postulated by the genetic explanation (aIle1es, segregation, 
dominance, etc.) were purely hypothetical in nature, an instrumentalist interpretation was also 
envisaged. Johannsen was the first to use the term 'gene' in order to refer to the ".special comii-
fions, joundations and determiners [present in the gametes and by means of which the] many 
characteristics of the organism are .\pecified' (1909 p. 124). What is less known is that, in defin-
ing the concept of 'gene', Johannsen also made a sharp distinction between the epistemic status 
of the notion of 'phenotype', pertaining to observable traits, and that of the notion of 'genotype', 
pertaining to the realm of what may be a strictly explanatory notion (Johannsen, 1909; Roll-
Hansen, 1989). Throughout his life, Johannsen remained an agnostic about the material existence 
and constitution of the genotype, and, according to sorne authors, treated alle1es as essentially 
instrumental constructs introduced for the purposes of explanation alone (Rheinberger, 2000). 
The genetic explanation was also interpreted instrumentally in a second, weaker sense. 
Under this altemate interpretation it is not question of doubting the existence of a genetic mate-
rial, but rather of understanding that the genetic theory proposed by Mendel simply assumes that 
'aIle1es' are transmitted from one generation to the next and that they determine the phenotype 
without incorporating any further hypotheses as to how these two feats are achieved. According 
to Moss, 
"[ w ]hat Johannsen ca lied for in distinguishing between the genotype and the phenotype was 
a separation of the inheritance of Mendelian units from development, thereby constituting the 
study of genetics as an independent discipline." 
(Moss, 2003 p. 29) 
177 
It seems therefore that early geneticists understood quite clearly that, if interpreted along the 
tines of semantic realism, Mendel's genetic explanation is incomplete or, if we prefer to put it 
this way, has a limited explanatory scope. 
This second sense in which the genetic explanation was used instrumentally appears qui te 
clearly in Morgan's research: 
"At the level at which the genetic experiments lie il does not make the slightest dif.ference 
wh ether the gene is a hypothetical unit, or whether the gene is a material particle." 
(Morgan, 1935 p. 3) 
If Johannsen expressed doubts concerning the existence of a material substance responsible for 
inheritance, Morgan chose to abstain from formulating any hypotheses about the physical, 
chemical or biological 'mechanisms' via which genes are inherited and determine phenotypes, 
and concentrate instead on the more immediate problem of defining the relationship between 
genes and phenotypes. 
The above considerations indicate that Mendelian and classical genetics are essentially 
about the probabilistic relationships between phenotypic traits and allegedly underlying geno-
types (or what Moss calls 'gene-P') and much less about • biological mechanisms'. This further 
indicates that 
1) although few geneticists doubted the existence of a physical entities responsible for in-
heritance, early on, genetic theories received only a partial physical interpretation; 
2) a sharp distinction was initially drawn between genetics and the budding new sciences of 
biochemistry, molecular biology and developmental biology. 
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Il.3 A Partial Physicallmerpretationfor IHendel 's 
Genetie Eyplanatioll and the Birth of Clas$'ical Geneties 
In the context of an instrurnentalist approach, an explanation fulfils its goal in as rnuch as 
it is ernpirically adequate in respect to sorne desired result - in this case, in respect to the ability 
to predict phenotypic distribution in a given population. The downside of instrurnentalism is that, 
once a successful explanation is provided, research has no logical reason to continue. In the case 
of Mendel's explanation, to ask "How genes are inherited?" or "How genes deterrnine pheno-
types?" implies that there is more to be said, that a 'mechanism' of sorne sort must be specified, 
in short, that a an instrumental- or 'black-box' approach, if we so prefer - use of the genetic ex-
planation is unsatisfactory or incornplete. 
HistoricaIly, Mendel's explanation was received by the scientific community along the 
lines of semantic realism at least in the minimalistic sens~ that it postulated the existence of 
physical entities called 'genes'. Furthermore, the historical development of genetics blatantly 
contradicts instrumentalist views of science advocated by Carnap (1928; 1936) and, later on, by 
Nagel (1950). As noted above, this is not aIl that surprising since instrumentalism leaves no 
room for further experimental and technological developments, which is a rather unhappy conse-
quence, considering that, most of the time, it is precisely the quest for experimental and techno-
logical control that motivates scientific investigation in the first place. 
Half a century after the initial formulation of the genetic explanation, Sutton and Boveri 
(Sutton, 1903; Crow, et al., 2002) hypothesised a plausible physical interpretation based on the 
observation that, during meiosis, chromosomes segregate in a Mendelian fashion. A decade later, 
Morgan and his research group showed that sorne traits are specifically linked to the sex chrorno-
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somes, thus providing evidenee supporting the Sutton-Boveri interpretation (Morgan, et al., 
1915). 
Morgan and his group are famously known for their work on jointly inherited traits. 
Morgan hypothesised that such traits are associated with alleles located on the same chromosome 
(henee 'genetic linkage'), meaning that each chromosome contains more than one allele (nothing 
surprising here sinee the number of chromosomes is extremely small in comparison with the 
number of phenotypic traits) and that a Mendelian distribution of phenotypes is possible only 
when genes/alleles are linked to different chromosomes. In this respect, Mendel' s explanation 
was extended in order to accommodate the newly discovered fact that theoretically postulated 
alleles must be located on or associated with physically existent chromosomes. 
By analysing minute divergence in the proportions of phenotypes associated with linked 
alleles, Morgan and his collaborators further discovered recombination phenomena and hypothe-
sised crossing-over (proeess during which chromosomes exchange parts). Shortly after, Stur-
tevant and his collaborators showed that the frequency of recombination is proportional with the 
distance between the locations of the linked alleles, thus providing the frrst 'chromosomal maps' 
(Sturtevant, 1913; Morgan, et al., 1915). Painter further found a correlation between the dis-
placement of genetic loci on chromosomal maps and visible changes in the banding pattern of 
giant salivary gland chromosomes of Drosophila (Painter, 1934), further strengthening the link 
between the genetic explanation and the Sutton-Boveri interpretation. 
Eventually, experiments involving radiation-indueed mutation (McClintock, 1929; Mul-
1er, 1951), chemical inhibitors of meiosis (Ravnik, et al., 1999), plasmid (Avery, et al., .1944) and 
chromosome (Dieter, et al., 2007) transfers, as well as a thorough classification ofthe syndromes 
associated with chromosomal aberrations showed beyond doubt that any interferenee with chro-
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mosomal segregation and alterations of the chromosomal content of a cell/organism correlates 
with changes in the phenotype. As a result, it is now generally acknowledged that each set of al-
ternate alleles in a diploid organism is associated with a precise place on a chromosome, namely 
with a gene - to be understood here in the classical sense of genetic locus -, and that several 
genes are arranged in a sequential order along each chromosome. 
Sorne of the experimental data justifying the Sutton-Boveri interpretation is presented in 
the figure below: 
II ~;{ fl 2 3 4 5 
l( li « 11 Ct ?) )( 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Jl J\... U u )f U 
13 ,. 15 16 17 18 
'U n 1. 'f'* }i 
19 20 21 22 X!Y 
The figure above depiCts the human male karyotype (chromosomes during 
metaphaseas observed via light microscopy alter staining). A different 
stripe pattern is associated with each chromosome. 
At the top lelt corner is reproduced Morgan's own illustration of the 
chromosomal crossoverhypothesis. 
The figure immediately below iIIustrates abenant crossover between non-
homoIoguous chromosomes. Similar changes in the smpe patterns following 
homoIoguous crossoverare observable (especially in giant polytene 
chromosomes). thus providing sorne initial confirmation of Morgan's hypothesis. 
Figure 20. Chromosornal Maps 
J 1.4 The Demise of the 11lstrumellttllist Illterpretation 
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It is possible to imagine an alternative formulation of Mendel's explanatory story which 
does not claim to be a statement about empirical reality, but an algorithm or method of calculat-
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ing phenotypic frequencies. By analogy with the mathematical representation of the correlation 
between the length of a metal rod and temperature as a linear function, we might view the ge-
netic explanation along the lines of a probabilistic representation of available empirical data. 
Note however that an instrurnentalist reformulation does not aim at the same goals as Mendel's 
explanation. An instrumentalist algorithm aims solely to yield the correct result; the main con-
cerns here are the accuracy and the efficiency of the algorithm. In contrast, the genetic explana-
tion, as understood by the scientific community, hypotheses the existence of entities named 'al-
le1es'; therefore, the efforts are oriented towards identifying and further investigating the posited 
entities. The obvious questions in this case are "What are the genes made of?" and "How do they 
determine the phenotype of an organism?" Such questions have no meaning in the context of 
strictly instrumentalist interpretations. 
By the third decade of the 20th century, researchers were able to physically locate the al-
le1es in an organism and identify the physical path they follow during segregation and passage 
from parents to offspring. With these specifications, a chapter in the history of genetics was 
closed and another one begun. Classical genetics, as defined by Morgan, treats the observed phe-
notype as a function of the genotype. The explanation does not specify, not even at purely hypo-
thetical level, how the genotype determines the phenotype. It is this question - a question tran-
scending both the aim and the explanatory resources of Mendelian and classical genetics - that 
motivated the subsequent research in the field of genetics. Hence, a distinction should, and is 
usually made between classical genetics and the further advances of biochemistry and molecular 
biology. 
The physical localisation of the alleles led naturally to the next step of the investigation: 
determining the material composition of the chromosomes. It is interesting to note that no further 
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over-arching explanatory story, at least none equalling the generality of Mendel' s genetic theory, 
was ever proposed in the subsequent development of genetics. Rather, researchers relied on the 
expectation that an elucidation of the material composition of the genetic material, a matter of 
chemical analysis, will reveal essential clues as to the nature of the causal links joining genotype 
and phenotype. The project is clearly outlined by Muller in late 1920s. Convinced that genes 
must be material particles associated with chromosomes, Muller (1951) further conjectured that 
they are endowed with two properties: autocatalysis, or the ability to replicate themselves, and 
heterocatalysis, the ability to determine a phenotype. He also realized that "the geneticist himself 
is helpless ta analyse these praperties further. Here the physicist, as weil as the chemist, must 
step in" (Muller, 1936 p. 214). 
Chemists and biochemists did step in. In 1933, Brachet showed that chromosomes are 
made, among other things, of DNA. A decade later, A very and his colleagues identified DNA as 
the 'transforming principle' capable of changing the phenotypes of certain bacteria (Avery, et al., 
1944). Yet another decade later, Watson and Crick elucidate the chemical structure of DNA and 
predict that it must replicate semi-conservatively (Watson, et al., 1953), prediction soon con-
firmed by the Meselson-Stahl experiment (Meselson, et al., 1958). The structure and mechanisms 
responsible for the 'autocatalytic' property of genes were thus uncovered and shown to be heav-
ily dependent on the specific chemical structure of DNA molecules. To this date, 1953 marks the 
year when one essential property of genes was shown to be essentially a matter of biochemistry. 
As one can easily guess, it is this strong dependence of 'autocatalysis' on the chemical structure 
of DNA that led several philosophers of biology to claim that the concept of' gene' can be reduc-
tively defined as 'stretch of DNA' (Schaffner, 1969; 1967). 
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The mechanisms and processes responsible for the 'heterocatalytic' activity were like-
wise elucidated. Note however that, unlike 'autocatalysis', the 'heterocatalytic' activity cannot 
be characterised exc1usively via biochemical analysis (i.e., as a function of chemical structure), 
but requires the further notion of 'molecular mechanism' (signalling, regulation, etc.). In a first 
time, Beadle and Tatum (1941) showed that genes .code for proteins and hypothesised that the 
enzyrnatic activity of proteins is responsible for the phenotype. During the 1960s, various re-
se arch groups work to uncover the mechanisms and processes leading to the 'expression' of 
DNA as proteins. Three decades later, Fiers and his colleagues determines the structure of the 
gene coding for the coat protein of the phage MS2 (Fiers, et al., 1971). Later on during the 
1970s, it becomes clear that most genes are regulated at the level of transcription regulation; sev-
eral other levels of regulation are also discovered, including splicing, frame shifting, etc. 
The tables below highlight sorne of the rnilestones in the development of modern genet-
ics. A schematic representation of the currently accepted model of the causal links between ge-
netic makeup and phenotype is also provided. More can be found in Moran, part four (Moran, et 
al., 1994); for a discussion of the historical development of molecular genetics see Darden 
(1991), Carlson (1967), Waters (1994). 
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CHAPTER12 
THE CONTINUITY AND CONVERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
12.1 Reference Coml1lellsllrabili~y l'S. Tlzeoretical Confinui(y 
The widespread experimental practice in sciences argues against instrumentalism, which 
must be confined to highly theoretical branches of science specifically aiming to provide an en-
hanced, easier to compute or just more elegant mathematical treatment of scientific problems. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow from here that semantic realism makes the unanimity. Quite on 
the contrary, the issue is still hotly debated, usually in relation to the continuity of scientific 
knowledge from one theory to the next. 
The theories, models and explanatory stories accepted today evolved through several ver-
sions before reaching their current textbook formulation. Presumably, they will continue to 
change in the future; science is an ongoing process. But if theories change, then it is not c1ear 
how reference, meaning, ontology and knowledge in general are continuous and compatible from 
one theory to the next. 
Notoriously, Kuhn argues that terms appearing in both classical and relativistic mechan-
ics, considered to be two successive theories explaining a common set of phenomena, do not 
have the same meaning and do not refer to the same things. He exemplifies his c1aim by discuss-
ing the status of mass in mechanical theories: 
"Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at low relative 
velocities may the Iwo be measured in the sarne way, and even then they must not be con-
ceived to be the same". 
(1970 p. 102) 
The argument here is that mass cannot be the same entity in classical and relativistic mechanics 
because the 'classical mass' is conserved while the 'relativistic mass' is no t, the underlying idea 
being that conservation defines sorne essential property of mass.28 
Kuhn alludes at two distinct problems. The first one pertains to 'reference commensura-
bility'. l showed on a previous occasion that we don't have to worry about the lack of meaning 
continuity between the cognitive and neurological manifestations of depression. To accurately 
evaluate contingencies does not mean to suffer from a serotonin-norepinephrine imbalance; in 
fact, to accurately evaluate contingencies doesn't even mean to be depressed. There is no reduc-
tion between theoretical terms, or between theoretical and observational terms. Nonetheless, in 
28 Against this conception, whereby mass is defined via to a list of properties, Mach (1893 pp. 266-267) proposes an 
operational definition whereby mass is an indicator of whether two physical objects can be interchanged such that 
changes in motion after a mechanical interaction remains identical. If a particle is accelerated from relative rest to a 
speed high enough for relativistic effects such as length contraction and time dilation to become manifest, does 
Mach's definition of mass still hold? Will the resulting motions of high-speed collisions still be the same for two 
bodies if it has been already established by low-speed collision experiments that the two bodies have the same mass? 
The answer is "Yes". Nowhere in the definition ofmass is it further specified what are the resulting motions, what is 
the total mass of a mechanical system or that the numerical value of the measured mass must remain the same. This 
definition works equally weil in classical and relativistic mechanics and refers to the same phenomenon of 'me-
chanical interchangeability' oftwo physical bodies. 
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the absence of a unified psychological theory, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology con-
tinue to refer, de scribe and assert something about the same subjects, operationally defined and 
selected by me ans of the same 'depression test' experimental protocol. 
The other problem pertains to 'theoretical continuity'. Coreference does not guarantee the 
possibility to translate terms belonging to a theory in the language of another theory; in other 
words, coreference is not necessarily paralleled by theoretical continuity. Ideally, scientific pro-
gress is characterised by both coreference and theoretical continuity, such that new theories are 
able to recuperate the successes of older theories and ultimately provide a more general basis for 
understanding empirical reality?9 
12.2 Arguments against the COl1l'ergellce and Con/inuit y of Sciemijlc Knmvledge 
According to Fine, the classical realist argument for the continuity and convergence of 
scientific knowledge makes use of the fact that, at any point in time, there are only a handful of 
related theories competing as true explanations for a given phenomenon. Fine frames a version 
of the realist argument, which he attributes to Boyd, as follows: 
"it is reasanable ta restrict one 's search for successar thearies ta thase whase ontologies and 
laws resemble what we already have, especially where what we already have is weil can-
firmed". 
29 Perhaps the most discussed example in the literature is that of Maxwell' s electromagnetism. Unlike the dual cog-
nitive and neurological description of depression, which merely core fer, Maxwell's electromagnetic theory is 
thought to have evolved with considerable modifications from previous ether mechanical models. Sorne realists ar-
gue that the ether, seen as the hypothetical medium responsible for the propagation of light, 'pointed to' or 'referred' 
from the very beginning to certain variations in the electromagnetic field (Psillos, 1999 pp. 130-143). The argument 
is that both the ether and the electromagnetic field share sorne features which explain the propagation of light. In 
contrast, other philosophers of science seem to think that the transition is characterised by theoretical continuity in 
the absence of co-reference and argue for structural realism, that is, the view that only the mathematical formalism 
survives from one theory to the next, and not a physical resemblance of the entities which the theories are concerned 
(Stein, 1989; Worrall, 1989). Finally, sorne argue that it is not reference which is conserved from one theory to the 
next, but rather bits and pieces of information amounting to an approximate truth (Saatsi, 2005). 
188 
This raises three questions: 
"(1) why only a small handful out of the (theoretically) infinite number of possibilities? (2) 
why the conservative family resemblance between members of the handful and (3) why does 
the strategy ofnarrowing the choices in this way work so weil?" 
(1984 p. 87) 
The realist' s answer to aH t11fee questions is that scientific theories are approximately true and 
therefore no new theory can depart significantly from current theories. 
Altematively, Laudan reframes the realist argument in terms of empirical success: 
1. If scientific theories are approximately true, then they typically will be empirically success-
fuI. 
2. If the central terms in scientific theories genuinely refer, then those theories generally will 
be empirically successful. 
3. Scientific theories are empirically successful. 
4. (Probably) theories are approximately true and their terms genuinely refer 
This argument from the success of science further links to the continuity of scientific knowledge: 
1.Ifthe earlier theories in a 'mature' science are approximately true, and if the central terms 
of those theories genuinely refer, then later, more successful theories in the same science 
will preserve the earlier theories as limiting cases. 
2. Scientists seek to preserve earlier theories as limiting cases and generally succeed in doing 
so. 
3. (Probably) earlier theories in a 'mature' science are approximately true and genuinely re-
fer. 
(Laudan, 1984 p. 220) 
Nevertheless, Fine retorts, instrumentalism can account for these observations just as weIl 
and without relying on the further unjustified assumption that "confirmation is a mark of an ap-
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proximately correct ontology". Presumably, similar theories, used instrumentally, say, as algo-
rithms for generating predictions, will yield similar results, and therefore share similar degrees of 
empirical success. Hence, convergence does not necessarily entail realism (Fine, 1984). 
Laudan attacks the realist argument from a different angle. He relies on the notion that if 
a theory is able to successfully explain, this does not automatically entail the existence of the 
terms postulated by its explanatory models. His argument consists largely in showing that the 
history of science provides a wealth of examples of theories that offered persuasive, yet utterly 
false explanations. Since the unobservables postulated by models of these theories were not in-
corporated in the ontologies postulated by later theories, theories about the same phenomena fail 
to consistently converge towards the same 'ontological picture' (Laudan, 1984; 1996). 
/2.3 Overlapping Empirical COllsll'aillls 
Typically, theories are thought to be similar in respect to their mathematical or logical 
formalism, to the explanatory strategies they introduce or again in respect to the unobservables 
they postulate. As a realist, Boyd has in mind primarily a similarity concerning the unobserv-
ables and the overall ontology of a the ory (Boyd, 1984; 1990). 
Beside the above criteria, theories can also be compared from the standpoint of the em-
pirical constraints they must initially satisfy in order to achieve an initial level of empirical ade-
quacy. Presumably, two theories aiming to explain similar phenomena cannot fail to satisfy 
common empirical constraints. More so, given a sequence of more and more comprehensive 
theories, it can further be argued that in as much as newer theories tend to coyer at least sorne of 
the phenomena previously explained by the older theories, they inevitably have to take into ac-
count identical experimental possibilities and impossibilities. 
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From the standpoint of historical development, it can be further argued that a theory can 
be modified without being completely abandoned. New theories are buiIt from scratch only if 
they refer to and aim to explain radically different phenomena, described in terms of different 
1 
observables. Otherwise, already existing theories are modified by targeting specific elements 
within the initial theory. Theories are often mended and recyc1ed, dismantled in a set of general 
principles and/or explanatory strategies, then recomposed back after adding, removing or altering 
sorne principles and strategies, as dictated the newly imposed empirical constraints. 
The existence of a common background of 'input' empirical constiaints provides a partial 
answer to Fine's objection. Aside the resemblance of theories in terms of explanatory strategies, 
formalism, postulated unobservables, etc., theories about the same phenomena must also satisfy 
common empirical constraints. l propose therefore that a progression towards truth does not fol-
low from the convergence of theories alone - which, as Fine points out, speaks equally weIl in 
favour of realism and instrumentalism - but also from the fact that additional empirical con-
straints are taken into account by newer theories. IdeaIly, newer theories satisfy new empirical 
constraints in addition to the previously established ones constraining older theories; thus, newer 
theories tend to achieve a higher initial level of empirical adequacy than older theories. Now, 
assuming that there are no radical changes in terms of postulated unobservables from one theory 
to the next, then an increase of the level of empirical adequacy amounts to net increase of the 
total empirical content. In sorne cases, this suffices to give a realist interpretation a slight advan-
tage over a purely instrumental one. 
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12.4 Tite Case of Genetics 
An increase of the overall empirical content of a theory is bound to occur every time a 
theoretical consequence given certain hypothetical conditions is subsequently verified and be-
cornes an empirically established consequence that must be entailed by a model of the theory if a 
revised version of the theory in question is to be empirically adequate. Thus, the strategy here is 
to ensure that sorne parts of the theory acquire an empirical significance they didn't have before. 
The immediate objection to this approach is that an increase of the overall empirical sig-
nificance of a theory doesn't target key unobservables hypothesised by a converging pattern of 
explanation spanning several theories. The added empirical content concerns side predictions and 
aspects of the theory, increasing the instrumental value of the core explanatory pattern without 
supporting in any obvious way realism about the unobservables associated with it. In fact, in as 
much as theoretical terms cannot be successfully reduced an replaced by observable ones, key 
unobservables are bound to remain just as unobservable and, in this sense, an increase of the 
overall empirical content of a theory fails to tilt the balance in favour of realism. 
The history of genetics constitutes a powerful counterexample to the above objection. It 
shows that it is possible to provide key unobservables with an empirical significance without re-
ducing or equating them to a set of observable empirical phenomena. The figure below depicts 
sorne of the reference relationships (dotted arrows) between the theoretical terms (orange boxes) 
introduced by Mendel's initial explanation and empirical/experimental observations associated 
with classical and molecular genetics (blue boxes): 
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Figure 22. 'l'he Development ofGenctic Theories 
Interestingly enough, the physical interpretation offered by classical genetics is incom-
pIete and non-uniform. The term 'allelic segregation' is reduced to and identified with the chro-
mosomal segregation occurring during meiosis (the biological process whereby chromosomes 
are distributed among haploid gametes); in this case, a theoretical term is reduced to observa-
tional terms. The term 'fertilisation', which aIready has a physical interpretation, is further corre-
lated with gamete fusion, whereby diploid organisms are generated; in this case, the network of 
experimental and empirical data is extended further without providing a physical interpretation 
and without involving a reduction of one term to another. Finally, the theoretical term 'al-
lele/gene' is correlated, but not reduced to the notion of 'chromosomallocus'; in this case a non-
reductive physical interpretation is provided. Of the three examples provided, only the first 
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matches the classical, logical positivist pattern of verification whereby a theoretical construct 
introduced for the purpose of explanation acquires a strictly empirical interpretation. 
Classical genetics doesn't specify what exactly genes refer to, what they are from a 
physical point of view and how they fulfil the functional role genetics attributes them. Neverthe-
less, reference is not completely absent either. Whatever genes are, they are physically tied down 
to specific places on chromosomes, which they follow through the subsequent processes of re-
combination, meiosis and fusion. Likewise, from the standpoint of molecular genetics, we can 
say that, as a general rule - that is, leaving aside more exotic cases such as developmental proc-
esses mediated by gradients of transcription factors in the fertilised egg -, genes are inseparable 
from DNA. At the same time, it is also the case that the term 'gene' cannot be easily reduced to 
that of 'DNA sequence'; at any rate, it is impossible to derive the auto- and hetero-catalytic 
properties of alleles from the properties of that which is found at a certain chromosomal locus, in 
occurrence, a stretch ofDNA (Rosenberg, 1978; Kitcher, 1982; 1984). 
Even though the physical interpretation hypothesised· and submitted to verification by 
! 
classical genetics is a partial one, it succeeds in imposing a novel empirical constraint onto future 
genetic theories. It became clear very early that differences in the chromosomal makeup of an 
organism correlate with differences in phenotype; furthermore, experiments showed that any in-
terference with the chromosomal makeup of an organism leads to radical changes in phenotype. 
This data served at the time as a partial confirmation of Mendel's conjecture and as a further em-
pirical constraint on future genetic theories: future explanations must take into account the fact 
that the fate of genes and their ability to determine the phenotype is tightly linked to the fate of 
chromosomes. 
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It follows that the above considerations that the continuity from Mendelian to classical to 
molecular genetics doesn't hinge on a reductive physical interpretation, whereby theoretical 
terms are reduced to observables, but rather on something along the lines of 'approximate refer-
ence': it is true that we cannot have alleles without genes, yet it is not entirely the case that al-
leles are genes either. In this sense, many authors like to argue that alleles are 'localised' onto 
(Darden, 1991; Wimsatt, 2006), as opposed to identified or reduced to (Schaffner, 1969) chro-
mosomes and DNA. 
This has an interesting consequence with respect to the realist - instrumentalist debate. 
According to Boyd, the genetic three theories must be approximately true because they conver-
gence towards a common explanatory pattern postulating the existence of something physical 
transmitted from parents to offspring and responsible for inheritance. Against this, Fine would 
retort that this kind of convergence may have nothing to do with the truth of the theories in ques-
tion, as it can also be due to a desire to preserve successful patterns of instrumental explanation. l 
argue that the genetic explanation is preserved from a theory to the next not because it is instru-
mentally valuable in respect to the derivation of certain predictions, but because sorne core ele-
ments associated with the genetic explanation acquired an experimentally tangible empirical sig-
nificance they didn't have before. 
12.5 FllIufamentall's. ll'/odel-Spec~fic Olltà!ogies 
Laudan's objection that science does not advance via a constant and continuous conver-
gence towards the same ontological picture can be defused more easily. Consider for example an 
attempt to extend the genetic explanation to a phenotypic trait that is not inherited, but acquired, 
say, a complex psychological trait. The ontology associated with the explanation would then be 
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false. Geneticists would end up hypothesising a set of genes and possibly a whole chain of tran-
scriptional/translational control as weIl, none of which really exists. Does this mean that there are 
no alleles, no genes and no molecular mechanisms? No. This simply means that there are no 
genes and no definite genetic molecular mechanisms underlying that particular phenotype. The 
general ontology associated with genetic theories is true in the sense that there are genes and that 
molecular mechanisms are responsible for expressing them as phenotypes, although sorne model-
specific hypotheses whereby genes and genetic control are associated with an individual pheno-
type may turn out to be false. 
In more general terms, there is something which Laudan overlooks in rus exposition of 
the various mistakes of science, such as the hypothesised existence of the phlogiston or that of 
the ether. Strictly speaking, the se are not new theories, but models aiming to extend the domain 
of application of already existing theories. The hypothesised unobservables concern solely the 
extension, not the initial, or core theory. The phlogiston was introduced as a mere generalisation 
of the observed fact that, in order to bum, a body must contain or be made of an inflammable 
material. The initial observation is not false. In most combustion reactions, an input of energy is 
required in order to weaken specific chemical bonds, whose final breaking releases more energy 
than the initial energy input. The empirical support for the phlogiston mini-the ory relied on the 
observation that the bumed leftovers weight less than the original body. As we allknow, the 
measurements were hardly accurate. Similarly, the ether was introduced as a physical medium 
for the propagation of electromagnetic waves, that is, in order to provide a mechanical model for 
electrodynamics. In this case, experimental data favoured a very different way of unifying me-
chanics and electromagnetism, namely special relativity. Analogous comments apply to the vari-
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ous other examples discussed by Laudan, most of which amount to mini-theories of the phlogis-
ton type. 
Often times, scientists try to extend the explanations a theory has to offer to new phe-
nomena. Each extension of a theory to a new phenomenon provides a model for that phenome~ 
non. Sorne of these models are verified, white others are falsified. Sometimes, models merely 
perpetuate the core ontology associated with a theory to new phenomena. In the above example 
of the extension of the genetic explanation to complex psychological traits, the model introduces 
new unobservables - namely, genes associated with acquired traits which are of the same kind 
as the unobservables associated with the core explanation. In other cases, new kinds of unob-
servables, such as gravitational forces acting at distance, are introduced in order to model the 
target phenomenon. One way or the other, these unobservables pertain to model-specific hy-
potheses; they are not central to the theory, nor are they in any way permanently attached to the 
theory. 
As discussed on a previous occasion, the falsification or lack of confirmation of sorne 
models does not automatically entail that the theory is false (Lakatos, 1970; Lakatos, et al., 1976; 
Putnam, 1991). That sorne models hypothesising the existence of specific unobservables are fal-
sified does not entail that other models derived from the same theory and postulating the exis-
tence of different unobservables cannot be corroborated. 
In the initial stages of modelling, there may be as many ontologies as there are models of 
a given phenomenon, and the final ontology associated with a theory is bound to change as sorne 
models are abandoned in favour of others. More so, in as much as the models in question are mu-
tually exclusive, their ontologies will also be incompatible. For example, in the case of planetary 
motion, there are several possibilities: gravitation al forces, frictional forces and their associated 
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media, jets, angels or volcanoes, etc. At the same time, beneath the divergence of model-specific 
ontologies, there is an identity of the 'ontological picture' associated with the fundamental hy-
pothesis common to a11 models. In this particular example, anything that might exert a force con-
stitutes a viable option, meaning that the divergence is at the level of individual models, while 
the core theory, the explanation it provides (in this case, something along the lines 'a11 acceler-
ated motion is caused by a force acting on the moving body') and the basic ontology associated 
with it (an ontology of forces, masses and motions) remain the same across all models. 
In summary, the overall ontology associated with a theory doesn't have to be, and often 
just can't be a coherent one converging towards a unique 'ontological picture'. For one thing, it 
cannot be known a priori how far a theory can be extended. And second, it is often the case that 
different preliminary models point towards different and potentially incompatible ontologies. 
Still, despite this uncertain diversity of unobservables attached to each model in particular, they 
are aIl built on the stable ontology associated with the fundamental hypothesis common to a11 the 
models of a theory. 1 think it is this core ontology which Boyd has in mind when he observes 
that, in any given domain of investigation, theories tend to converge towards the same general 
'ontological picture'. 
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CHAPTER13 
_REDUCTIONISM 
13.1 Two Kinds of Reduction 
In the philosophical literature on genetics, and biology in general, the problem of conver-
gence and continuity of scientific knowledge is tightly linked to the issue of redœtionism. 
Nagel (1974 p. 907) defines inter-theoretical reductionism as the possibility of deducing 
the predictive statements entailed by a theory starting from the premises of a different theory. 
More specificaIly, theory T is reducible to theory T'if T' is at least as weIl systematized as T and 
aIl observational statements explained by Tare also deductive consequences of T' (Kemeny, et 
al., 1956). If the theories in question are formulated in a mathematicallanguage, the deduction is 
mathematical, as exemplified by the derivation of Kepler's laws from Newton's mechanics and 
the inverse square law for gravitational attraction. If the theories are not formalised or only par-
tially formalised, which is the case of most, if not aIl theories in biology, then cannot be a deduc-
tion since there is no explicit deductive system allowing us to prove that one statement entails 
another. Nevertheless, we may still speak of a reductive derivation assuming that it is possible to 
replace aIl the terms of reduced theory with terms proper to the reducing theory and show that 
under this substitution the reducing theory can account for aIl the relationships between these 
terms as postulated by the reduced theory. 
In addition to this criterion of interchangeability, which merely makes the two theories 
equivalent respect to their ability to save the phenomena, the reducing theory must also have the 
advantage of accounting for cases in which the reduced the ory fails to agree with empirical ob-
servations or at least provide a more univers al formulation applicable phenome~a extending be-
yond the reach of the reduced theory (Nagel, 1961 p. 136; Schaffner, 1969 p. 340). 
In contrast to the above 'successional' reduction, usually illustrated by examples drawn 
from physics, stands an 'inter-Ievel' kind ofreduction (Nickles, 1973; Schaffner, 1967; Wimsatt, 
1976; Wimsatt, 2006) whereby "reductive explanations are driven by referential identifies or 
localizations" (Wimsatt, 2006 p. 450). The relationship between Mendelian genetics and the 
c1assical genetics is considered to belong to this second category, and is viewed either as a local-
ization of alleles to chromosomal loci (Darden, 1991), or as a straightforward gene - chromoso-
mal DNA identity (Schaffner, 1969). 
Interestingly enough, in as much as c1assical genetics offers a particular physical interpre-
tation of Mendel' s explanatory story, the former can be said to be a special case of the more gen-
eral pattern of explanation provided by the latter. More so, since it is possible to provide a series 
of valid physical interpretations for Mendel's notion of allele - alleles can be associated with 
chromosomal inheritance, mitochondrial inheritance, plasmid-based inheritance, etc. - and as-
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suming, as Nagel does, that generality is one of the hallmarks of reducing theories, we might be 
tempted to conclude that classical genetics reduces to Mendelian genetics rather than vice versa. 
It seems however that this counterintuitive result can be defused if we take into account 
the fact that further investigation can be conducted only in as much as an explanation receives a 
physical interpretation. If multiple physical interpretations bec orne available, then this simply 
means that several avenues of research are open. Conversely, if cut from the prospect of acquir-
ing a physical interpretation, a theory is bound to remain purely instrumental, and therefore ex-
perimentally sterile. Presumably, the advantage stems from the fact that each physical interpreta-
tion renders the the ory more apt to account for minute empirical observations. For example, 
Mendelian genetics can explain linked phenotypes only by further hypothesising that alleles are 
somehow linked via a yet to be defined mechanism; in contrast, classical genetics provides a 
more complete explanation by specifying how alleles are linked and how they segregate together. 
Thus, although an inter-Ievel reduction leaves the door open to the possibility of multiple realis-
ability, physically interpreted theories are typically considered to be a preferable alternative to 
purely conceptual explanations. 
13.2 The AlI-lmportnlll 'iWo/ecu/nf Details' 
Waters points out that, as a general rule, "geneticists did not understand how (i.e., by 
what mechanism) individual genes made their contributions to phenotype" (1994 p. 171). The 
historical development of biochemistry and molecular biology is tightly linked to the elucidation 
of the physical connection linking genotype and phenotype.30 It seems therefore legitimate to 
30 Schaffner (1994 p. 201) makes a similar point about immunology: on the background of Burnet's 'clonaI expan-
sion' theory, the 'genetic recombination' hypothesis further postulates the mechanism whereby genetic diversity is 
achieved. For Burnet, the notion of a 'generator of genetic diversity' is essentially a theoretical term serving an ex-
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conclude that the relationship between classical genetics and molecular biology can likewise be 
described as being primarily a matter of 'inter-Ievel' reduction (Wimsatt, 2006 pp. 450-452). 
In Une with this remark, Hull points out that, initially, classical genetics and biochemis-
try/molecular biology started as disciplines covering different aspects of heredity (Hull, 1974). 
However, adverse to the reduction the sis, Hull further concludes that the clarifications brought 
about by molecular biology specify the causal chain linking the genotypes of an organism to its 
phenotype without directly contributing to the genetic explanation (Hull, 1979). Hence, Rosen-
berg concludes, 
"[a]ntireductionism must claim that there are at least some e.:tp/anations in functiona/ bi%gy 
that cannot be completed, correcfed, or otherwise improved by adducting considerations from 
mo/ecu/ar bi%gy". 
(2007 p. 129) 
It seems that Hull is not against the idea that molecular biology offers the tools required 
to experimentally manipulate sorne of the entities hypothesised by c1assical models and therefore 
offers sorne experimental proof of the models postulated by classical genetics, but he is vehe-
mently opposed to the idea that molecular biology offers a more comprehensive theoretical basis 
from which the classical genetic rnodels and probabilistic laws of phenotypic and genotypic dis-
tribution can be derived as special cases. 
Several authors back up this conclusion by arguing that it is impossible to derive the laws 
of phenotypic distribution associated with classical genetics from the laws of biochemistry 
(Rosenberg, 1978; Kitcher, 1984). Given this irnpossibility, which rules out the Nagel-style re-
ductionisrn defended at sorne point defended by Schaffner (1969), Hull pushes the argument a 
planatory purpose. In contrast, the various hypothesis concerning as to what this generator might be provide a physi-
cal interpretation. 
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step further and dismisses the 'inter-Ievel' reduction of classical genetics to molecular biology as 
'trivial'. Now, l take it that Hull is not aiming here to dismiss the achievements of molecular bi-
ology. l think that what he means to say is that the 'inter-Ievel' reduction of classical genetics to 
molecular biology is 'trivial' in the sense that despite its contribution towards the elucidation of 
the mechanisms behind the auto- and hetero-catalytic properties of alleles, it does not pro vide a 
more accurate or more generally applicable explanation of observed phenotypic distributions 
from one generation to the next. 
Hull successfully conveys the idea that although mole?ular biology has a wider explana-
tory scope which includes, or at very least extensively overlaps with the narrower explanatory 
scope of classical genetics, in respect to the initial explanatory scope of classical genetics, mo-
lecular explanations don't have much to add. The core idea behind the argument is of extreme 
value for anyone interested in the study of the history of genetics. On the other hand however, 
Hull's antireductionist argument is accurate only at the first approximation. The truth is that the 
'molecular details' turned out to be relevant in respect to the explanatory scope of classical ge-
netics in the most surprising ways. 
Allow me to clarify my remarks by means of a simple example. The 'red eye' phenotype 
in Drosophila depends on the production of a pigment whose synthe sis requires a chain of bio-
chemical reactions involving more than one enzyme. This shows that the expression phenotype 
depends on two kinds of constraints: 
a) the synthetic pathways responsible for their synthesis must present and functional; 
building materials, such as amino acids, must be available; finally, the general tran-
scriptional/translational machinery responsible for the synthesis of the required en-
zymes must be intact 
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b) aIl the enzymes specifically required for the synthe sis of the pigment in question must 
be present and functional. 
Condition a) is usually met by default, for any organism incapable of sustaining essential 
metabolic pathways as weIl as transcription and translation is bound to die early in the develop-
ment. 31 Thus, although these fundamental functions of the cell are determined genetically, 10ss of 
functionality mutations in the genes encoding for the basic metabolic apparatus are lethal muta-
tions; since they are lethal, they never reflect in the phenotype of populations and notoriously fail 
to enter the domain of study of classical genetics. Alone, this observation points out that there are 
phenotypes which elude the methods of investigation of classical analysis. SpecificaIly, aIl phe-
notypes that result in the death of an organism before it reaches sexual maturity cannot be inves-
tigated via the breeding techniques proper to classical analysis and that despite the fact that the 
phenotypes in question are genetically determined. It follows from here that molecular analysis 
has something to say about minute discrepancies in the actual phenotypic distributions, discrep-
ancies which classical analysis systematically fails to explain. 
The limitations of classical analysis don't stop here. Even assuming that the explanatory 
sc ope of classical genetics excludes juvenile lethal phenotypes, problems can still arise. From a 
molecular perspective, constraint b) states that a loss of functionality mutation in the gene encod-
ing for enzyme El or a mutation in the gene encoding for E2 or .... or any combination of these 
mutations is bound to result in a loss or considerable reduction in the production of the pigment 
and therefore in a loss of the 'red eye' phenotype. 
From the standpoint of molecular analysis, the mapping of genes via classical techniques 
cannot always pinpoint individual genes. In fact, classical analysis often identifies clusters of 
31 The only exception to this rule wou Id be, say, a fly which has ail the essential molecular apparatus intact, as weil 
as ail the enzymes required for 'red eye' phenotype, yet fails to display' this phenotype because it temporarily lacks a 
sorne amino acids or vitam in co-factors in the diet. 
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genes jointly required for the manifestation of a phenotype. Many c1assical explanations are ade-
quate despite the fact that they provide only a crude genetic map simply because the populations 
used in most genetic studies carry a loss of functionality mutation in only one of the genes re-
quired for the expression of a given phenotype. Furthermore, many genes required for a given 
metabolic pathway are c1ustered together in what c1assical genetics identifies as a unique chro-
mosomallocus and often depend on common mechanisms of gene activation and expression. 
In short, from a molecular point of view, c1assical analysis happened to yield the correct 
answers because sorne special requirement~ happened to be met. The diagram below illustrates 
the molecular explanation of a hypothetical phenotype dependent on the expression of a pigment 
requiring enzymes El, E2 and E3 for its synthesis: 
Classical analysis Molecular analysis 
Parent 
phenotype: 
Chromosome 
pairs: 
Offspring 
phenotype: 
4 combinations 
(x = G E2-GEJ 
or M E2-GE3) 
2 combinations 
classical phenotypic distribution 
(Ex.: ail Nph for F 1 and _ N Ph and _ MPh 
for F 2 => X = G E2-GE3) 
Reduction conditions: 
ln the studied population M El and M E3 never 
occur, while G E/ME2 and G EJ segregate 
together (are 'linked') 
Nph 
~
GEl G E2 G E3 
-" -" -
x x x 
Ü 
GEl G E2 GE3 
GEl G E2 GE3 
GEl G E2 GE3 
GEl G E2 G E3 
(2 3)2_8 = 56 
possible 
combinations 
figure 23. Cilissiclil vs. Molccular Allalysis 
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Mph 
~ 
MEl ME2 ME3 
-v-v-
MEl ME2 ME3 
Ü 
MEl GEz GEJ 
MEl G E2 G E3 
or 
MEl ME2 GE3 
ME1 ME2 GE3 
or 
••• o ••••••••• 
(2 3)2_16 = 48 
possible 
combinations 
Knowledge about the biochemical pathway leading to the synthesis of the pigment has a huge 
impact on the genetic analysis. Since three enzymes are involved in the synthesis pathway, it is 
hypothesised that at least three distinct genes must be expressed in order for the se enzymes to be 
produced. GEl, GE2 and GE3 are identified as the genes encoding for functional enzymes, while 
MEl, ME2 and ME3, occurring naturally or created in the lab, encode for mutated, non~functional 
versions of the enzymes. According to a molecular analysis, the normal/wild-type phenotype Nph 
must have at least one copy of the genes GEl, GE2 and GE3 (in classical terms, the wild-type aIle1e 
is 'dominant'), while a mutant phenotype Mph must have at least one gene mutated on both 
chromosomes (the mutant aIle le is 'recessive'). Consider now that GEl and GE3 are never mutated 
in the populations accessible to classical analysis and that GE2/ME2 and GE3 are located close to 
each other on the same chromosome (they are closely linked, to the point that recombination is 
extremely infrequent). It follows from here that classical analysis, which is limited to naturally 
available genotypes, cannot distinguish between GE2/ME2 and GE3, nor can ever establish that 
there is a third gene GEl also involved in the expression of the phenotype. 
This example demonstrates two things. First, it shows that that classical genetics can 
make mistakes about the number of genes necessary for the express~on of a phenotype. This is 
mainly due to the fact only molecular biologists have in their possession the experimental tools 
necessary to individually mutate, restore and insert genes, that is, to create mutants which do not 
occur in any known population, although they could exist in unstudied populations and can al-
ways arise in any population as a result of spontaneous mutations in the genetic material of the 
gametes. Molecular analysis spells out the mechanism leading to the expression of a phenotype, 
and in doing so it often ends up saying something about the genotype explanation of the studied 
phenotype. It follows from here that molecular biology explicitly competes with classical genet-
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ics within the same explanatory sc ope and therefore the view according to which c1assical genet-
ics and molecular biology run in parallel is false. 
The second point is equally important. By introducing three genes instead of one, the 
, 
fundamental explanatory hypothesis initially introduced by Mendel is not in any way altered. In-
stead, molecular analysis simply ties it down to a more accurate and more detailed physical in-
terpretation imposed by the partial elucidation of the mechanism responsible for the expression 
of the phenotype. This fits a typical, Nagel-style reductive scenario whereby 
1. molecular biology can explain the bulk of actual phenotypic distributions already ex-
plained by c1assical genetics, as weIl as make successful predictions about mutants and 
populations thus far inaccessible to c1assical analysis; 
11. molecular biology can explain why c1assical explanations work despite the fact that they 
where wrong about sorne key element (in this case, the precise number of genes associ-
ated with the phenotype under investigation). 
13.3 nie h,sue ofSimplicity 
A c10sely related anti-reductionist objection capitalises on the one - many correspon-
dence between c1assical and molecular gene. For instance, Rosenberg (1985 p. 101) gives the 
same 'red eye' example in order to show that molecular is "hopelessly complicatecf', while c1as-
sica} genetics is so elegantly simple. Even more perplexing, Kitcher (1984) is deeply concerned 
that "our feeble human brains" might not be able to handle the increased number of genetic 
combinations associated with the genetic maps provided via molecular analysis. Finally, Hull 
(1972) talks about an infinite disjunction problem in relation to the one - many relationship be-
tween the c1assical and molecular understanding of the term 'gene'. 
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This family of objections points out that the c1assical analysis is simpler than the molecu-
lar analysis. l couldn't agree more. In the hypothetical case illustrated above, instead of having 4 
genotypes underlying 2 possible phenotypes, there are 64 potential genotypes assuming all genes 
segregate independently. Things get more complicated, although not to the point that we have to 
worry about our 'feeble' capacities of computation. Genes are not in an infinite number and do 
not code for omnipotent proteins, hence one cannot appeal forever to the argument "we know so 
far that there are n genes determining this phenotype, but there could always be another gene in-
volved". Besides, even if this were the case, our current knowledge of molecular mechanisms 
and their genetic component is not in any way invalidated or falsified. 
Above all, the se authors seem to forget that the results yielded by a c1assical analysis, 
while successful when applied to a given population today, may be completely false when ap-
plied to a different population or even to the same population a couple of years later. When sim-
plicity goes against empirical adequacy, it is simplicity which must be sacrificed, and not vice 
versa. 
Classical genetics defines dominance via macroscopic observations unaided by any ob-
jective standards of measurement. Roughly speaking, a mutation in the coding sequence render-
ing an enzyme dysfunctional is equivalent to a complete truncation of the promoter region result-
ing in a total loss of enzyme synthesis: since both situations result in approximately the same 
phenotypic symptoms, c1assical genetics hypothesises that they are caused by the same gene. It 
must be understood however that this identity holds only in as much as we make abstraction of a 
host of minute variables, such as the severity of the symptoms, the onset of the disease, sec on-
dary complications, difference in response to treatment, etc. A prote in, even if dysfunctional, still 
alters the chemical environment of the cell by interfering with a number of other processes. A 
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mutated enzyme may bind its substrate without processing it, thus competing with functional 
version of the enzyme, as weil as with other enzymes using the same substrate for other meta-
bolic purposes. In contrast, if the mutation results in the enzyme not being produced at aU, there 
is no impoverishment of the substrate. Thus, in this particular case, the phenotypic condition as-
sociated with a loss-of-function mutation in the co ding sequence is more severe than the pheno-
typic condition associated with a truncation of the regulatory sequence. The two conditions are 
very similar, but not identical. Only the more detailed molecular analysis is able to account for 
this diversity of sub-phenotypes. Once again, this proves that the 'molecular details' are not su-
perfluous, but add to the overall empirical adequacy of the genetic explanation. 
13.4 The Jlo/ecular Definitiolls oftlte Term 'Gelle' 
The most serious matter of concern remains however the bridging of the classical notion 
of 'aUele,l'gene, to its molecular homologues. Such definitions are required for the formulation 
of 'bridge laws' or 'translation rules' allowing the substitution of the terms belonging to the re-
duced theory with terms from the reducing theory. 
Falk observes that there is no weIl defined entity that plays the role ofterm 'gene' in mo-
lecular biology. The 'molecular gene' is 
"neither discrete - there are overlapping genes, nor continuo us - there are introns within 
genes, nor does il have a constant location there are transposons, nor a cle,arcut function 
there are pseudogenes, no! even constant sequences - there are consensus sequences, nor 
definite border/ines - there are variable sequences both 'upstream' and 'downstream '." 
(Falk, 1986 p. 169) 
To this 1 would add that there is no well defined set of molecular mechanisms that plays 
the role of the classical notion of 'gene' either. In a recent paper, Gerstein provides a comprehen-
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sive overview of the various historical definitions of the term 'gene', of the problems associated 
with these definitions, as weIl as an attempt to redefine the concept in order to account for newly 
discovered regulation and diversity-generation mechanisms associated with gene-expression 
(Gerstein, et al., 2007). The definitions of 'gene' discussed by Gerstein, as weIl as sorne of the 
problematic unaccounted for by the se definitions are briefly summarised in the table below: 
~:~ !"'::I f" ;f~ <,' .1~ 
\H ",,,, , ..... ,y '(:,~ 
~,.s:.. i:r1"'" 
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Figure 24. The Concept of 'Gene' 
The bulk of the problems associated with the definition of the term 'gene' faH in three 
categories: 
1. Pirst, despite the initial successes of biochemistry, it turned out the auto- and hetero-
catalytic properties of a gene cannot be defined solely as function of the chemical proper-
ties of the material associated with a certain genetic locus. These properties of genes re-
duce to the DNA sequences associated with certain chromosomal loci only in the ex-
tended the context of a general replication & transcription-translation biochemical ma-
chinery. In this sense, Ruse (1971) rightly points out that molecular biology takes a gene 
to be a "functional" (i.e., biologically functional) stretch of DNA rather than just the 
chemical structure and composition of that stretch of DNA. The 1940s definition, 
whereby a gene is a 'blueprint' for a prote in takes into account the fact that genes must be 
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expressed, usually as proteins, in order for a phenotype to become manifest; by the same 
token, this definition disqualifies non-coding DNA sequences, such as pseudo-genes and 
structural DNA. 
11. Second, the general machinery responsible for replication and gene expression merely 
explains how the auto- andhetero-catalytic properties can be realised in terms of molecu-
lar mechanisms. The precise knowledge of heredity as it manifests itself in a living or-
ganism requires to take into account the associated regulatory mechanisms modulating 
the activity of the general replication & gene expression machinery in response to a pre-
defined 'genetic program' or in response to environmenta~ eues. This category includes 
problems related to the various levels of regulation (cell-cycle regulation, chromatin 
structure, transcriptional and translational regulation, inducible promoters, etc.). The 
1960s definition is still the most widely used definition, for the very simple reason that 
the most potent and most widely studied mechanism of regulation is that of transcrip-
tional regulation. The 1970s-1980s definition handles a fairly common mechanism of 
translational regulation. 
111. And third, the heterocatalytic :activity of several genes maps (localises) onto overlapping 
chromosomalioci. This inc1udes problems related to mRNA and protein splicing & trans-
splicing. Gerstein's newly proposed definition aims to take into account the fact differen-
tial patterns of expression of the same genetic 10cusIDNA sequence can yield several 
RNA or protein end products sometimes serving distinct biological functions, and there-
fore are responsible for distinct phenotypes. 
i) and ii) point to an inability of biochemistry to directly derive the auto- and hetero-catalytic 
properties of alleles/genes from the chemical structure of the material found at a certain locus. 
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iii) points out a further complication, namely the impossibility to associate an allele with a 
unique genetic locus. 
13.5 Gene Expres!;ùm 
Classical genetics draws a net distinction between genes (or alleles in Mendelian genet-
ics) and their chromosomallocus (Morgan, 1935; Wain, et al., 2002). A locus is the place on a 
chromosome where the allele responsible for a given phenotype is to be found (Sturtevant, 1913; 
Painter, 1934); physically, this locus consists of a specifie DNA sequence (Brachet, 1933; Wat-
son, et al., 1953). The classical approach remains open to the idea that genes are localised, rather 
than identical to, a certain chromosomal locus (Wimsatt, 2006). The gene itself is 'that which 
ultimately leads to the manifestation of a given phenotype'; in slightly more modem terms, the 
gene is 'that which has autocatalytic and heterocatalytic properties' (Muller, 1951). In contrast, 
biochemistry and molecular biology aim to define the term 'gene' which is a primitive, unde-
i 
fined term in classical genetics as a function of what one finds at a the locus associated with a 
certain gene, that is, as a function of the properties of certain stretch of DNA (Schaffner, 1969; 
Darden, 1991; Waters, 1990; 1994). 
Now, as Kitcher (1982; 1984) remarks, the difficulty of the molecular project stems from 
the fact that the properties of a gene are not identical to and do not reduce in any obvious way to 
the properties of the DNA sequence found at the locus associated with that gene. At any rate, it 
seems impossible to derive the auto- and hetero-catalytic properties of genes from the biochemi-
cal properties of the DNA found at a certain chromosomal locus (Rosenberg, 1978; Kitcher, 
1984; Hull, 1972). 
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The initial ambition ofbiochemistry was to show that the chemistry of the living material 
alone suffices to explain and determine biological function. Supporting this initial ambition, it 
can be argued that, up to sorne point - that is, by making abstraction the fact that replication 
tumed out to be a tightly regulated process - the 'autocatalytic' property of alleles is highly de-
pendent on the peculiarities of the chemical structure of DNA; this realisation constitutes one of 
the most spectacular successes of biochemistry. Schaffner's argument that a gene reduces to 
what one finds at the specific chromosomal locus associated with that gene, namely a stretch of 
DNA, relies almost exclusively on the notion that the 'autocatalytic' property of alle1es is 
granted by the chemical structure of the genetic material (Schaffner, 1969). 
Based on the fact that enzymes act as catalysts in biochemical reactions in virtue of their 
chemical structure (three-dimensional structure, affinity for substrates, etc.), Beadle and Tatum 
(1941) entertained the hope that the 'heterocatalytic' property of a gene can likewise be defined 
in strictly biochemical terms. Unfortunately, it became clear fairly soon that certain biochemical 
mechanisms must be present and functional in order for DNA to be 'converted' into proteins. 
TypicaIly, classical analysis establishes that one or more loci are associated to each 
gene/alleie. It does not follow from here that genes reduce to the said loci. Even if a stretch of 
DNA 'encodes' the sequence of a protein, this doesn't guarantee the expression of that protein, 
and therefore may have nothing to do with phenotypes and their genetic inheritance. In the ab-
sence of a mechanism linking the DNA sequence to the manifestation of a phenotype, a stretch 
of DNA does not 'code' for anything. For instance, DNA floating in an aqueous solution inside a 
centrifuge tube is simply a chain of phosphate-liked deoxyribonucleotides. In the context of a 
living ceIl, there are pseudogenes lacking the promoter region, just as there is huge amount of 
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highly compacted structural chromosomal DNA which doesn't seem to code for anything despite 
the fact that it consists of sequences of deoxyribonuc1eotides. 
In order to be attached to a phenotype, as required by the genetic analysis which led to 
their discovery in the first place, genes must be expressed. In the vast majority of cases, gene ex-
pression amounts to DNA being transcribed into mRJ'JA, the translation of mRJ'JA' into proteins, 
themselves ultimately responsible for phenotypes. Investigation of gene expression at the level of 
transcription revealed that genes consist of regulatory sequences, such as promoters and en-
hancers, and coding sequences, which are transcribed into mRNA and eventually translated into 
polypeptides. Without a basic promoter to which the basic transcriptional apparatus, consisting 
of the RNA polymerase and transcriptional factors, can bind, a gene is never transcribed into 
mRNA and therefore never expressed. Thus, it cannot be the case that a gene is a DNA sequence, 
and not even a coding DNA sequence. At the molecular level, a gene must be composed of a 
promoter regulatory sequence and a (usually adjacent) coding sequence. 
The figure below illustrates a typical case of transcriptional regulation. As we can see, 
without an intact promoter region, gene expression is lost and, as a consequence, the phenotype 
changes. This c1early indicates that a phenotype is dependent not only on gene sequence (the 
chemical composition of a particular chromosomal locus), but also on gene expression, that is, 
on of the details of the 'how' leading from a certain to genotype to the corresponding phenotype. 
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figure 25. Promoter and Coding Sequences wil hill Il Gene 
DNA sequences that do not have this structure are transmitted to the offspring following 
DNA repli cation (Le., are autocatalytic, in Muller's terminology), but cannot be identified as 
genes via c1assical analysis since they don't have a phenotype associated to them (do not have a 
heterocatalytic property). If a coding sequence is treated as a gene, for example in order to trans-
late sorne case of 'dominant-recessive' relationships in molecular terms, it is also immediately 
specified that it is a defective gene in which the minimal regulatory sequence necessary for the 
expression of the gene has been truncated (i.e., the gene has a dysfunctional regulatory sequence 
and there is a functional, promoter-endowed version of it in the population). In contrast, a pseu-
dogene is a potentially 'coding' sequence (i.e., it would code for something if we would artifi-
cially add a promoter in front of it) devoid of regulatory sequence on both chromosomes and in 
aIl the members of a species. 
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The above considerations provide the necessary elements for understanding the standard, 
1960s definition: a gene reduces to the DNA found at a certain chromosomal locus + transcrip-
tion apparatus (promoter DNA sequence and biochemical machinery necessary for transcribing 
DNA into mRNA). 
13.6 Gelle Expressioll: A l'riote Complete Definition 
This definition is satisfactory in regard to most intents and purposes, but remains incom-
pIete. Ultimately, the whole 'DNA unpacking ~ DNA transcription ~ mRl\J"A translation ~ 
protein localisation & post-translational processing' sequence of ,events must be reflected in a 
complete definition of a gene. Note that sorne of the se steps most notably transcription, transla-
tion and localisation - depend on specifie sequences and therefore are said to be 'encoded' in the 
gene, yet none of these sequences means something in the absence of a biochemical apparatus 
recognising and processing them. Other processes, such as differential translation frames or al-
ternative splicing seem to depend more on the stability of nuc1eic acid molecules and their inter-
actions with proteins rather than specifie sequences 'encoded' originally by the gene. 
For example, a more accurate translation oftalk about the TRAIL gene, understood in the 
c1assical sense of the 'ability-to-induce-apoptosis allele located at a certain chromosomallocus', 
in molecular terms is presented in the figure below. The data provided illustrates the correlation 
between the levels of expression of TRAIL mRNA, TRAIL protein inside the cell, TRAIL pro-
tein on cell surface and, finally, TRAIL protein function, which is to induce apoptosis (pro-
grammed cell death) of activated T cells. 
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Figure 26. Causal Chains Linli.illg Genotype and Ph('notype 
Talk about 'genes' and 'alleles' can be successfully replaced by talk about transcription, transi a-
tion, etc.; depending on the gene, the molecular mechanism behind its heterocatalytic activity 
may be more or less complex. Note also that the first kind of talk, proper to Mendelian and clas-
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sical genetics, is theoretical and serves only explanatory purposes. In contrast, the second kind of 
talk is backed up by experimental data; at the very least, by simply examining the figure above, 
the reader will be convinced that the molecular redefinition of Mendel's initial notion of 'allele' 
is associated with a whole network of observational outputs and empirical knowledge of causes 
and effects. 
The above considerations show that the chemical structure of a stretch of DNA is insuffi-
cient to ground biological function; rather, a whole molecular mechanism, in this case DNA in 
conjunction with a whole replication & transcription/translation mechanism and their associated 
regulatory mechanisms are required in order for a biological function to obtain. This speaks 
against a straightforward reduction whereby "genej = DNA sequence/' (Schaffuer, 1969 p. 342). 
The bidirectionality of the equation proposed by Schaffner is highly problematic. It is in-
deed the case that, set aside a handful of exceptional cases, a gene is always associated with a 
certain chromosomal locus, itself consisting of a certain DNA sequence. However, we cannot 
know a priori if a random polymer of deoxyribonucleotides, or even better, a freshly sequenced 
strand of DNA extracted from a celI, is a gene, for neither is necessarily associated with a certain 
allele and its corresponding phenotype. In order to count as a putative gene, a DNA sequence 
must also present certain functional domains, most notably, a promoter responsible for recruiting 
the basic transcriptional machinery (the promoter region) and a sequence homology with sorne 
prote in or RNA known to have sorne distinct biological function (the coding region). 
13.7 Gene Expression Regulation 
Although a key element, the DNA structure of a gene cannot determine alone the pheno-
type of an organism. In order to count as a gene, a DNA sequence must at the very least be able 
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to interact with the basic transcriptional machinery of a cell. However, this is not the only re-
quirement. 
The 1960s definition applies very weB to genes 'coding' for enzymes, structural proteins, 
cell-surface receptors, ligands/hormones/neurotransmitters, etc. It is less clear how it applies to 
what Waters (1990; 1994) caUs "regulatory genes", that is, genes coding for transcription fac-
tors, as well as genes coding for the various protein and RNA components of the general tran-
scription-translation, DNA compacting/uncompacting, post-translational modifications, general 
metabolism machinery. 
As 1 mentioned on an earlier occasion, mutations in these genes have systemic effects 
which usually amount to a unique 'embryonic death' phenotype. Less radical phenotypes associ-
ated with mutations in genes 'coding' for transcriptional factors include 'severe immunodefi-
ciency' syndromes and developmental aberrations. In these cases, the mechanism whereby the 
genotype determines the phenotype is not fundamentaUy novel, but just more complicated thàn 
the usual transcription-translation mechanism, as it usually involves a whole cascade of tran-
scription-translation cycles. 
One of the main differences between biochemistry and molecular biology hinges pre-
cisely on the notion of 'regulation'. While biochemistry uncovers the relationship between bio-
logical function and chemical structure, typically reducing the former to the later, molecular bi-
ology studies the mechanisms via which the biological function of a protein is modulated or 
turned off/on via an alteration of its chemical structure. In other words, biochemistry shows how 
certain chemical structures allow for certain processes/functions/properties, while molecular bi-
ology shows how living organisms literally function as biochemical automatons, that is, how the 
various chemical structures articulate together in order to form chemical mechanisms. 
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In order to understand how 'regulation' applies to gene expression, let us consider a typi-
cal example. The figure bellow provides a schematic representation of the chemical structure of 
the IDB polypeptide (the structure of the unfolded protein): 
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Figm'e 27. The Chemiral StrurtUI'C orthe lOB Polypeptide 
The structure, chemical composition, as weIl as the chemical properties of the various functional 
domains of the protein is determined by means of physical, chemical and biochemical techniques 
ranging from X-ray crystallography to immunoprecipitation assays. Note that although biochem-
istry reveals the chemical properties of the protein, most notably its ability to bind other proteins 
with high affinity, it tells us very little about its role in the actual functioning of a living cell. 
In contrast, the figure bellow provides a schematic representation of a typical molecular 
mechanism: 
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Figure 2H. The Regulation of the 1J B Gene 
Briefly, in mammalian cells, unphosphorylated IDB binds a DNA-biding transcription factor 
known as NF-CB, forming a bulky complex that cannot reach the nucleus. When the cell is ex-
posed to certain stimuli, IDB is phosphorylated. Phosphorylated EJB binds a complex of prote-
ases and is degraded. As a result, NF -DB is freed, can translocate to the nucleus and bind specific 
DNA sequences. The binding of NF -:JB results in an increased transcription of the target genes, 
in turn causing an increase in the expression of certain ligands, hormones, cell-surface receptors, 
antibodies and other key players responsible for a successful immune response. Interestingly 
enough, NF-DB also binds the promoter of the IDB gene, causing an increased production of IDB. 
1 
The newly synthesised IDB binds NF -DB, trapping it back in the cytoplasm. Thus, following 
stimulation, the cell secrets a number of chemicals and expresses cell-surface receptors essential 
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for cell-cell communication, and then the system automatically turns itself off by means of a 
relatively simple molecular mechanism. 
Note how in moving from biochemistry to molecular biology there is a loss of resolution 
in terms of chemical structure details, but something is gained in terms of a 'bigger-picture' Ull-
derstanding of biological function. Ideally, both a complete understanding of chemical structure 
and the wider understanding of molecular mechanisms is required in order to achieve complete 
knowledge. In practice, there is always a trade-offbetween the two. 
Molecular biology shows that biological functions don't reduce to plain chemical struc-
tures, but rather to complex molecular mechanisms made possible by certain chemical struc-
tures.32 ln this particular example, defects of the NF-DB signalling and regulation pathway some-
times manifest as 'immunodeficiency syndrome' phenotypes. In order to understand the genetic 
basis of these syndromes it is not enough to understand that certain proteins directly responsible 
for immunity, such as antibodies, are produced following the expression of sorne genes. The ge-
neticist must also have an overall understanding of the mechanism responsible for the regulation 
32 ln this respect, 1 would like to reiterate a point made on an earlier occasion: ail mechanisms are mechanisms of a 
certain kind. The Mendelian mechanism for heredity is a probabilistic one about mixing particles and then redistrib-
uting them. Molecular mechanisms are chemical; they function in virtue of chemical interactions. Physiological 
mechanisms are classical mechanisms relying on the notion of contact force and the laws 'dictating' its behaviour. 
And so on. It is impossible to talk of mechanisms simpliciter. A set ofrules stating sorne fundamental ways of action 
must also be specified. 
For example, it is often the case that a certain chemical structure, say, a phosphorylated protein, 'means' some-
thing for the overall functioning of the organism in the context of its newly acquired ability to bind DNA (or to bind 
more of the same protein in order to form a polymer playing a structural function; or again, to serve as a mediator in 
sorne signalling transducing pathway, etc.). The phosphorylated protein performs a certain function, namely biding 
DNA, while the unphosphorylated version of the same protein fails to perform the said function. Thus, in this case, 
phosphorylation is the molecular mechanism responsible for the 'turning on/off of a certain biological function. 
Note however that the phosphorylated protein can bind DNA because the negative charge carried by the newly at-
tached phosphate group causes a change in the three-dimensional structure of the protein, exposing a DNA bind ing 
domain hidden inside the unphosphorylated protein. Thus, the biological function of proteins depends on their 
chemical structure and, in this sense, the molecular biologist endorses the biochemist's credo that ail biological 
function is consequence of chemical structure. 
1 make this point in order to emphasise the fact that just as the study of levers, pulleys, screws and other me-
chanical devices is a branch of classical mechanics, molecular biology is a branch of biochemistry. Many authors 
rightly emphasise the differences between biochemistry and molecular biology [see, for example, (Darden, 2006)]; 1 
think however it is equally important to keep in mind that there cannot be molecular explanations in the absence of 
the theoretical and experimental framework ofbiochemistry. 
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of NF -DB. Mutations in the genes coding for NF -DB, IDB, the upstream signalling receptors and 
ligands, the kinases responsible for the phosphorylation of IDB, etc. are just as important as mu-
tations in the genes directly responsible for immunity. It follows from here that, in many cases, 
talk about the heterocatalytic activity of certain genes cannot be successfully replaced by talk 
about transcription/translation alone, but requires talk more complex molecular mechanisms in-
volving multiple cycles of transcription/translation, as weIl as signal transducing pathways, 
phosphorylation regulation mechanisms, etc. 
13.8 Overlapping CllrOinosomal Loci 
In the context of classical analysis, research starts at the level of an inherited pheno-
typelbiological function, hypothesises the existence of a gene responsible for the phenotype and 
attempts are made to localise the gene as a chromosomallocus/DNA sequence. Molecular analy-
sis usually follows the reverse pattern. Chromosomal DNA is sequenced, putative genes are de-
fined by matching probable coding DNA sequences homologous to known genes/RNAIprotein 
sequences and possible promoter/enhancer regions, preliminary research shows that the putative 
genes can be expressed in artificial systems such as plasmid transfected-cells, and, eventually, 
the DNA sequences in question are shown to be essential to the determination of sorne biological 
function in vivo, say, via the generation oftransgenic/knockout organisms. 
On one hand, a gene, as defined in the context of classical genetics, is a chromosomal 
10cus/DNA sequence associated with the inheritance and the expression of a certain phenotype. 
In contrast, many molecular biologists speak of genes while in fact they refer to putative genes 
whose precise biological function is still unknown or in the process of being elucidated (Fogle, 
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2001). The Human Genome Nomenclature Committee definition (the 1990s-2000s definition in 
Gerstein' s list) attempts to alleviate the divergence between the se two uses of the term 'gene' by 
redefining a gene as 
"a DNA segment that contributes to phenotype/function. ln the absence of a demonstrated func-
tion a gene may be characterized by sequence, transcription or homology." 
(Wain, et al., 2002 p. 464) 
The HGNC definition is the perfect complement to the molecular definitions preceding it. 
Biochemistry and molecular show that, in order to result in the expression of a certain pheno-
type, the stretch of DNA associated with a gene must have certain characteristics that allow it to 
interact with the transcriptional/translational machinery of a cell and its associated regulatory 
mechanisms. Hence, genes are defined as transcribed & translated stretches of DNA, or again as 
stretches of DNA participating in a larger and more complex mechanism such as the NF-DB 
pathways, etc. Conversely, if a stretch of DNA consists, say, of a promoter and a co ding se-
quence showing sorne strong homology with known RNAiprotein sequences, the stretch of DNA 
in question will most likely interact with the general transcription/translation machinery, thereby 
resulting in the synthesis of proteins which must one way or another affect the overall function-
ing of an organism. In other words, the presence of sequence motifs provides preliminary evi-
dence that a stretch of DNA is most likely a gene responsible for a yet to be determined pheno-
type/function. 
Gerstein and his collaborators point out that, although satisfactory for most intents and 
purposes, the HGNC definition fails to provide unique names for genes responsible for distinct 
phenotypes, but associated with overlapping chromosomal loci. For example, it was long known 
that the differential splicing of mRNA results in the synthesis of different proteins, which, in 
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sorne cases, rnay have distinct functions and therefore be responsible for radically different phe-
notypes. In order to account for this difficulty, Gerstein proposes that 
"1. A gene is a genomic seqùence (DNA or RNA) directly encoding functional product mole-
cules, either RNA or protein. 
2. In the case that there are several functional products sharing overlapping regions, one takes 
the union of al! overlapping genomic sequences coding for them. 
3. This union must be coherent - i.e., done separately for protein and RNA products - but does 
not require that al! products necessarily share a common subsequence." 
(Gerstein, et al., 2007 pp. 676-677) 
The figure bellow illustrates how this definition would work in practice: 
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Note that the promoter region is no longer considered to be part of the gene. Just as several genes 
can share the same enhancer, Gerstein proposes that several genes can also share a common 
promoter. 33 
J 3.9 The Reduclioll of Classical Genetics 10 
.Molecu/af Bi%gy is Camp/ex, but Ilot impossible 
The above survey indicates that there is no universally applicable allocution formulated 
in the language of molecular bioiogy, that can replace the classical understanding of the term 
'gene'. Based on this observation, Hull (1974), Rosenberg (1978) and Kitcher (1984) argue that 
the transition from classical genetics to molecular biology is marked by a discontinuity that ren-
ders intertheoretical reductionism impossible. 
1 think their conclusion is unjustified. Classical analysis localises genes at the level of the 
chromosomes. Biochemical analysis further establishes that specific DNA sequences are found at 
the chromosomalloci associated with genes and establishes that the chemical structure of DNA 
can account for certain properties of genes. Finally, molecular biology shows exactly hQw the 
auto- and hetero-catalytic properties of genes are actually realised via molecular mechanism in 
the living cell/organism. Since aIl the se disciplines study the same spatio-temporal reality, we 
can safely conclude that there is at least a partial reference continuity from classical genetics to 
molecular biology. 
33 It should be c1ear though that ev en if the promoter regions are ignored in order to simplify the classification and 
nomenclature procedure, a gene does not reduce to a collection of exons (Le., fragments of genomic DNA tran-
scribed and eventually translated into proteins). As discussed in the previous sections, a stretch ofDNA cannot func-
tion as a gene in the absence of a minimal transcription/translation machinery with which it must be able to interact 
via the promoter and enhancer sequences. Thus, whether the promoter/enhancer regions play a role in the classifica-
tion and naming of genes, they are absolutely required for the molecuJar explanation of the heterocatalytic activity 
of genes, and therefore must be taken into account in a complete definition of the term 'gene'. 
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As a general ruie, reference continuity is not a matter of dispute between reductionists 
and anti-reductionists; 1 mention it only to defuse possible charges of reference incommensura-
bility. The first point of debate is whether classical genetics and molecular biology investigate 
different aspects of the same phenomena. It is question here of establishing whether there is a 
theoretical connection between the two disciplines in addition to mere reference continuity. 
There are at least two good reasons to suspect that theré is a tight theoretical relationship 
between classical genetics and molecular biology. First, the constant updating of the definition of 
'gene' indicates that molecular biologists deploy relentless efforts to preserve the continuity be-
tween classical genetics and molecular biology. The presence of such efforts is inconsistent with 
the view that that molecular biology replaced, in a non-reductive sense, classical genetics. Sec-
ond, 1 showed how the so-called 'molecular details' play a role in determining the genotype of an 
organism; this refutes the view that molecular biology and classical genetics have mutually ex-
clusive explanatory scopes. 
This brings us to the core of the debate. If there is a theoretical relationship between clas-
sical genetics and molecular biology, does this relationship amount to a reduction? Hull argues 
that reductionism is impossible because there is no simple, one-to-one relationship between clas-
sical and the molecular terms: 
"Phenomena characterized by a single Mendelian predicate term can be reproduced by several 
types of molecu/ar mechanisms [. . .} converse/y, the same type of molecular mechanism can 
produce phenomena that must be characterized by difJerent Mendelian predicate terms." 
"To convert these many-many relations into the necessary one-one or many-one relations lead-
ing from molecular to Mendelian lerms, Mendelian genetics must be modified extensively. Two 
problems then arise the justification for terming these modifications 'corrections' and the 
transition from MJndelian to mo/ecular genetics 'reduction' rather than 'replacement '. " . 
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(Hull, 1974 pp. 39,43) 
Part of the argument is that different kinds of molecular mechanisms explain the same 
classical notion of 'heterocatalytic' activity of genes (i.e., gene expression/regulation). This is 
true, but also irrelevant to the issue of reductionism. AU that matters is that talk about the 'het-
erocatalytic' activity of genes can be successfuUy replaced by talk about molecular mechanisms 
without any loss, and often with a net gain of explanatory power. Even assuming that each indi-
vidual instance of the term 'gene' in classical explanations corresponds to a different molecular 
mechanism, in as much as the sum total of classical explanations postulates a finite number of 
genes, to this finite number of genes corresponds an equally finite number of molecular mec ha-
nisms. The absence of a simple algorithm for converting talk about genes/alleles into talk about 
molecular mechanisms pertains to a technical difficulty, not to an impossibility ofprinciple. 
In fact, the reduction of classical genetics to molecular biology may not ev en be as com-
plex as anti-reductionists like to believe. Most anti-reductionists fail to realise that despite their 
diversity, aU molecular mechanisms consist of combinations between a handful of simpler sub-
mechanisms such as transcription, translation, phosphorylation, etc. This suffices to defuse the 
misconceived idea that molecular biology introduces an indefinitely large number of explanatory 
strategies, each hypothesising a distinct kind of mechanism. In truth, molecular biology relies on 
a very limited number of basic explanatory mechanisms, which it combines as needed in order to 
provide a huge diversity ofhigher-level mechanisms (Darden, 2002; Darden, et al., 2002). 
The second half of Hull's argument states that the same kind of molecular mechanisms 
must sometimes be translated by different classical terms. For instance, ifwe equate the molecu-
lar understanding of the term 'gene' to 'transcribed & translated piece of chromosomal DNA', 
then it can be argued that the same mechanism of transcription/translation results in the synthe sis 
of proteins, yet mutation in one protein is 'dominant', while a similar mutation in the other pro-
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tein is 'recessive'. Note however that the argument hinges on the implicit assumption that the 
molecular definition of 'gene' must be relatively rigid. Thus framed, half of Hull's argument 
goes head against the other half of his two-part argument. If we agree that the unique classical 
term 'gene' relates to a variety of molecular mechanisms, then the molecular biologist is free to 
further investigate and find out whether there is sorne minute molecular difference between the 
two cases that may explain the results of the classical analysis. In this case, the divergence may 
be eliminated by elucidating·the mode of action of the prote in in question (say, the first mutation 
may increase the affinity of some enzyme for its substrate, which would thus bind aB the avail-
able substrate and render it unavailable for the 'wild-type' version of the enzyme; in contrast, the 
second mutation may render an enzyme totally incapable to bind its substrate, which can be 
processed by the non-mutated enzyme). Hull's argument works only if there are documented 
cases where mechanistic differences were not found despite the best efforts o(molecularbiolo-
gists to understand the preliminary data provided by classical analysis. To my best knowledge, 
h 34 there are not suc cases. 
I conclude therefore that the argument from the absence of a one-to-one relationship be-
tween the classical and molecular understandings of the term 'gene' does not prove the impossi-
bility of reduction. Instead, it simply points to a technical difficulty due to its inherent complex-
ity. 
34 Outside the narrower issue of the reduction of classical genetics to molecular biology, it can be argued that certain 
biological functions and phenomena cannot be reduced to molecular explanations. According to Kitcher (1999), 
natural selection would be a good candidate. Following Lewontin and Levins (1985), Rosenberg (2007) also points 
out that genic reductionism is tlawed. For example, he argues that even if the cause of haemophilia can be traced to 
a mutant gene, a complete explanation of the disease requires a wider understanding of genetics, biochemistry and 
human physiology. Note however that we are not concerned here with the general problem of reducing biological 
functions to molecular mechanisms or genetic explanations, but only with the particular problem of reducing the 
auto- and hetero-catalytic properties of genes to molecular mechanisms, as outlined in Muller's initial project. 
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13. JO A ... S'impl{fied Approllch to the Retluction of C!assÎcal Gelle/ies to [lJoleeular 
Biology: Differences in Geuo(vpe T.VpiCII/(v Redu!'e to Differences in DNA Se-
quences 
It is interesting to note that despite the painfully elaborate definitions discussed above, 
most molecular biologists continue to do what everybody eise is doing, namely caU certain 
pieces of chromos omal DNA "genes' and claim without the shadow of a hesitation that the DNA 
makeup of an organism is responsible for its inherited traits. The reason behind this widespread 
beHef seems to escape most authors writing on the topic of reduction in genetics. In this section I 
will elaborate on a simplified and yet very powerful approach to reductionism initially outlined 
by Waters (1994). 
Technically speaking, what is passed from parents to offspring is DNA coming from both 
parents and the egg from the female parent. The egg contains the molecular machinery required 
for gene expression and its associated regulatory mechanisms. If the latter were not passed along 
with the DNA to the next generation, there wouldn't be a next generation to talk about, less al one 
its phenotype. From the standpoint of the reductionist project, it is likewise clear that the 
'genes/alleles', as defined in, classical and Mendelian genetics, must have auto- and hetero-
catalytic properties. As discussed in sorne detail, these properties cannot be accounted for by the 
chemical properties of DNA alone. 
This said, it is also the case that, with very few exceptions, the basic biochemical ma-
chinery responsible for energy production, transcription, translation, essential metabolic path-
ways, etc. is highly conserved not only across the members of the same species, but often for aIl 
eukaryotes (Weber, 2005 pp. 162-164). Thus, in as much as the general context of a machinery 
responsible for 'reading' and "expressing' the 'genetic code' is implicitly granted, it is correct to 
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say that what makes the difference between the inherited phenotypes of two individuals of the 
same species, or even different species is their DNA makeup. 
This simplifies matters considerably. If we are interested in providing a molecular defini-
tion for the classical notion of' gene', then we have to accept the fact that there is no unique mo-
lecular description that fulfils the explanatory role of the term 'gene'. However, if we are inter-
ested in comparing the genotypes of two or more organisms, then the difference between the 
'genes' of various organisms can almost always be described in molecular terms as a difference 
between various DNA sequences. 
Most commonly, the biochemical analysis of the material found at the chromosomal loci 
associated with a mutant and wild-type gene typically reveals only a difference in the DNA se-
quence. Furthermore, the experimental manipulation of the DNA sequences almost always estab-
lishes that the phenotype changes from wild-type to mutant or vice versa by making the appro-
priate changes in the DNA sequence. But if genes change as dictated by their associated DNA 
sequence, then not only the difference between the two genes localises at the level of point muta-
tions, deletions or insertions in their DNA sequence, but it genuinely reduces to the said muta-
tions, deletions or insertions. 
There is therefore a clear sense in which classical genetics reduces to molecular biology. 
Note that this is not sorne lateral approach to genetics. This is the sense in which genetics is un-
derstood as a branch of medicine. What a clinical geneticist does most of the time is compare 
genotypes and their relation to phenotypes. In respect to clinical applications and counselling, 
this amounts to explanations of the type 'condition X is linked to a recessive mutation of gene Y 
to be found at chromosomal locus Z'. In other words, there is a difference between healthy sub-
jects and patients affected by condition X, and this difference correlates with sorne difference of 
231 
the DNA sequence to be found at Z. The geneticist infonns his patients about the risk of their 
progeny being affected by condition X given the presence of a mutant version of gene Y in one or 
both of the parents, or given the incidence of the condition in the family, etc. The molecular bi-
ologist hypothesises, and then verifies in cellular and animal models, that if the DNA sequence 
found at Z is restored back to the wild-type version of Y, condition X is eradicated. For those un-
familiar with the concept, this is the basic principle behind gene therapy. 
13.// The COll vergence (lIld Ctlmillativi(~' of Scientific Kllowletige 
from Cillssicai Gelletics 10 Presellt-D(~J' jl;lo/eclllar Bi%gy 
Despite the complexity issues related to the molecular definition of 'gene', there is an ex-
tensive overlap between classical genetics and molecular biology, where molecular biology suc-
ceeds in explaining most of what classical genetics explains while adding an increased degree of 
empirical adequacy, experimental control and overall degree of confinnation: 
Convergence and cumulativity 
more complex model 
(molecular analysis) 
CONFIRMATION 
handles exceptions 
(explanalion of sub -phenotypes, 
full experimenlal control) 
EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY 
similar degree of 
approximation of 
intended empiricallaws 
(phenotypic frequency) 
CONFIRMATION 
physicallnterpretation 
(alleles are located at 
specific loci on 
Figure 30. The Convergence and Continuity of Genl'lk Theories 
The dual effect of convergence and cumulativity is demonstrated by the possibility to reduce 
classical analysis to molecular analysis and by the fact that differences of genotype typically re-
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duce to differences of DNA makeup strongly suggests that classical genetics reduces to molecu-
lar biology. 
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CHAPTER14 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
TO THE EMPIRICAL AUEQUACY OF SCIENTIFIC 
EXPLANATIONS 
14.1 The Realism - Alltil'ealÎsm Spectrum 
Strictly speaking, the assumption that terms like 'allele' and 'segregation' refer does not 
contribute significantly to Mendel's initial explanation. Nevertheless, this assumption shaped the 
subsequent development of the theory and channelled the investigation on issues that are mean-
ingless from an instrumentalist point of view. Thus, ev en if a theory in particular may allow for 
an instrumentalist interpretation, the subsequent development of the theory may deny it. 
If instrumentalism is not a serious issue in this particular field of investigation, things are 
quite different when it cornes to epistemology. The first thing worth noting is that epistemology 
allows for many degrees of confirmation, as weIl as truth approximation, in addition to plain 
truth. As a consequence, epistemological realism and antirealism range towards the two extremes 
of a relatively wide spectrum of intermediate positions: 
instrumentalism 
(semantic antirealism) various degrees of confirmation truth 
iii ~ 
Antirealism e··············---""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""~~ Realism 
empirical adequacy 
(epistemological antirealism) 
inference and/or 
verisim ilitude 
Figure 3 t. The Realîsm - Antirealism Spectnlln 
On the above spectrum, realists tend to defend at least the possibility of inference, that is, the 
possibility to conclude that a model is true because sorne elements it postulates are confirmed in 
experience. At the other end of the spectrum, antirealists tend to de fend at least sorne form of 
epistemological antirealism. 
This leaves us with the obvious question: "ls currently available confirmation enough to 
conclude, predict or reasonably expect realism?" Part of the answer must have something to do 
with the fact that, throughout the historical development of a theory, model or explanation there 
is a constant shift from empirical adequacy towards higher degrees of confirmation. Explanatory 
stories that don't shi ft towards the realist end of the spectrum are not necessarily abandoned, yet 
they invariably retain the lower status of possible routes of investigation in comparison with the 
higher status of acceptance associated with explanatory stories that receive sorne amount of con-
firmation (Lakatos, 1970; Laymon, 1984). The other part of the answer must have something to 
do with the possibility of inferring truth from partial confirmation. The traditional HD/DN ap-
proaches (Popper, 1959; 1965; Hempel, 1945; Hempel, et al., 1965), as weIl as abductive ac-
counts allow for su ch inferences (Maxwell, 1962; Smart, 1963; Psillos, 1999), while similarity-
based accounts allow a model to be truthful about a target phenomenon only in as much as indi-
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vidual elements of the model resemble individual aspects of the target phenomenon (Hesse, 
1966; van Fraassen, 1980; Giere, 1988; 2004). 
14.2 Constructive Empiricism 
Van Fraassen argues that a distinction must be made between strictly empirical data and 
the further conceptual structure unifying empirical data into a larger theoretical structure. For 
example, in the case of celestial mechanics, we are told that observed or apparent motion 
amounts to "relational structures defined by measuring relative distances, time intervals, and 
angles of separation". It is only to these observables that we have direct epistemic access. In 
contrast, for Newton "bodies are located in absolute space, in which they have real or absolute 
motions". Absolute space and absolute motion are unobservables postulated by Newtonian me-
chanics. Nevertheless, within a Newtonian model of celestial motion "we can define structures 
that are meant to be exact rejlections of those appearances, and are [ ... ] identifiable as difJer-
ences between true motions" (1980 p. 45). It is in virtue of this identity or isomorphism between 
actual appearances and structures within the model that Newton' s mechanical theory can claim 
empirical adequacy. 
The constructive empiricist approach can be applied to other disciplines as weIl, in par-
ticular to genetics and biology. As Johannsen (Johannsen, 1909; Roll-Hansen, 1989; Rhein-
berger, 2000) seems to have realised with a surprising clarity, Mendel's genetic explanation con-
sists of two distinct stories: a smaller, empirical story conceming the frequency of phenotypes, 
and a bigger, explanatory one about the segregating alleles. The bigger story contains the smaller 
story; conversely, the smaller story is - to use van Fraassen's terminology (van Fraassen, 1980; 
1989) - 'embedded' in the bigger story. One is part of the other. Unfortunately, if we know the 
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smaller story to be empirically true, we cannot say the same about the bigger story. The bigger 
story doesn't contradict the smaller story and in this sense it saves the empirical content of the 
latter, yet its own contribution towards explanation remains purely theoretical. 
The diagram below summarises the main idea behind constructive empiricism: 
Semantic accounts 
Theory 
(axioms, set of equations, 
etc.) 
Satisfaction 
Model 
(unquantified propositions, 
solutions, idealisations, etc.) 
Isomorphism, 
similanty, etc. 
Empirical 
description 
Constructive empiricism 
Theory 
(axioms) l Satisfaction 
figure 32. Constrllctive Empiricism 
Given the antecedent provided by such examples, van Fraassen pushes the argument a 
step further and concludes that the aim of science is to provide empirically adequate explanatory 
stories: 
"Science aims ta give us thearies which are empirically adequate; and acceptance af a theary 
invalves as belief anly that if is empirically adequate." 
(1980 p. 12) 
In his more recent writings, van Fraassen adopts a less ambitious formulation, according to 
which science could be just as intelligible and successful without further assuming that it suc-
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ceeds in ascertaining truth about its theories, models and explanations. Under this weaker formu-
lation, constructive empiricism c1aims to portray an equally viable alternative to science rather 
than science as it is actually practiced (van Fraassen, 1994; van Fraassen, et al., 1997). 
14.3 Direct ObservlIbility 
The epistemological antirealism associated with constructive empiricism stems, in part, 
from the premise of a rigid distinction between 'observable' and 'theoretical' terms. Van Fraas-
sen proposes that an entity is observable in fact or in principle if and only if observers can or 
could perceive it by unaided senses (van Fraassen, 1980 p. 16). In the case of genetics, this 
means that, irrespective of the experimental control and technological advances in terms of diag-
nosis and therapy brought about by molecular analysis, the genes and other entities associated 
with molecular mechanisms are bound to remain unobservable because, in aIl probability, there 
will never be nano-scientists observing directly these microscopic entities. 
This conception of positivist descent was and still is heavily criticised (Hempel, 1965; 
Maxwell, 1962; Hacking, 1984; Chuichland, 1985; Salmon, 1985; Menuge, 1995; Psillos, 1999). 
Here are sorne common matters of concern: 
First, it has been noted that van Fraassen's criterion of observability presupposes that new 
evidence can never raise the probability of t-assertions (Psillos, 1999 pp. 187-188). This presup-
position is untenable, especially if applied to models and explanations. An explanation, such as 
Mendel' s genetic explanation of inheritance, is constructed in such as way as to entail an empiri-
cally adequate phenotypic distribution of the offspring. In the context of a Bayesian account of 
confirmation, the initial empirical adequacy of the explanation ensures that the explanation has 
non-zero prior probability. Further evidence, such as Griffith's discovery of the 'transforming 
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principle' raises the probability of Mendel's initial hypothesis that material 'elements' are trans-
mitted form parents to offspring and are responsible for the phenotype ofthe latter (Avery, et al., 
1944). It seems therefore reasonable to assume that hypotheses containing unobservables are 
confirmed the same way as hypotheses formulated only in terms of observables. 
Van Fraassen (1985 p. 253) claims that "experience can give us iriformation only about 
what is both observable and actual". But, as Rosen (1994) observes, 'observability' itself is a 
modal property. Since van Fraassen (1980 pp. 59-60) professes agnosticism about mo-
dal/dispositional facts, which he distinguishes from direct observations, it is not clear how it is 
possible to ascertain observability in the first place. Even if 'observability' is operationalised by 
correlating it with the presence of certain observable properties, there is no stable vocabulary of 
strictly observable terms. 'Red' is directly observable in reference to cars, but not in refererice to 
blood cells. This raises questions as to what kind of things and properties are directly observable 
(Maxwell, 1962). AIso, the notion that instrument-based observation is weaker than direct obser-
vation because we must further assume that the instrument of observation is reliable does not 
stand, for the same requirement applies to direct sense observation: the observer must not be 
blind, drugged, etc. (Menuge, 1995). Thus, there is a sense in which even direct observational 
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data is conditional to a certain kind of experiment. 
Finally, van Fraassen' s criterion for distinguishing what is observable in principle re-
mains quite vague. Our conception of what is possible in principle depends on our past experi-
ence and our CUITent understanding of the world; to use Hempel's terminology, it hinges on the 
notion of 'nomological possibility' (Hempel, 1965; Hempel, et al., 1965). For example, it is not 
aIl that clear why there cannot be nano-observers, nor is it in any way clear how CUITent theories 
in physics and astronomy allow for an observer travel to other end of the Solar System in order 
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to directly observe the satellites of Satum or to the other end of the universe in order to directly 
observe a quasar (Psillos, 1999 p. 190). 
14.4 Ohsen'{ItÎonal vs. Experimelltal Data 
The above objections to constructive empiricism are certainly damaging, yet they remain 
insufficient. Van Fraassen has a 'secret weapon' so to speak, a far-reaching argument that must 
be carefully considered, as it targets a key piece of scientific reasoning. 
Van Fraassen backs up his agnostic position by making a sharp distinction between direct 
observation and experimental data. The argument is that experiments provide a fundamentally 
different kind of information about the world, not to be put on the same level as strict observa-
tional data. In relation to Newtonian mechanics, van Fraassen argues that 
"[i]n the context of that theory, and arguably in al! of classical physics, al! measurements are 
reducible to series ofmeasurements oftime and position. Hence let us designate as basic ob-
servables al! qualities which are functions of time and position alone. These include velocity 
and acceleration, relative distances and angles of separation - al! quantities used, for exam-
pie, in reporting the data astronomy pro vides for the celestial mechanics. They do not include 
mass, force, momentum, kinetic energy." 
On the background of this general distinction between observables and unobservables, van 
Fraassen further exemplifies the status of inertial mass: 
"ifwe postulate wilh Newton that every body has a mass, then mass is not definable in terms 
of the basic observables (not even if we add force). For, consider, as simplest example, a 
(model ofmechanics in which a) given particle has constant velocity throughout ils existence. 
We deduce, within the theory, that the total force on it equals zero throughout. But every 
value for its mass is compatible with this information." 
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" In order to determine the mass of a particle, a force must be applied on the particle; only then its 
mass is determined. This kind of concerns suggests the following conclusion: 
"the core behind them [definitions ofmass] is that mass is experimentally accessible, that is, 
there are situations in which the data about basic observables, plus hypotheses about forces 
and Newton 's laws, allow us to calculate the mass. We have here" a counterfactual: if two 
bodies were brought near a third body in turn, they would exhibit difJerent accelerations. 
But, as the example shows, there are models ofmechanics - that is, worlds allowed as possi-
ble by this theory - in which a complete specification of the basic observables does not allow 
to determine the values of ail the other quantities. The same observable phenomena equally 
fit more than one distinct model of the theory. (Remember that empirical adequacy concerns 
actually phenomena: what happens, and not, what would happen under difJerent circum-
stances). " 
(1980 pp. 59-60) 
/4.5 ,Hodal & Disposition al Properties 
Stripped from its counterfactual formulation, van Fraassen's argument states that experi-
mental knowledge is not about the studied objects or phenomena, but about their behaviour in 
'contrived' or 'artificial' circumstances. This indicates that experimental data is not about prop-
erties of objects or phenomena, but about properties of larger experimental contexts in which 
these objects or phenomena are considered. In tum, this distinction further suggests that experi-
mental data may not contribute to the total empirical adequacy of a model aiming to explain a 
naturally -occurring phenomenon. 
Van Fraassen's insight is quite powerful. Experimental properties of an object or phe-
nomenon can be said to be dispositional in nature. For example, in light of van Fraassen's analy-
sis, it can be concluded that mass is a dispositional property of physical bodies that manifests 
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itself only when a force is applied onto the bodies in question. According to most analyses of 
dispositionality, dispositions are hypothetical properties making an implicit reference to a coun-
terfactual state of affairs (Prior, 1982). Hence, in as much as talk about the experimental proper-
ties of an object considered outside the experimental context responsible for rendering these 
properties manifest is bound to refer to counterfactual states of affairs, it seems that van Fraassen 
is justified to conclude that experimental data does not contribute to the empirical adequacy of 
explanations concerning the actual state of the object. 
Another point of interest to the issue pertains to the fact that many scientific models and 
explanations point to the 'possible' rather than the 'actual' mechanisms or structures underlying 
the empirical manifestation of the phenomenon under study. Many successful and fairly well 
confirmed explanations show how lab-produced phenomena relate to certain underlying mec ha-
nisms and structures; since the lab conditions are realised in naturally-occurring phenomena, sci-
entists hypothesise that it is physically possible, and even probable, that the same mechanisms 
and structures underling the lab-produced phenomena are responsible for determining the natu-
rally-occurring phenomena. Note however that even though scientists may know for sure that 
certain lab-produced phenomena are determined by specifie underlying mechanisms and struc-
tures, they are not always sure whether these mechanisms and structures actually determine simi-
lar naturally-occurring phenomena. Depending on the domain of investigation, it is possible that 
the same phenomenon can be produced via several redundant mechanisms; this is especially true 
in biological sciences. Thus, a certain dose of agnosticism seems to be justified when successful 
explanations of lab-induced phenomena are extrapolated to naturally-occurring phenomena. 
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14.6 The Empirical "S'ta tus (~f E:'Cperimental Data 
In the case of classical genetics, van Fraassen's objection would be that there are no 
chromosomes outside an experimental setup involving microscopy. There is a distinction to be 
made between directly observable patterns of phenotypic frequency and the further physical cor-
relation of the alleles/genes with chromosomal loci, which is deemed to depend counterfactually 
on microscopy experiments. Thus, the empirical adequacy of classical genetics is guaranteed by 
direct observations while the further confirmation, in this case amounting to a suitable physical 
interpretation of sorne theoretical entities, relies on experimental data having a lesser empirical 
status. 
The objection may seem sound, but if we look up closer there is something unmistakably 
absurd about the whole approach. If we take van Fraassen's objection seriously, we would have 
to conclude that Sutton redefines the theoretical term 'allele' in function of the theoretical term 
'chromosome'. This is an extremely odd conclusion! It would further follow that Morgan pro-
vides empirical evidence for the well founded of the redefinition of a theoretical term in function 
of another theoretical term. But how can it be possible to provide empirical evidence for a theo-
retical definition? More so, why would one need to conduct an empirical investigation if we are 
concerned only with theoretical matters from the very beginning? There is something incongru-
ous about arguing that chromosomes are theoretical entities because they are not observable by 
the unaided senses. Quite evidently, ev en if chromosomes are not observable by van Fraassen's 
standards, they do not stand on the same level as purely explanatory devices such as talk about 
alleles, nor do they play the same role in the overall economy of the explanation. At the very 
least, we should consider a three-way distinction between observables, experimental data and 
purely theoretical terms introduced for explanatory purposes. 
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Van Fraassen is entirely justified in arguing that we should not confuse properties of the 
observational outcome of an experiment, or properties of an experimental setup in general, with 
properties of the objects or phenomena subjected to experimentation. Nevertheless, 'ït can hardly 
be said that the latter are actual, while the former are counterfactual. Rather, what is under scru-
tiny is an inference about whether the objects or phenomena in question behave the same way in 
different experimental setups. If this is the case, then researchers typicaUy conc1ude that the 
properties belong to the objects/phenomena rather than to the experimental context or the inter-
action with the experimental context in which they are studied. If not, the properties in question 
remain just as empirical and actual, only they are not said to belong to the objectlphenomenon 
under investigation (i.e., that they would have been there in the absence of a larger experimental 
setup). 
This kind of inferences is undoubtedly very important, yet it is not something researchers 
must establish at aU costs, especiaUy in the early stages of a scientific inquiry. At the stage of the 
development of the genetic theories with which we are concemed in this particular example, it 
simply doesn't matter whether chromosomes exist outside micr6scopic observation or not. What 
matters is that a difference in phenotype (say, sex, mental retardation or cancer) is consistently 
associated with a difference in the observational output of microscopy (XX vs. XY karyotype, 
trisomy or chromosomal deletion) (Morgan, et al., 1915; Painter, 1934). Morgan did not know 
and did not c1aim to know what genes and chromosomes are 'in and by themselves' (Morgan, 
1935). For him and his contemporaries, chromosomes were what one observes via a microscope 
after harvesting, staining and observing ceUs in a certain way. In the absence of substantial hy-
potheses about the nature, makeup and biological function of the chromosomes, there is nothing 
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theoretical about observing chromosomes and correlating these observations with certain pheno-
types. 
AIso, given the right experimental setup, the correlation between certain phenotYpes and 
chromosomal loci constitutes actual empirical data. In these specific setups, it is not necessary to 
translate this empirical correlation into talk about genes having an intrinsic, dispositional prop-
erty of being associated with a chromosomal locus. It follows from here that experimental data is 
not (necessarily) theoretical, as it sometimes overlaps with actual empirical data. 
14.7 The Continuity between Observatiollal and E\1Jerimentlll Data 
Molecular analysis further correlates phenotypes not only with a more precise chromo-
somal mapping, but also with a host of other experimental data, such as the results of artificial 
mutations experiments, transgenic/knockout experiments, production of RNA, proteins, etc. By 
analogy with the mass ex ample, van Fraassen might want to argue that this additional knowledge 
is counterfactual in the sense that it de scribes the objects of study as they behave in artificial ex-
perimental setups and does not reflect a knowledge of the world as it is by itself, that is, in ab-
sence of the experimenter' s intrusion. 
Intuitively, there seems to be a discontinuity between the direct, passive observation of 
phenotypic distributions from one generation to the next, c1assical analysis, whereby naturally 
occurring phenotypes are correlated with chromosomal loci via microscopy observations, and 
molecular analysis, characterised by an aggressive intervention whereby new mutants are artifi-
cially created. There is however a partial continuity as weIl. For example, although the mutants 
produced by the experimenter do not exist in the original populations studied by the c1assical ge-
neticist, they 
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1) could exist in populations not currently under investigation 
2) can always occur in virtue of 'spontaneous mutation' (replication and transcription errors, 
radiation, exposure to carcinogens, etc.) 
3) if released in the population under study, they contribute to its overall genetic pool and 
cause a change in the phenotypic frequency of the studied population. 
There is a variable overlap between 'naturally-occurring situations' and 'experimental setups' 
that doesn't fit very well van Fraassen's rigid actual-counterfactual distinction between experi-
mental and passive observation data. 
To use a popular, but quite adequate anal ogy, one of the most common experiments, the 
so-called 'knock-out' experiment, whereby genes are literally deleted from the genome of an or-
ganism, is similar to an attempt to identify the function of the various parts of a TV set by re-
moving them one by one and assessing the impact of their absence on the overall functioning of 
the TV. Since electronics stores don't usually sell TVs with missing parts, van Fraassen would 
say that this or that component of the TV has a function only in the context of a counterfactual 
'knock-out' kind of experiment. Nevertheless, TV sets occasionally break down and, on these 
occasions, by comparing functional and non-functional TVs, it is possible to actually observe the 
function of this or that part of the TV set. What is actual and what is counterfactual depends on 
what phenomenon we are considering. If we limit ourselves to the study of a brand new TV dur-
ing one hour, then it might be impossible to observe the function of its various pieces. However, 
if we study the TV during its entire 'lifetime', the time it works, the time it breaks and the time 
after it is repaired, or even better, the 'lifetime' of the many TVs to be found out there, then we 
can observe the function of its parts quite easily. Seen from this angle, active experimentation in 
molecular biology, or any other field of research, simply accelerates the process of knowledge 
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gathering rather than providing a radically distinct kind of knowledge. Instead of waiting for TV s 
to break, something that invariably happens sooner or later, scientists break them frrst. 35 
Typically, the actual - counterfactual distinction arises only when empirical correlations 
(which may or may not amount to universal and/or necessary laws of nature) are generalised and 
th en translated into talk about entities and properties in order to make predictions about specific 
35 A very similar comment applies to mass. If it is possible to determine the mass of a moving particle only by 
means of a counterfactual experiment, then it must be equally true that in the case of a particle actually deflected by 
a series of instantaneous or sustained collisions with various bodies, mass is actually observed. By considering a 
series of naturally occurring collisions, we find out that the partic1e may collide with perceptually indistinguishable 
bodies, yet the resulting change in motion varies considerably. Altematively, the particle may collide with perceptu-
ally dissimilar bodies, yet the resulting change in motion is identical. To simplify the scenario, let us assume that the 
colliding bodies have ail identical motion, say, they ail enter in frontal collision with the partic1e and always at the 
same speed. Although it would require a significant amount of time, it is possible to gather ail the required observa-
tions from naturally occurring phenomena alone. The results of the observations can be summarised as follows: of 
those bodies that undergo identical change in motion and cause an identical change in motion of the test particle 
following the collision, we say that they have the same mass; of those bodies that undergo and cause a different 
change in motion, we say that they have a different mass. Mass, which was defined so far as the empirically estab-
lished equality or inequality of motion following collision, doesn't correlate with any visually detectable attributes 
of the objects and therefore cannot be seen no matter how hard we look at any object in particular, yet it remains an 
observable feature of a series of collisions. If we look at the overall event consisting of a series of collisions, we 
literally see the equality or inequality of mass; we didn 't quantify it yet, but we definitively see it as clearly and dis-
tinctly as we see motion. 
The above approach is a variation ofMach's definition ofmass: 
"lf[ ... ] mechanical experiences clearly and indubitably point to the existence of in bodies of a special 
and distinct property determinative of accelerations, nothing stands in the way of our arbitrarily estab-
lishing the following dejinitions: Ali those bodies are bodies are bodies of equal mass, which, mutually 
acting on each other, produce in each other equal and opposite acceleratiol1s. We have, in this, simply 
designated, or named, an actual relation of th ings. [ ... ] The ratio of the masses is the negative inverse 
ratio of the counter-accelerations. [ ... ] ln our concept ofmass no theory is involved; 'quantity ofmat-
ter' is wholly unnecessary in it; ail it contains is the exact establishment, designation and denomina-
tion of a fact."( 1893 pp. 266-267) 
In respect to his definition of mass, Mach remarks that 
1) it is purely empirical, and 
2) it is inseparable from a measure of mass, for it is impossible to define mass without saying at least if the 
masses of two bodies are equal or unequal (this second remark eliminates the satellite problem raised by van 
Fraassen: in as much as mass is observable, it is impossible to define mass without determining at the same 
time a quantitative or semi-quantitative measure of mass). 
Given this definition - which, as Mach points out, is the mere naming of an empirical fact - the argument estab-
lishes that sorne particles, namely those actually colliding, actually have a mass. Pretending that collisions do not 
occur, and therefore their mass is forever hidden to observation, is a counterfactual statement. Pretending that the 
universe consists of a single, uniformly moving particle is a highly counterfactual statement referring to a very dis-
tant possible world. Van Fraassen focuses our attention on the fact that during the overall event of an experiment 
consisting in looking at a partic1e in motion, we do not observe mass. However, during the overall event of a second 
observation experiment, consisting of the initial motion as weil as the collisions with other bodies, mass is observed 
and describes the event. In both cases, ail we do is observe. As van Fraassen suggests, mass in not an observable 
property intrinsic to individual objects, but a property of a larger system consisting of colliding objects. However, it 
does not follow from here that the property is counterfactual or artificially created: in as much as the universe is ac-
tually made of colliding objects, there is nothing counterfactual or 'unnatural' about mass. 
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objects or phenomena. In this simple example, for any single TV at time t, we infer based on 
wide-range of correlations covering many TVs observed during long periods of time and/or in 
particular experimental setups that, although the TV is actually functioning perfectly, if sorne 
piece x were to removed, the TV would start displaying a specific malfunction. The original cor-
relations pertain to actual empirical knowledge, and only the further inferences about individual 
units at specific moments in time refer to counterf<l;ctual states of affair. 
14.8 Experimental Data: Actulii or COlll1teifactual? A Alore Problemlltic Example 
This said, there are more problematic cases. Sooner or later, predictions must be made. 
Not only these predictions are dependent on inductive inferences, but quite often they also in-
volve extrapolations to allegedly similar phenomena. As a study case, l will present an example 
drawn from my own research. 
As part of my graduate curriculum, l worked in a molecular oncology lab on the regula-
tion of T-cell activity. It was known at the time that, following direct stimulation, potent anti-
gens, exposure to inflammatory agents, cell-to-cell contact, etc. primary and immortalised T-
cells are activated in vitro and in vivo for a brief period of time, during which they multiply and 
produce a variety of chemicals leading to a strong immune response. After this period of activa-
tion, T -cells die via apoptosis (programmed cell death, to be contrasted with necrosis, or dam-
age-induced cell death) and, as a consequence, the immune response shuts down. Crucial to the 
activation of the T -cells is a dimeric transcription factor known as NF -DB (nuclear factor DB; in 
its active form, it is found in the nucleus where it binds specific DNA sequences known as DB 
binding sites). Various stimulators work via distinct transduction pathways, allleading to the ac-
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tivation of NF-DB. In the resting cell, NF-DB is held away in the cytoplasm by a small protein 
known as lOB (inhibitor of NF-DB). However, when the cell is stimulated, a chain of prote in-
prote in interactions leads to the degradation of lOB, such that NF-DB is now free to translocate to 
the nucleus, bind the OB sequences in the promoter regions of target genes and drastically en-
hance their transcription, process ultimately yielding in the production of the various chemicals 
secreted by activated T-cells. 
Paradoxically, it was shown that NF -DB is responsible for the transcription of several 
genes encoding for proteins responsible for inhibiting apoptosis. Presumably, this up-regulation 
of inhibitors of apoptosis is responsible for the early activation and proliferation of T-cells. It 
remained however unclear how T-cells die following activation. Eventually, it was shown that a 
family of ligand proteins - TNFO (tumour necrosis factor 0, originally characterised as responsi-
ble for killing cancer cells) being the first discovered member of the family - are secreted or ex-
pressed on the surface of activated cells. These ligands bind receptor proteins found on neigh-
bouring cells and cause them to die through apoptosis. Thus, once a pool of T-cells is activated, 
they end up by producing apoptosis-inducing ligands which eventually kill neighbouring T-cells. 
The figure be10w summarises these findings [for a more complete review of TNF, FAS 
and TRAIL-induced apoptosis, see (Baetu, et al., 2002)]: 
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Figure 33. The NF-UB Signalling Pathways and Apoptosis 
In a series of preliminary experiments, a former member of the lab noticed that the acti-
vation of NF-IJB correlates with an increase of TRAIL (TNF-related apoptosis-inducing ligand) 
mRNA. As the name suggests, TRAIL is highly similar to TNF and was shown to be an ex-
tremely potent apoptosis inducing protein. This proved to be an excellent opportunity for re-
search, as it was becoming more and more clear that TNF and other previously investigated 
members of this family of ligands, although involved in apoptosis, are not the most important 
players in as much as T-cell death is concerned. My task was to show that NF-JB activation is 
responsible for TRAIL induced apoptosis. 36 
In order to do so, 1 divided my project in two main steps. All the cells of an individual 
contain the same genetic material. Furthermore, genes essential for survival display little varia-
36 For a complete listing and discussion of the results discussed in the following pages, see (Baetu, et al., 2001). 
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tion from one member ofthe species to another. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that any human 
cell would contain the TRAIL gene and the associated OB sequences in its promoter. Neverthe-
less, in order to be transcribed, the DNA must be un-compacted in the relevant cells, in this case, 
T -cells. In order to show that TRAIL is expressed following an activation of NF-OB, 1 had to re-
produce the preliminary results in T-cells. The easiest way is to use an immortalised T-cellline, 
such as cells extracted from lymphoma patients. Primary cells, that is, normal, non-immortalised 
cells extracted from a healthy individual, die soon after their removal from the body; although 
not impossible, it is very hard to keep them alive in artificial media. In contrast, immortalised 
cells contain specific mutations leading to a loss of regulation of the cell cycle and an uncontrol-
lable proliferation; in particular, they can proliferate in vitro, making them ideal targets for study. 
Figure 26 shows the results in Jurkat T-cells (an immortalised T-cell line). Following 
stimulation with a variety of chemical agents known to induce NF-OB (in my study, PMA and 
ConA), the amounts of TRAIL mRNA, cytoplasimc TRAIL prote in, surface TRAIL as weIl as 
the levels of apoptosis increases. As expected, this increase correlates with an increase in nuclear 
NF-OB, DNA-bound NF-OB, as weIl as the disappearance of IDB. The results were very encour-
aging, but insufficient. The experiment relied on very potent stimulators known to activate NF-
OB,' as weIl as many other transcription factors. Therefore, although highly probable, it was im-
possible to conclude that NF-OB is specifically required for TRAIL expression. 
Without entering the technical details, 1 will simply state that it is possible to create artifi-
cial celllines in which the expression of IDB can be drastically enhanced on command, thus lead-
ing to a complete or almost complete inactivation of NF -OB. The technology relies on the engi-
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neering of a special bacterial plasmid (short, circular piece of DNA) responsible for Doxycyc1ine 
(Dox; an antibiotic) resistance. Bacteria replicate and exchange this plasmid among them, thus 
gaining resistance to the antibiotic. The regulation of the Dox resistance gene ('encoding' for an 
enzyme responsible for digesting Dox) is very peculiar, as it relies on a transcription factor capa-
ble of biding the promoter of the gene only in the presence of Dox. By replacing the original 
Dox-resistance coding sequence with that of a constitutively active mutant of IIJB (in my ex-
periments, a truncated version of the protein that cannot be degraded following T -cell activation) 
and integrating the plasmid in T-cells, it is possible to create artificial cells in which NF-CIB ac-
tivity can be inhibited and restored at will by adding and removing Dox from the cell growth 
medium (this technology is known as the 'rtT A system'). 
There is a risk associated with this procedure. The bacterial plasmid is eventually inte-
grated in one of the chromosomes of the cell. The integration can disrupt chromosomal genes, 
thus creating mutants of various kinds. In addition, the integration is essentially random, mean-
ing that in a pool of transfected T -cells (cells having absorbed the artificial plasmid) integration 
may occur in a different place for each cell. The frrst thing to check is whether TRAIL regulation 
is affected in the newly created T-celllines. In the figure below, the left columns (labelled rtTA-
Neo; these are control cells transfected with an empty plasmid) indicate that mRNA and cell-
surface TRAIL expression is increased following activation of artificially engineered cells the 
same way as in the original T -cell line. This indicates that the integration did not affect overall 
cell viability, the transcription/translation machinery, the TRAIL gene or any of the players in-
volved in the NF-DB regulation pathway. 
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Now, if TRAIL requires NF-DB for its expression (the hypothesis under test), then by 
keeping NF-DB inactive a loss in TRAIL expression following stimulation of T-cells should be 
expected. This is indeed what happens, as shown in the right columns (labelled rtT A-2N04 and 
referring to cells transfected with a truncated version oflIJB): 
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Figure 34, NF-DB Dependent Regulation ofTRAIL 
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This shows that NF-IJB is indeed necessary for the expression of TRAIL. Note however 
that in using a T -cell line instead of primary T -cells, 1 took a risk, namely the risk that the tran-
scriptional regulation of TRAIL may be dysfunctional or different in immortalised cells than in 
primary cells. In order to show that TRAIL is, or at very least might be regulated by NF -DB in 
normal ceIls, the same results had to be reproduced in primary T -cells. In addition, aIl the work 
done so far was exclusively in vitro. In order to ensure at least a partial continuity with 'natural' 
in vivo conditions, it is required to switch to a different kind of stimulation, namely a ceIl-cell 
interaction. This posits a number of problems.' First, to this date, it is impossible to use the rtT A 
technology on primary ceIls; they simply die too fast in order for the procedure to work. Second, 
ceIl-cell interactions are very difficult to reproduce in vitro (in vivo/clinical studies/trials on ani-
mal/human patients are simply out of question at this stage of the investigation). 1 had therefore 
to resort to a compromise. Instead of using the highly specific rtT A system targeting only the 
inhibition of NF-DB, 1 had to rely on less specific anti-inflammatory drugs (aspirin, Bay 11 , 
MG 132) known to work mainly by knocking down NF -DB activity. Likewise, instead of per-
forming cell-cell interaction assays, 1 relied on the fact that, in the case of T-cells, these interac-
tions are known to be mediated principally via specific surface receptors known as CD3 and 
CD28. 1 used therefore antibodies known to bind these receptors with high affinity and cause a 
cellular response highly similar to that of naturalligands of these receptors or direct, cell-cell in-
teraction. Once again, it was possible to show that TRAIL expression is greatly enhanced follow-
ing stimulation ofT-cells and that this stimulation can be inhibited by NF-IJB inhibitory drugs: 
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Figul'e 35, NF-OB Dependent Regulation ofTRAIL in Primai}' T-rells 
l hope the reader can see without any difficulty that my project consisted in reproducing 
the same results, using essentially the same techniques, in systems approaching more and more 
the actual, in vivo conditions of the human body, l also hope the reader can see that there is no 
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single huge jump from one context to another, but rather a whole series of extrapolations, each 
involving a modest inference about a slightly more complex, or sometimes just a less controlla-
ble, experimental setup. Sorne of these inferences can be justified theoretically, or at very least 
are coherent with the general theoretical framework of molecular biology (e.g., the notion that, 
with very few exceptions, aU cells of an organism possess the same genetic material), while oth-
ers rely on brute empirical correlations (the resemblance between primary and immortalised T-
cells, between the effects ofCD28 ligand stimulation and those of the anti-CD28 antibody stimu-
lation, etc.). 
14.9 Experimental Data Îs not IIsed cOllllterfactually mul 
Similllrity does 110t allevitlte the Needfor (AJI1firmatioll 
My study does not show that T -cells actually die in vivo following activation due to an 
up-regulation of TRAIL. Rather, it shows that the up-regulation of TRAIL following the activa-
tion of NF-DB is responsible for their death in vitro and that it is possible that the same scenario 
happens in vivo (i.e., it is possible that the same conditions are met in vivo, thus leading to a se-
quence of events culminating with TRAIL-induced death of T-cells). This is the officially ac-
cepted interpretation of my results. 
Since data obtained in vitro and/or on celllines is not thought to contribute directly to the 
empirical adequacy of models about in vivo primary cells, the data obtained in the lab is not used 
counterfactually. AIso, despite the similarity between various experimental setups (amounting, in 
sorne cases, to material models) and a target phenomenon, it does not follow, at least not from a 
scientific point of view, that what is true about the experimental setups is also true or approxi-
mately true about the target phenomenon. If that were the case, there would be no need for clini-
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cal trials. Unfortunately, clinical trials are still needed, meaning that similarity does not replace 
the requirement for confirmation. 
14.10,lfodeb; Comisting of Il Chain of Dctrapoliltive H.vpotheses 
Now, if data obtained in vitro and/or on ceil lines does not de scribe what actuaily hap-
pens in vivo and/or in primary cells despite an increasing degree of similarity, the reader may 
wonder what might be the value of studies on ceil lines in respect to the understanding of the 
functioning of the human body. In my experience, it helps formulate further hypotheses and 
more complex models. 
Work on cell lines tells researchers where to look first: they hypothesise that whatever 
happens in cell lines also happens in primary cells. In my case, a preliminary justification of my 
hypothesis relies, it is easy to guess, on the fact that immortalised T-cells resemble morphologi-
cally and functionally primary T -cells more than, say, epithelial cells or even B-cells resemble T-
cells. As noted above, this kind of preliminary justification does not count as conclusive proof or 
evidence that the hypothesis is true, approximately true, probably or possibly true. Further em-
pirical research must be conducted, else the project is bound to remain a mere hypothesis, maybe 
a very attractive one, but nevertheless just a hypothesis.37 
The experimental control associated with cell line research is a lot tighter and more di-
verse; in addition, the confirmation of hypotheses is stronger and more complete. Not to mention 
that working on primary cells from the very beginning would have meant draining myself of half 
a litter of blood every three days until 1 figure out the right concentrations of activators and in-
hibitors of NF -IJB, the best RNA extraction protocol, etc. From a practical point of view, work-
37 Sorne episternologists consider such hypotheses to have a higher probabi1ity oftruth. In contrast, scientists usually 
understand 'episternological probab il ity' along the 1 ines of a 'project worth pursuing'. 
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ing first with a suitable cellline was the only viable strategy. Once the research on celllines fi-
nally gave results, 1 was able to formulate a reasonably acceptable hypothesis about what goes on 
in a living body and switch to the rnuch more difficult and expensive work on primary T -cells. 
J 
Similarly, what happens in vitro serves to formulate a hypothesis about what happens in 
vivo. For example, it was hypothesised that during AIDS, HIV infected T -cells die because of an 
up-regulation ofTRAIL. The elements for the above hypothesis were two-fold: it was shown, by 
my study and other studies as weIl, that NF -DB activation leads to an increased expression of 
TRAIL and a subsequent increase in apoptosis; the other piece of the puzzle came from a study 
of a colleague of mine who showed that HIV infection leads to an activation of NF-DR Both 
studies were done in vitro with sorne partial emulation of in vivo conditions. The challenge was 
to show that the AIDS stage of the HIV infection correlates with a massive increase of TRAIL 
expression. This turned out to be !rue and several groups published a number of highly quoted 
papers on the subject. 
Work on cell lines and/or in vitro is the equivalent of a mini-theory subsequently ex-
tended to similar phenomena occurring in primary cells and/or in vivo conditions. Due to the lack 
of a mathematical formalism, most models in molecular biology amount to something along the 
lines of the pre-mathematical 'rock spinning on a string' model for planetary motion initially 
suggested by Newton. It does not necessarily follow from here that these models are of an 
analogical kind. It is not question of determining to what extent two phenomena resemble each 
other in order to conclude that, if a high degree of similarity is established, what is true about one 
phenomenon must be approximately true about the other phenomenon as well [as exemplified in 
(Hesse, 1966; Giere, 1988; Giere, 2004)]. Rather, explanatory models derived from such mini-
theories hypothesise that, just as the circular path of a rock spinning on a string is due to a ten-
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sion force acting perpendicular to its motion, the circular planetary orbits are also due to gravita-
tional forces acting perpendicular on motion; or again, that just as NF-DB is responsible for the 
regulation of TRAIL in T-cell lines, NF-IJB is also responsible for the regulation of TRAIL in 
primary T-cells. These hypotheses need to be confirmed, at least partially, before researchers can 
claim to posses any kind of knowledge about the modelled phenomena. 
The figure below summarises the overall modelling procedure associated with the ex am-
pIe from TRAIL research: 
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Figure 36. The 'TRAfL-mediated' Model ofT-cell Death during HlV Infedion 
The final picture whereby HIV infection leads to NF-IJB, in turn leading to TRAIL expression 
and cell death is still a hypothetical one. As shown in the figure above, the various pieces of the 
puzzle belong to different systems and experimental setups. Only by transgressing the differ-
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ences between immortalised cells and primary cells, as well as the differences between in vivo 
and in vitro environments, can scientists pretend to have a complete, rounded up explanatory 
story. In this particular example - mu ch more so than in van Fraassen's original mass example-
the objection conceming the [counterfactual] attribution of properties proper to one system to 
another system is a mûst serious matter of concem. 
14. J 1 !lolistic COl~firm(ltioli (?{ a Chain (?{ E'(frapo[ative f~ypotheses 
Hopefully, there is a way out of the difficulty. Thus far, researchers have in their posses-
sion a reasonable hypothesis explaining the studied phenomenon: they have a theoretical model 
in which data obtained in vitro (a set of premises) entails massive T-cell death (the conclusion, 
which is description of the phenomenon under study). 
Science is an ongoing process. Given the above model, researchers can design future 
treatments for AIDS and sorne auto immune diseases based on the development of highly specifie 
NF-DB inducinglblocking drugs, as well as various other means targeting directly or indirectly 
the production of surface TRAIL protein. The eventual success of such treatments will confirm 
the whole series of inferences whereby data from in vitro cell lines is extrapolated to living sys-
tems. Conversely, the failure of such treatments will show that somewhere the chain of extrapo-
lations is broken (for instance, there might be anessential difference between stimulation in vivo 
and stimulation in vitro; or it may turn out that primary cells are, under sorne relevant aspects, 
very different from their immortalised cousins; etc.). If this is the case, then what is true about 
experimentally modified cells and of the lab models of a disease is not true of the cells and of the 
disease as they occur 'naturally'. 
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The above scenario illustrates the main idea behind the 'conjunction argument' (Fried-
man, 1983 pp. 244-247). The simplest and most straightforward confirmation strategy is to test 
each model on an individual basis. However, most of the time, the confirmation is only partial 
and the fact that sorne elements of the model are confirmed provides insufficient grounds for in-
ferring that the model is true, most likely true or true to a high degree of approximation. Things 
change for the betler when, instead of having to make a judgement about the truth of a single 
model, it becomes possible to assess the truth of a collection of models cross-referencing each 
other. The moment several partially confirmed models combine together in order to yield new 
confirmed predictions, the conjunction of the models receives a higher degree of confirmation 
than each individual mode1.38 
The figure below summarises the concept ofholistic confirmation: 
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Empirical 
description 1 
Empirical 
description 2 
Empirical 
description 1 &2 
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38 It has been argued that constructive empiricism is incompatible with the ability to der ive novel predictions from 
the conjunction of several models (Psillos, 1999 pp. 205-211). The incompatibility targets van Fraassen 's isomor-
phism approach to empirical adequacy [illustrated in (1989 pp. 218-220)]: the fact that two theories have models 
isomorphic with two distinct sets of empirical data does not entait that there is a model of the conjunction of the two 
theories isomorphic with the conjunction of the two sets of empirical data. This indicates that constructive empiri-
cism is not a perfectly equivalent alternative to the actual scientific practice. 
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Figure 37. Holistic Confirmation of Il Conjunctiull of Mouds 
In as much as two partially confirmed models combine together and entail new, eventually con-
firmed predictions, scientists can conclude that they are on the right track. For example, the con-
junction of classical genetics and chemistry (Figure 22), or again the conjunction of the NF -DB 
dependence regulation of TRAIL mode1 with the NF -DB dependence of HIV rep1ication mode1 
(Figure 36) entail new predictions, derivable only from the conjunction of two theories or mod-
els. In more general terms, given the 1arger context of an extended research project whereby 
more and more complex models are built on the premises of simpler models, mode st inferences 
from lab setups to naturally-occurring conditions can be hypothesised and subjected to confirma-
tion. 
14.12 The Conjullction Argument and Abductive Reasolling 
As a final point, 1 would like to make a link between holistic strategies of confirmation 
and abductive reasoning. It has been suggested that the on1y way to defeat the problem of the 
'underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence' (Quine, 1975; Laudan, 1996) is to allow 
for the explanation itself to decide between equally adequate theories. The argument goes as fol-
lows: if a theory amounts to a body of theoretical statements T from which a body of statements 
about observables 0 is derived, then no matter how much we extend 0 (to include, for example, 
further experimental data in addition to direct sense observations), there will always be, in prin-
ciple, a second body of theoretica1 statements T' which entails 0; the only way to effectively ad-
judicate between T and T' is to assess the extra-empirica1 explanatory 'efficiency' of the two sets 
of theoretical statements (McMullin, ] 987; Lipton, 1993). The conclusion here is that justifica-
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tion cannot be exclusively empirical. Given this need to rely on extra-empirical justification, it 
has been further suggested that the practice of inferring is a reliable form of reasoning conducive 
to truth (Boyd, 1984; Psillos, 1999). 
Unfortunately, the approach is problematic. In order to conclude that abductive reasoning 
is a reliable practice conducive to success, one must provide sorne previous successful instances 
of abductive reasoning. Presumably, these earlier successes are established in light of sorne other 
form of justification, in occurrence, empirical justification (van Fraassen, 1980; Fine, 1984). This 
suggests that reliability cannot be a primary mode of justification, comparable to or more impor-
tant than empirical confirmation. To make things worse, reliability doesn't justify the results, but 
rather the ability of a given practice to yield the desired results. That the practice in question 
aims to truth doesn't change much to the situation. In order to associate a practice with truth, one 
must first recognise truth. It follows from here that truth the criteria in virtue of which we justify 
something as being true are independent of the reliability of the methods used to obtain truth. 
Given these difficulties, it appears that explanationist approaches can work only in as much as 
they make place for a priorism in matters of justification. Despite sorne sympathetic voices 
(Miller, 1987), a priorism in matters of justification is deemed fundamentally incompatible, with 
the standards and aims of scientific knowledge (Boyd, 1990). For the time being, it is hoped that 
naturalised accounts relying on evolutionary-like reliability might provide a way out of this im-
passe (Psillos, 1999). 
The 'conjunction argument' may provide the patch this approach needs. The confirmation 
of more and more complex models constructed on the premises of simpler models retrospec-
tively justifies a multitude of modest inferences required in order to combine models issued from 
various experimental setups. Presumably, once justified, the same inferences can be used again, 
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this time with a higher degree of confidence, as it has been already established that they are con-
ducive to confirmable predictions. 
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Co n clwûo Il 
As announced in the introduction, the primary purpose of this thesis is to defend and up-
date the hypothetico-deductive account of the scientific practice. Although it is tacitly under-
stood that when it cornes to empirical confirmation scientists invariably follow the same general 
strategy, namely formulate hypotheses and test for specific observational consequences, contem-
porary philosophers of science raised a number of doubts and objections as to the logical validity 
and efficiency of the method. The resulting philosophical reactions to this critique turned out to 
be very diverse, ranging from a denial of the possibility of confirmation, anti-empiricism and 
anti-realism, to an exploration of new aspects of scientific reasoning neglected by positivist cur-
rents, such as explanation, modelling and thinking in terms of mechanisms. 
A first set of difficulties, addressed in Part 1 of the thesis, pertains to the possibility of 
distinguishing between the theoretical component of scientific hypotheses and the experimental 
data which often plays a role in the formulation of hypotheses and against which specific conse-
quences of hypotheses are tested. Needless to add, if there were no such thing as experimental 
knowledge, then the whole practice of formulating hypotheses wouldn't make any sense. Ac-
cordingly, my first concern was to defend the possibility of gaining experimental knowledge in 
the absence of higher-Ievel theoretical interpretations. 1 think the discussed examples, sorne in 
fairly minute detail, amply demonstrate this possibility. 
Beyond the mere illustration of the possibility of experimental krlowledge, an effort was 
made to relate it to sorne leitmotifs of positivism and provide a fresh and more charitable under-
standing of sorne aspects of the logical positivist project. Set aside its immense relevance from a 
practical point of view, philosophically, the most interesting use of experimental knowledge is 
perhaps operationally-defined coreference, mainly in relation to its implications for the non-
theoretical unit y of scientific knowledge. At a more preliminary level, 1 also explore the impact 
of available experimental knowledge on the formulation of explanatory hypotheses and conc1ude 
that, in sorne cases, the former posits a constraint onto the latter. At this stage my analysis is in-
complete, and a more extensive investigation of the historical development of molecular tech-
niques is required in order to determine how exactly experimental knowledge shapes molecular 
explanations; nevertheless, my immediate goal was to show that scientific explanations must be 
coherent with a relatively large and quite complex web of experimental correlations which fa-
vours sorne explanations at the detriment of others. 1 think that, the latter, more modest goal was 
successfully completed. 
A second set of difficulties, discussed in Part II, is tightly linked to the issue of confirma-
tion holism. The core concern here is that a hypothesis is usually formulated within a much 
larger and more complex theoretical context to which a host of initial conditions, idealisations 
and auxiliary assumptions/hypotheses are added in or der to allow for the derivation of predic-
tions specifie enough to allow for empirical confirmation. Although there is no general solution 
to the holist conundrum, 1 show by means of a relatively simple example that specifie elements 
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of a model can be confirmed and that it is possible to provide falsification conditions for a given 
theoretical approach, both necessary for successful science. The goal here is to analyse a simple 
study case in order to derive partial solutions applicable to the more complex exarnples. Most 
notably, 1 argue that models inconsistent with the theory but supported by empirical data pro vide 
powerful falsification conditions for that particular theoretical approach. 
On the sarne occasion 1 discuss newer approaches to confirmation, issued form the so-
called 'semantic approach', holding that a model or explanatory story is compared as a whole 
against empirical reality. The idea is to circumvent the holistic conundrum altogether by remov-
ing the requirement of a piece-meal confirmation strategy advocated by logical positivists. The 
semantic approach is credited to Suppes, who claimed that scientific models are empirical instan-
tiations of theoretical structures, and is at the origin of present-day structuralist accounts. AI-
though instantial models are fairly common, 1 argue that they pertain primarily to the subsuming 
of empirical data under a suitable mathematical formulation. At any rate, the confirmation strate-
gies used to justify Newton's gravitational model of planetary motion are not compatible with 
Suppes' suggestion and 1 couldn't find a suitable illustration in the field of molecular biology 
and associated sciences. As far as 1 could gather via my formation and personal experience as a 
scientist, it is virtually never the case that an explanatory story, even a fairly modest one, can be 
shown to share an overall structural similarity with a target empirical phenomenon; rather, once 
specifie elements of the explanation are shown to share a structural similarity with specific ele-
ments of the target by means of a multitude of confirmation experiments, it is further inferred, 
usually as a mere hypothesis, that the model as a whole is structurally similar with the target 
phenomenon. In particular, even though typical molecular explanations rel y on elaborate bio-
chemical mechanisms, in the end it is not the whole mechanism that is subjected to confirmation, 
267 
but rather very particular elements which entail specific consequences in terms of direct observa-
tion and experimental manipulation. As a consequence, 1 chose to de fend a deductive approach 
to the modelling practice in science according to which theoretical models, as they are typically 
used in the scientific practice, amount to derivations linking more general patterns of explanation 
to specific bits and pieces of experimental data. The upshot of this view is that, although it is ab-
solutely true that most explanations in molecular biology are framed in terms of mechanisms, the 
mechanisms in question are reconstructed bit by bit, like a puzzle, via the testing of much more 
modest, very specific and often indirect empirical consequences (or what Suppes calls 'models of 
data'). This observation strengthens my initial claim that experimental knowledge plays a sig-
nificant role in shaping the formulation of explanatory hypotheses. Instead of constructing a 
mechanism and then showing that the mechanism bears an overall structural similarity with sorne 
empirical phenomenon, the mechanism is construèted step by step, via a succession of revisions 
starting from a relatively simple initial scheme and towards a more and more complex picture, as 
dictated by new empirical findings. 
Finally, in Part II of the thesis 1 discuss difficulties pertaining to the realism - antirealism 
debate in philosophy of science. The deductive approach to explanation and modelling defended 
in the second part of the thesis is compatible with instrumentalism. It seems however that the his-
torical development of science favours a realist interpretation. The study case on the basis of 
which 1 reach this conclusion is the development of present day genetic theory. The argument 
rests on the observation that the initial hypothesis formulated by Mendel was interpreted realisti-
cally, namely as postulating the existence of physical entities possessing what Muller called 
'auto-' and 'hetero-catalytic' properties; the subsequent development of the theory consisted es-
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sentially in identifying the se entities and elucidating the mechanisms and modes of action re-
sponsible for their properties. 
Despite the claims of sorne authors, my investigation revealed that hypotheses issued 
from a realist interpretation of the initial genetic explanation were parti aIl y confirmed and, inter-
estingly enough, the physical interpretation favoured via confirmation turned out to contribute 
back to the explanatory story by adding further constraints the explanation must satisfy in order 
to be empirically adequate. This suggests that earlier versions of the genetic theory reduce to pre-
sent day molecular genetics. In this respect, 1 provide a very detailed and up to date analysis of 
the theoretical relationships between classical and molecular genetics. 
ln the final chapter of the thesis 1 discuss a problem that, just like the observational-
theoretical distinction and the holist conundrum, was left in suspense for quite sorne time. Gen-
eralising the principle of incertitude in quantum mechanics, it has been argued that experimental 
data is counterfactual and therefore cannot contribute to the empirical adequacy of an exp lana-
tion. This scientific practice under attack here is that of inferring something about the structure 
and nature of naturaIly-occurring phenomena from knowledge of the structure and nature of lab-
induced phenomena. As van Fraassen observes, strictly speaking, such inferences are unjustified. 
Nevertheless,1 show via actual example that such inferences can sometimes be empirically justi-
fied via the confirmation of consequences entailed by a conjunction of models. The argument 
here is that by viewing science as an ongoing project, constantly integrating idealisations, as-
sumptions and inferences taken for granted into the formulation of more complex explanations, it 
is possible to frame the latter as hypotheses that stand or fall as the more complex models they 
make possible are confirmed or falsified. 
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ln conclusion, 1 hope the present thesis achieved a double goal. On one side, by using de-
tailed examples, 1 showed how the use of the hypothetico-deductive method integrates the larger 
1 
context of the scientific practice. In this sense, 1 depict science as dependent onto the generation 
and eventual confirmation of fairly specific observational consequences, yet try not to faU into 
the trap of extreme empiricism or naive positivism. This is part of a descriptive side of my pro-
ject. In paraUe1, 1 showed how deductive accounts compare with alternative philosophical ac-
counts of the scientific practice and in what measure they are apt to answer a number of key phi-
losophical concerns. This is part of a critical assessment aiming to establish in what measure the 
use of the hypothetico-deductive method supports claims to truth and knowledge. 
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